

Statement by 2nd Lt. Roy Williams (3rd Platoon) regarding action of July 19, 1966

I, Lt. Roy D. Williams II, was on 19 July 1966 the platoon leader of 3rd platoon, Company A, 1/27 Infantry. My mission was to conduct an Eagle Flight to objective one and search and clear this area. My platoon had the entire second lift of six UH-1Ds. We lifted off at 1235 hours and approximately ten minutes later, we were in the vicinity of our LZ. As we made our approach one of my men said to me, "Sir, we are being shot at." I looked and observed gun flashes from the east of our LZ. We were approximately 300 feet over the LZ. As we landed light sniper fire was encountered from the east. I deployed my platoon on line with the 1st squad on the right, the 2nd squad in the center, and the 3rd squad on the right. At this point I discovered that a team leader of the 2nd squad, Sgt. James R. Brown, had received a bullet wound in his arm that, from all appearances had severed an artery. At this point, we were receiving no fire, and I called Alpha 6 and requested a dustoff. I was instructed to move into the wood line north of the LZ, which was the start of my objective area. I swung my platoon to the left maintaining the original formation.

As we moved into the edge of the wood line, I was located 10 meters to the rear of the 2nd squad. The wood line was extremely thick with only two apparent openings. As we moved into the wood line, an enemy automatic weapon fired a short burst. Sergeant Mummel, the 1st squad leader and an AR man, Sp4 Jackson, made a bold rush and a machine gun opened up on them from a distance of approximately 10 feet. Sp4 Jackson was in the head and killed instantly. Sergeant Mummel was hit in the chest and had two sucking chest wounds. This signaled a general fire from concealed positions just inside the wood line. A grenadier, PFC Blevins, got a first round hit in the machine gun position that had killed Mummel and Jackson and we received no more fire from that gun. We seemed to have gained fire superiority and we tried to move into the enemy but were halted by heavy automatic weapons fire from approximately 50 meters inside the woodline. Sergeant Merle E. Brown went in and pulled Sp4 Jackson and Sergeant Mummel back into the paddy. Sp4 Jimmy Allen and PFC Chennault assisted him in this.

In instructed my people to move back to the edge of the paddy, and I was calling in artillery. My platoon sergeant, SFT Allunde, informed me that the 3rd squad had suffered two WIAs and that they were the squad leader, Sergeant Baker, and one team leader, Sergeant Conde. At this point, the marking round came in about 200 meters inside the wood line. I had requested a drop of 100 meters when automatic weapons fire started from my front (N) 2nd right (E), hand grenades accompanied this. My platoon sergeant was hit through the leg and dove over a berm into a more protected location, and I jumped over behind him. As my RTO, Sp4 Clawson, tried to join us he was hit in the right thigh and fell across the berm. As I tried to pull him over the berm, a burst of automatic rifle fire hit him in the back and destroyed the radio.

We were receiving hand and rifle grenades, and I ordered Sergeant Brown to take everyone we could and move back out in the paddy out of hand grenade range. At this time, I received a bullet along the right side of my head and small fragments in the right arm and buttock. Sergeant Brown started moving what he could back, and I crawled about 100 meters into the paddy and positioned my men in a horseshoe formation using the paddy berm as cover. We placed M72 fire into the wood line and seemed to stop a great deal of enemy fire. The M16s had malfunctioned to such a degree that we had none

left operable. A redistribution of M14 ammunition was made and all automatic rifles placed on semiautomatic. The men with M14s were instructed not to fire unless they had a sure target. At this time, several of the enemy was spotted crawling toward us. Approximately 6 to 8 were hit by our men with M14s as they attempted to move toward us. I was barely able to hear and had red dots in front of my eyes so I told Sergeant Brown to take charge, and I laid behind the berm. We received constant sniper fire until the relief force landed, and I was placed in a dustoff. I estimate a reinforced platoon was engaging us.

The outstanding thing observed in this encounter was the accuracy of the enemy's small arms fire and his uniform, which consisted of camouflaged fatigues and steel helmets. The reaction of our men to this was outstanding in every way. Sergeant Brown who risked his life to pull out Sergeant Mummel, Sp4 Smith who constantly engaged the enemy's machine gun, and I credit with 16 kills are just two of many heroic efforts. [End of Report]




Figure 1 After Action Report for July 19 3rd Platoon Map - 1966.

