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HEADQUARTERS  
1ST BATTALION 27TH INFANTRY  
(THE WOLFHOODS)  
APO US FORCES 96225

AVTISEE-T

6 August 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: LBDE-T  
APO US FORCES 96225

Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVTLEGA-MH  
APO US FORCES 96225

TO: Commander  
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: J343  
APO US FORCES 96243

References:

- a. OPORD 30-66 (Operation MOKULEIA), Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 11 July 1966.
- b. OPORD 9-66 (Operation MOKULEIA), Headquarters, 1st Battalion 27th Infantry, 14 July 1966.

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION:
  - a. Operation MOKULEIA
  - b. Search and destroy
  - c. Pacification
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 17 July through 23 July 1966
3. LOCATION: Hau Nghia Province in designated area as shown by Annex A (opn overlay).

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4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

5. REPORTING OFFICER: Lt Col Alvin L. O'Neal.

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. A1/27 Inf (Capt Mayone)

1 National Policemen  
1 Vietnamese Interpreter

b. B1/27 Inf (Capt Garrett)

1 National Policeman  
1 Vietnamese Interpreter

c. C1/27 Inf (Capt Laschi)

1 National Policeman  
1 Vietnamese Interpreter

d. Support Control

Recon Platoon  
Anti-Tank Platoon  
Heavy Mortar Platoon

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery Support: A1/8 Arty was DS to 1/27 Inf.  
A (-) 3/13 Arty and D (-) 3/13 Arty reinforced A1/8 Arty.

b. How and when artillery employed: On 13 July 1966, C1/8 Arty conducted a motor march from Cu Chi to Trang Bang, XT484195, and established a fire support base. C1/8 Arty supported 1/27 Inf in the AO until 171305 July 1966, at which time they were replaced by a battery group consisting of a control element, Headquarters, 1/8 Arty, A1/8 Arty (four 105mm howitzers), A3/13 Arty (four 155mm howitzers), and D5/A3 Arty (two 8" howitzers). These elements moved to the Trang Bang fire support base, and remained in that location until 241405 July 1966, when they returned to Cu Chi. Movement to and from Trang Bang was by road convoy.

c. Results of Artillery:

(1) The artillery was used extensively throughout the AO in an REI role at suspected VC locations.

(2) On 17 July, prior to the assault on CPJ A, a fifteen minute preplanned artillery prep was employed to neutralize the LZ and the objective.

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On 19 July, during a heavy engagement by A1/27 Inf with a large VC force, the entire fire support base at Trang Bang responded with over two hours of continuous fire. Only one platoon of A1/27 Inf was within range of the 105mm howitzers. The other platoon, 1500 meters away, was supported by 155mm and 8" howitzers. The fires suppressed the VC movement and assisted the platoons in the extraction phase of the airmobile operation.

## d. Army Aviation

(1) How and when aviation was used

- (a) Command and control aircraft for ground operations
- (b) Airlift of troops and equipment within the AO
- (c) Evacuation of serious casualties

(2) Results of Army aviation: Army air support was invaluable in accomplishing the mission in Operation MOKUJELI. The helicopter support provided 1/27 Inf with a high degree of flexibility which could not be achieved by other means. Army helicopters were also utilized to evacuate the wounded. During the 19 July operation, in which Co A1/27 Inf encountered a VC battalion sized force, the helicopters were used extensively to suppress enemy fire and to extract the wounded.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy situation prior to operation: Prior to the operation, the VC had not conducted any large scale operations in the area. Also, no recent movement of any large VC force was reported in the AO. The VC were reported most active along Highway 1 where they repeatedly built roadblocks and laid mines during the hours of darkness. The roadblocks, which were in most instances mounds of earth, were most frequently located in the area on Highway 1 between XT540178 and XT520189. The VC also harassed and at times attacked Popular Force outposts in the AO. On 19 June 1966, one VC Co unsuccessfully attacked an outpost located at XT564163. One ambush was reported on 29 June 1966. In this engagement 2 VC Squads ambushed a three-truck ARVN convoy with command detonated mines, automatic weapons, and small arms fire. Many VC guerrilla units were reported to be operating in the villages and hamlets in the AO. Guerrilla platoons were reported to be located in the vicinity of XT508143, XT501162, XT515201, XT520241, XT605150 (two platoons), and XT572137 (two squads). In addition, smaller VC units were reported in the vicinity of the VC infiltration and supply route which runs South to North from Thai My (XT5214) in the South, to the Ho Bo, Boi Loi Woods, and FIIHOL Plantation area in the North. Two local force VC units were reported operating in or in close proximity to the AO. The 320th Local Force Battalion was reported to be located at XT530326 on 28 June, and C54 Company (Trang Bang District Company) was reported at XT476326 on 24 June 1966. On 1 July 1966, elements of a main VC force, the 2d Battalion,