Statement by 2nd Lieutenant Schnizer (1st Platoon) regarding action of 19 July 1966.

Mission: To search Objective 5

First platoon departed division chopper pad about 1200 hours, and flew to Objective #5. Upon departing choppers, I set the platoon with a squads on line, fire teams abreast. Third squad was right flank, 2nd was center and base squad, 1st squad was left flank. My command group (medic, RTO, platoon leader) was in position behind the 1st squad. Originally, we set up along the east-west trail. I then shifted the platoon 75 meters to the right, so as to come to center sector of the area we were to sweep. We did this, I then directed the platoon to move into the tree line and begin our sweep of the objective's area.

The platoon advanced 25 meters. When we received what appeared to be one or two snipers firing at us. The firing came from the right center sector, 100 meters to the front of the platoon. I directed 3rd squad, using fire and movement, to overcome the sniper fire. The 2nd and 3rd squads were to lay down a base of fire for the maneuvering element. As the 3rd squad started, they became engaged with enemy automatic weapons fire. I then directed the 1st squad to advance so as to relieve the pressure being brought on the 3rd squad. However, they immediately became engaged with enemy automatic weapons and rifle grenade fire.

At the same time, 3rd squad had received 3 men wounded, and the platoon medic was sent to that sector. Also, it was reported to me, the 1st squad had wounded men. The medic was sent to that sector after finishing with the 3rd squad. The medic was on his way back to the command group to report the extent of casualties, when he himself was wounded by rifle fire. Seeing that his shoulder was broken and was in a great deal of pain, a shot of morphine was administered. After this, the right flank of the 2nd squad had a man, CPL Thompson seriously wounded. It was a type wound where Thompson was unable to breath. The medic instructed the RTO to perform a tracheotomy and give artificial respiration. This accomplished, CPL Thompson was already dead. The RTO was directed to remain on the right flank and engage the enemy from there.

The enemy fire became so intense I realized we could no longer advance. It was also reported, the enemy was running into the tree line to our right (west) flank. I directed the remainder of the 3rd squad to fall back to the right flank and bend back so as to provide flank security. The 2nd squad was directed to fall back to help fill in the right flank. The 1st squad had 5 more men wounded (including Sergeant Freeman, acting squad leader). They were directed to fall back to come on line with the command group (myself).

During this period of time, air strikes, with jets and gunships, were being called in. At first, they came in from a SW to NE direction. I directed this to be changed to a west to east direction, so as they would be in a better disposition to work the tree line to our front. This was accomplished and the area covered by the air strikes was greatly enlarged.

It was during this period of time we could actually see the enemy and identify them wearing uniforms, steel helmets, carrying packs, and on two occasions we saw radios being carried.

Throughout this time, the medic was giving [indecipherable] assistance to the wounded men. Because the men who were not wounded were heavily engaged with the enemy, many of the wounded had to administer first aid to themselves.

During this time, we were receiving 82mm mortar fire, 60mm mortar, in addition to the rifle grenades, automatic and carbine weapons fire. Earlier, I tried to call a dust off, but the helicopter was driven off by mortar and rifle fire.

It was now reported that a large number of the enemy were attempting to over run our positions to the left and left front. They were driven off by rifle, machine gun, and automatic rifle fire. At this time, I could see three enemies to my front at a distance of 40 meters; two hand grenades were used to suppress the enemy. One more enemy was located 50 meters to my direct front, and was killed by rifle fire.

The 2nd platoon was now landing (1430 hours) and the enemy took them under fire. I directed the 2nd platoon leader to move his element to my right flank since I

considered that to be my most vulnerable area. Due to heavy enemy fire, the 2nd platoon was only able to advance to within 75 meters of my right flank.

I directed the air strikes and gun ship strikes to come in closer to our positions in an attempt to drive off the enemy who was again closing into our positions. This seemed to work, however, the enemy still seemed determined to over run our positions.

During this time, we kept hearing enemy bugle calls.

I then observed the enemy throwing hand grenades and wooden boxes of TNT using all remaining hand grenades and ammo, which had been collected from the dead and wounded, we drove back the enemy who apparently were getting ready to rush our positions from the left and left-center. I then directed the 2nd platoon leader to fire M-79s into our left center sector. He had one round fired, I then adjusted 2 more rounds to where I considered them to do the most good.

The 2nd platoon at this time was about 100-150 meters to my direct rear.

Because we had no more ammo, hand grenades, M-79 ammo, ammo for the automatic rifles, and since all three machine guns had been destroyed and that we had only one rifle which was able to fire one round at a time; I then directed the following air strikes to come in even closer. Realizing that the next air strikes would be on top of our positions, I directed the platoon to get ready to move back to the 2nd platoon's positions. Each person, that was able to, was to assist wounded personal. We then waited for the gun ships. I observed them coming in for their strike. As soon as the gun ships started firing, I ordered the platoon to fall back.

At this time, altogether, there were 8 (including myself) unhurt, and we moved back 11 wounded.

This maneuver was successful. We came back to the 2nd platoon's area, and took up firing positions using what weapons we could find from their wounded. We waited about 15 minutes before we observed a flight of choppers coming from the south to get us out. Air strikes were still working the area. The choppers managed to come in very close to our positions. Under a heavy volume of enemy fire, we assisted wounded into the choppers, then extracted ourselves.

Two of my men, PFC Brewington and Rosado, who up to this time were unhurt, were killed by rifle fire and rifle grenade fire in attempting to help wounded personnel into the choppers.

The choppers lifted us back to base camp, time, approximately 1700 hours.

COMMENTS:

As for my platoon in general, at no time did anyone panic or run away. They obeyed all orders without hesitation. Everyone realized that we were in a tight situation, and that there was nothing we could do but fight our way out. All of the wounded remained cool and continued to fight as best they could. I never heard of one of the wounded complain. PFC McIntosh, although wounded in the head by an enemy bullet, he still stayed on his weapon and was able to engage the enemy. Sergeant Freeman was another, although painfully wounded in the leg, he still managed to collect ammo, grenades, observe air strikes, and enemy movements, give encouragement, and first aid to other men. Other wounded men, seeing the example he set, started doing the same. Although Sergeant Freeman, himself was wounded, he still managed to assist other wounded back to the 2nd platoon area and to the choppers. His actions were not uncommon for the platoon on that day.




Figure 2 After Action Report for July 19 1st Platoon Map - 1966.

Statement by 2nd Lieutenant James Holliday (2nd Platoon) regarding action of 19 July 1966.

The 2nd platoon of Company A departed our company area at approximately 1135 hours, which was one hour ahead of the scheduled departing time. We arrived at the 25th Division chopper pad at 1145 hours and immediately broke down into five groups of seven men in each group.

At approximately 1240 hours, we boarded the choppers, and as we were ready to depart. The pilot received word that instead of going to Trang Bang as were scheduled to, we were to wait at the division pad to be used from there as a reaction platoon for either Objective #5 or #1, who were both receiving enemy fire at that time. At 1300 hours, we dismounted the choppers and waited until 1415 hours until we received word to load up again and that we would be landing on Objective #1. As we were in the air, our landing zone was changed to Objective #5 where the 1st platoon was receiving heavy enemy fire.

We were set down in a rice paddy approximately 200 meters south of a wood line, which the 1st platoon was on line and engaged in a heavy fire fight. Before we landed, we started receiving a heavy volume of enemy small arms fire. Upon touch down, the volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire increased and we were fired upon by enemy mortar fire.

As the men got off the choppers according to a prearranged plan, which the platoon has set up in case we received enemy fire upon landing, we set up a perimeter and immediately began to return fire.

While getting off the chopper, PFC Edwards, Earl, was hit in the chest by an enemy small arms round. I called for a dustoff chopper but was informed by the 1st platoon leader that we could [not?] get any chopper to evacuate any wounded at the time. I told our men to give PFC Edwards a shot of morphine and then he and I moved him partway to our position and made him comfortable as possible behind a paddy dyke, and then we moved up to join the rest of the platoon.

I then got on the radio and called the first platoon leader to ask him the exact location for about 200 meters ahead of me. I could see some US soldiers. He then (indecipherable) and after seeing this, I asked him which flank he was receiving the heaviest volume of enemy fire, and he said it was on his right flank. I then directed the platoon to move in a northeasterly direction so that we could link up with the 1st platoon's right flank. We moved approximately to our right and forward about 125 meters. I then had the platoon move up on line behind a paddy dyke with the 1st squad on the right and the 2nd squad on the left flank. Due to a shortage of personnel, we have been operating for the past month with just two rifle squads with a machine gun attached to each squad. I informed both the 1st and 2nd squad leaders to bend their squads around into a "U" formation so as to provide flank security.

Upon getting into the position, we started laying down a base of fire and the M79 men were instructed to try and knock out the enemy automatic weapons and machine gun position. The 1st platoon leader asked to bring up my platoon on line with his right flank, but due to a protruding tree line that came out approximately 40 meters from the main wood line, the linking up of our platoon would have meant that my platoon would receive heavy fire from our right rear. This protruding tree line is where VC with automatic weapons and rifle, and I personally saw VCs firing rifle grenades and M79s at us from that tree line. From that tree line, we moved up to about 50 meters from the protruding wood line, which put us about 75 meters to the rear of the right flank man of the 1st platoon.

During this moving PFC Knott, our number 1 machine gunner was hit by enemy small arms fire. Despite efforts by the medic and First Sergeant Letoto, who went with the 2nd platoon that day, PFC Knott died within a few minutes. We also suffered 2 or 3 more casualties during our advancing, but due to the platoon, despite their injuries, these men after being treated by the medic continued to function even though in great pain.

After a short period of time, one of the 1st squad team leaders, Sergeant Hamby, was shot in the leg, and he after not saying a word to anyone except to a man on his left. He realized that the medic was busy working on some more seriously wounded men, so he treated his own wounds and kept on with his difficult mission of directing his team to fire and offering words of encouragement to those around him.

During the period of our two hour and 15 minute firefight, both my squad leaders were hit; Sergeant Fitch was shot through the shoulder with a bullet and Staff Sergeant Walker was hit on the forehead with shrapnel from a rifle grenade. Sergeant Fitch, after receiving first aid from the medic, continued to function in a very outstanding manner, crawling on his hands and knees subjecting himself to enemy fire, not to mention the extreme pain that he was in as he was crawling around checking the men in his squad to insure that they had ammo and were alright.

Staff Sergeant Walker treated himself, and despite the throbbing pain from his head and the blood that kept running down his face, he continued to control his squad as though he was not even hit. Due to the blood that kept getting in his eye, there was many times that he couldn't see the VC who would come out into the open rice paddy at times to fire rifle grenades and M79s at us. While wiping his eyes with one hand, he had the man on his right direct his fire into the area where the VC were until his eyes were cleared.

Throughout the firefight, my platoon sergeant, Sergeant Rodriguez, kept moving through the platoon checking to see how the ammo was holding out and giving much needed encouragement to our men. He then crawled out to our front to help lay down a base of fire as the 1st platoon drew back to our position.

We all as men and Americans have our own opinions and ideas as to what constitutes a hero or what makes a man forget his personal safety and work together as a group of men who in such a small minority could hold off a force that so out numbered us. It is my opinion, that each and every man out there in the 2nd platoon on the afternoon of 19 July deserves more than just a pat on the back and a "well done." For it is men like these, who have made and keep America what it is today, and I feel that they should all be justly rewarded for their actions.

I feel that special consideration be given for a Distinguished Service Cross to my platoon medic, PFC Rios, who throughout the course of the afternoon was constantly moving from the right to the left flanks of our platoon completely disregarding his own safety to treat wounded men in the platoon. As the choppers were coming in to evacuate the remainder of the 1st platoon and the 2nd platoon's wounded, I told PFC Rios to take a man with him to help load PFC Edwards onto a chopper. It was while doing this that PFC Rios was hit in the back with a bullet and seven of his vertebra were smashed leaving him paralyzed from the waist down.

During the afternoon, I personally saw approximately 40 to 50 VC moving about in the wood line. I also saw muzzle flashes from at least 15 different positions spread throughout the wood line. At one time, I saw three enemy mortar rounds hit about 175 meters to my left and then in a few seconds, three more hit about 100 meters to my left and in a few more seconds, three more hit about 25 meters to my left front. I had already called the company commander to ask if any friendly mortars were being fired at this time, and he said there was none. Within less than a minute or two from the time the three mortar rounds hit 25 meters to my left front, a friendly jet air strike dropped napalm and bombs into the woods to our front and after that, we did not receive any more enemy mortar fire.

There were many rifle grenades fired at us, however many of them fell all around us but failed to explode.

At approximately 1635, the second stick of choppers landed and evacuated the remainder of the 2nd platoon and myself back to our base camp.




Figure 3 After Action Report for July 19 2nd Platoon Map - 1966.

Inclosure 4: Units Involved in the Action

Army Units:

Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.

1st Platoon: Objective 5

2nd Platoon: Objective 5

3rd Platoon: Objective 1

Company B, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry.

1st Platoon: Objective 1

Aviation Units:

Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion.

Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion.

118th Aviation Company, 145th Aviation Battalion.

116th Aviation Company.

52nd Aviation Company Provisional (Armed CH-47).

Air Force Units:

4503rd Tactical Fighter Squadron.

531st Tactical Fighter Squadron.

416th Tactical Fighter Squadron.

612th Tactical Fighter Squadron.

Army Artillery Units:

A Battery, 1/8 Artillery.

A Battery (minus), 3/13 Artillery.

D Battery (minus), 3/13 Artillery.

Viet Cong Units:

1st Battalion, 165th-A Regiment.

320th Local Force Battalion.

Figure 4 Units involved in July 19 1966 action.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

RECOMMENDATION FOR DECORATION FOR VALOR OR MERIT (Submit in Three Copies)			
THRU: Commanding Officer 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div A/O 96225		TO: Commanding General 25th Inf Div ATTN: AWDGAG: AWARD S A/O 96225	
FROM: Commanding Officer 1st Bn 27th Inf A/O 96225			
1. AWARD INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED FOR			
XXX DSC	ACM "V"	SERVICE	FOREIGN/OTHER AWARD
SS	LM		
DFC	ES	ACHIEVEMENT	
SM	AM		
BS "V"	ACM		
AM "V"	PH	OAK LEAF CLUSTER	
(For Air Medal Only Attach USARV Form 131)			
2. NAME: (Last, First, MI) R.O.C, Adolph Jr.		3. SN: RAL677985	4. GRADE: SP4 E-4
5. BRANCH (OFF) DMCS (WO & EM) 94B			
6. AGE: (Nearest Year)	7. CATEGORY 1-Y PERSONNEL: YES XXX NO	8. MONTHS IN VN: (Nearest Month) 7	9. POSTHUMOUS AWARD: YES XXX NO
10. ORGANIZATION AT TIME OF ACTION: 1st Bn 27th Infantry		11. ACTION OF FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY: APPROVAL _____ DISAPPROVAL _____ UPGRADE _____ DOWNGRADE _____	
12. DATES OF SERVICE - MERIT: DATE(S) OF ACTION - VALOR: 19 July 1966		13. DEROS: July 66	14. CURRENT ORGANIZATION: Walter Reed Army Hosp, Washington, D.C.
15. PREVIOUS AWARDS (PH and Higher)			
DECORATION	DATE OF ACTION OR SERVICE		AUTHORITY
Bronze Star "V"	5 February 1966		AT 672-5-1
Purple Heart	19 July 1966		AR 672-5-1
16. OTHERS RECOMMENDED FOR AN AWARD OF THE SAME ACTION: (State Name and Award)			
1LT Schnitzer - Silver Star			
1LT Williams - Bronze Star "V"			
Eugene L. Brown - Silver Star			
17. NAMES OF EYEWITNESSES:			
1LT Schnitzer			
1LT Holliday			
USARV Form 157-R (10 Oct 66) THIS FORM REPLACES USARV 157 EDITIONS OF WHICH ARE OBSOLETE			

HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

GENERAL ORDERS
NUMBER 1092

20 September 1966

AWARD OF THE SILVER STAR

1. TC 320. The following AWARDS are announced.

SCHNIZER, PETER H. 05325645 1LT INF USA
HHC, 1st Bn, 27th Inf, 25th Inf Div

Awarded: Silver Star

Date action: 19 July 1966

Theater: Republic of Vietnam


Reason: For gallantry in action: Lieutenant Schnizer distinguished himself by heroic actions on 19 July 1966, in the Republic of Vietnam. On this date, he was serving as platoon leader in a company engaged in a search and destroy mission near the Ho Bo Woods, Republic of Vietnam. As Lieutenant Schnizer's platoon was crossing a rice field, it received intense small arms, mortar, and rifle grenade fire from an estimated reinforced VC company. For a period of three hours, Lieutenant Schnizer directed his platoon and his fire support despite the fact he was receiving heavy fire from three sides. During the course of the action, he dispatched his radio-telephone operator to provide additional fire support to one of the three squads. He then personally directed use of air strikes, gun ships, and artillery fire support bringing one mission in on top of the platoon position. As ammunition in the platoon ran low, Lieutenant Schnizer personally took the Viet Cong under fire with his own weapon and hand grenades. With complete disregard for his own safety, he moved throughout the platoon area redeploying his men and instructing his leaders. On one occasion, he was struck in the chest by a hand grenade which failed to explode. Lieutenant Schnizer's unimpeachable valor in close combat against a hostile force is in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service and reflects great upon himself, his unit, the 25th Infantry Division, and the United States Army.

Authority: By direction of the President under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved 9 July 1918, and USARV message 16695, 1 July 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS W. HELLER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff


HERBERT L. FORSYTHE
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY
(WOLFHOUSES)
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96225

AVDCSBB-A

12 September 1966

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Distinguished Unit Citation

THRU: Commanding Officer
2d Bde, 25th Inf Div
APO 96225

THRU: Commanding Officer
25th Inf Div
APO 96225

TO: Commanding General
United States Army Viet Nam
APO 96307

1. Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, is recommended for the Distinguished Unit Citation, for its actions on 19 July 1966.

2. This unit has not been submitted for a similar award for this action.

3. Conditions under which the action was performed: Terrain consisted of a heavily wooded area, surrounded by rice paddies. The weather was hot and the rice paddies were flooded.

4. Current intelligence indicated that no Viet Cong forces were currently located in that area, although small guerrilla sized units periodically used the area for rest stops.

5. Narrative of the Action:

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was to conduct "Eagle Flights" from 1200-1600 hrs. Company A had been planning their operation for two days, based on objectives selected by the battalion commander. Accordingly, the 1st platoon was flown into objective 5 at 1224 hrs and the 3rd platoon flown into objective 1 at 1239 hrs. The 2d platoon was held back as the reaction force.

AFMOSBB-A


SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Valorous Unit Award

21 September 1966

At 1620 hours, 8 helicopters from Company A, 25th Aviation Battalion, and 8 helicopters from the 118th Aviation Company flew to objective 5 to extract the 1st and 2d platoons of Company A, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. As the pilots began to maneuver into the pick up zone, they came under heavy attack from enemy automatic weapons, rifle grenades and mortar fire. The enemy ground fire was so intense that all helicopters received hits and one helicopter was destroyed by mortar and machine gun fire. Observing that the infantry was heavily engaged with the enemy and that there were many seriously wounded soldiers who were widely dispersed throughout the pick up zone, the pilots skillfully maneuvered their helicopters from point to point on the ground to within two meters of the wounded soldiers so that the door gunners could assist the troops into the helicopters. Maneuvering on the ground in this manner required the extracting helicopters to remain longer than a normal extraction. Throughout the extraction phase of this engagement, the extracting helicopters and troops were continuously engaged with the enemy, while gunships from Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion provided covering fire for the extracting elements. Gunships from the 116th Aviation Company were called in by the 25th Aviation Battalion to provide covering fire when the ammunition supply of Company B became exhausted.

Prior to the extraction, the battalion commander requested additional fire support. In response, an armed OH-47 was dispatched to objective 5. The pilot maneuvered his aircraft to tree top level and attacked the area with devastating effect. With each attack, the helicopter was repeatedly hit with enemy automatic weapons fire. After the extraction was completed, a helicopter from the 116th Aviation Company observed two additional wounded soldiers still on the ground waving a white T-shirt. Upon hearing of this situation, the pilot of the armed OH-47 courageously landed his helicopter in a hail of enemy fire. The crew chief and flight engineer then jumped out and assisted the two wounded soldiers to safety. During this time, the armed OH-47 and crew were subjected to a murderous volume of enemy fire.

Subsequent PW interrogation and discussion with personnel who participated in the engagement, established the enemy strength as being one hard core Viet Cong Battalion and one local Viet Cong Company in objective 5 and one Viet Cong Company in objective 1.


 GUY S. MELOY
 Major, Infantry
 Commanding

4 Incl

1. Individual Awards
2. Maps and Overlays
3. Casualties Sustained
4. Units Involved in the Action 3