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165 A Regiment, were reported to be in the vicinity of XT550205 and XT808069.

b. Enemy Situation during the operation: The enemy employed the usual guerrilla tactics against US Forces. However, on one occasion, the VC remained on location and engaged Co A1/27 Inf without withdrawing. This engagement, which lasted approximately three hours, involved an estimated VC Battalion (elements of 1st Battalion, 165 A Regiment and elements of the 320 Local Force Battalion) plus local guerrilla forces at X Sa Nho (2) vic XT563265 and X Sa Nho (1) vic XT576265. The VC force was massed at the preceding two locations with a larger force concentrated at X Sa Nho (1). At both locations the VC initiated the engagement with sporadic SA and AW fire. This sporadic fire was steadily increased until a heavy, sustained volume of SA, AW, MG (at least 2 MG were employed at each location), rifle grenades, 60mm, and 82mm mortar fire was attained. This could indicate that the US unit initially made contact with a VC security element which was then reinforced by the larger, massed VC force. The VC were observed to be dressed in fatigues, khakis, and black and blue uniforms. Several VC were observed with steel helmets and rucksacks. At X Sa Nho (2), 2 radios were seen and at X Sa Nho (1), bugles were heard by the US troops. There were three (3) significant factors in this operation: (1) The VC had an abundant supply of SA, AW, and MG ammunition which enabled them to fire a heavy, sustained volume of fire for three hours. However, a large amount of defective CHICOP ammunition and hand grenades were observed by the US troops; (2) At X Sa Nho (1), squad size VC elements attempted to execute flanking and assault movements against the US Forces in the last hour of the engagement; and (3) A large number of VC were concentrated in a relatively small area. The area was surrounded by rice fields on three sides and a narrow strip of wooded area on the fourth side leading north to the Ho Bo Woods. This wooded area of land was their only withdrawal route. Indications are, after considering these three factors, that the VC were evidently massing for an operation on 19 or 20 July 1966. Further information pertaining to the enemy was received from District MACV personnel and from the Trung Lap Ranger Training Center. Information received from Trung Bang District disclosed that: (1) The 320 Local Force Battalion located in the Poi Loi Woods frequently moved from XT490009 to vic XT4625 to obtain supplies (rice); (2) The VC were active in the hamlets vic XT4824, XT5022, and XT5224. Reports indicate that these hamlets were supply where VC forces obtained rice. Information received from the Trung Lap Ranger Training Center (XT5921) indicates that the following areas along a VC infiltration and supply route were frequently used by the VC as overnight bases or rest areas: (1) X Rang (3) vic XT560203; (2) X Den Gian vic XT560210; (3) X Rang (2) vic XT570235; (4) X BO HEO vic XT542337; (5) X Tam Dinh vic XT555247; (6) X Bau Soi (1) XT572248; and (7) X Ba Song vic XT600245. Also, a VC training center was reported vic XT5928. The

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cadre from this Training Center was reported to be from X Sa Kho (1) vic XT575270. Information received from Cu Chi District disclosed the presence of a VC drafting school located at Hung Hamlet (XT509272) which was comprised of 25 cadre personnel. This unit is equivalent to a company when it is up to strength. A VC Rear Service Company, strength unknown, was also reported at Loc Hung Hamlet vic XT516275.

c. Terrain & Weather: The terrain in the AO varied from fields of roads and swamps in the southern portion to elevated, heavily wooded forests in the northern portion. Between these two extremes in terrain there were rice fields intermittent with elevated areas of land where hamlets, towns, and villages were located. Most of the central and northern portion of the AO could support APC's. The weather was typical of the monsoon season with rains and thunderstorms prevalent from 1500 to 2200 hours daily.

9. MISSION: 1/27 Inf conducts airmobile assaults, search and destroy operations, combined operations with local ARVN forces, and pacification operations in assigned AO beginning 17 July 1966. On order, be prepared to provide one company as Division Reaction Force; be prepared to deploy one company for security of Duc Hue sugar mill or Sao Trai, and be prepared on order to provide security for 1/8 Arty fire support base.

10. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION: 1/27 Inf will conduct a series of airmobile, ground assaults, and search and destroy operations commencing on 17 July 1966. 1/27 Inf will employ "cable flights," combat patrols, ambushes, and combined operations with local ARVN forces to locate and destroy VC forces, supplies, and hospital areas. Airmobile operations will be characterized by several small unit cable flights with the capability to rapidly reinforce or extract. All airmobile operations will be supported by prepositioned artillery.

11. EXECUTION: The 1st Battalion 27th Infantry Wolfhounds was tasked by the Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, to conduct search and destroy and pacification operations in assigned AO as part of the Brigade Task Force in operation MOKULEIA. The Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 27th Infantry, issued OPORD 9-66 (Operation MOKULEIA) on 16 0000 July 66 for the conduct of the operation.

15 JULY 1966

1/27 Infantry commenced operation MOKULEIA on 15 July 1966. One platoon from 1/27 Infantry was airlifted to Trang Bang at 1600 hours and attached to C Battery, 1/8 Arty which had established a fire base at that location. The platoon set up a defensive perimeter on the southwest portion of the Trang Bang football field.

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At 160108 hours, the VC detonated a claymore mine near the right flank of the platoon position killing one man and wounding another. The platoon returned fire with negative results. 1/27 Inf (-) at Cu Chi continued to improve on the condition and appearance of bunkers, weapons, vehicles, and equipment.

16 JULY 1966

1/27 Inf (-) continued to defend the battalion defense perimeter at Cu Chi and to work on bunker and perimeter improvements. Due to the increased VC activity in the vicinity of Trang Bang, 101/27 Inf was reinforced at 1530 hours by the remainder of the company. The company was airlifted into Trang Bang and immediately began to dig in defensive positions around the football field. No VC contact was made during the night.

At 1330 hours, a coordination meeting was held at 1/27 Inf TOC between the 1/27 Inf S-3 and the Senior US Advisor to the 49th ARVN Regiment. During this meeting the two discussed future plans to include the upcoming operation on 17 July 1966.

17 JULY 1966

The first offensive action of operation Mokuleia took place on 17 July 1966. The plan envisioned a 3 platoon air assault into objective A, GS5233 by A1/27 Infantry. The 2/49 ARVN battalion was to be utilized as a blocking force to the south while A1/27 Infantry swept south with 3 platoons abreast. C1/27 Infantry, at Trang Bang, was to be utilized as a ready reaction force to reinforce engaged elements as necessary, while B1/27 Infantry remained at Cu Chi and manned the perimeter defenses. At 0740 hours, A1/27 Infantry conducted an air assault into objective A, utilizing 3 LZ's located at XT523237, XT527236, and XT526231. Once the ARVN blocking force was in position to the south, A1/27 Infantry commenced its sweep. During the sweep south, A1/27 Infantry destroyed 1 VC identified house and two tunnels approximately 30 meters long. Several villagers were interrogated. One individual stated that he had seen 10 VC carrying small arms and moving in a Northwest direction on 16 July 1966. Another villager stated that five days before he had seen a VC platoon in the area. He did not know their destination and was unable to determine what type of weapons they carried. On the sweep back to the North, the company encountered sniper fire but the unit was unable to locate the source. The company was extracted at 1155 hours. During the extraction the helicopters received small arms fire. Gunships were immediately called in and neutralized the fire. The 2/49 ARVN Battalion aided in the operation as a blocking force to the south and captured 2 VCS.

B1/27 Infantry remained in base camp Cu Chi and continued to improve upon the perimeter defenses.

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01/27 Infantry provided the "standby reaction" element for the A1/27 Infantry operation. Once the helicopters had dropped A1/27 Infantry, they moved to Truong Bang in order that 01/27 Infantry could be deployed immediately if the situation dictated. 01/27 Infantry conducted one ambush 500 meters Northwest of Truong Bang but made no contact with VC elements.

A recon platoon, based at Cu Chi, conducted a sweep to O-4 YED via XT605152 at 1230 hours. No VC contact was made and the platoon returned to the battalion perimeter at 1705 hours.

18 JULY 1966

1/27 Infantry continued to conduct a/c flights throughout the AO. B-10 flights continued with B1/27 Infantry conducting five separate platoon sized operations at selected targets of opportunity. 01/27 Infantry remained at Truong Bang to secure the artillery base and together with 3B1/27 Infantry acted as the quick reaction force for B1/27 Infantry operation.

A1/27 Infantry assumed battalion perimeter defense responsibility at Cu Chi, actively defended it by conducting two night ambushes, and continued to improve upon the bunker line fortifications and fields of fire.

Elements of B1/27 Infantry were airlifted into numerous platoon sized objectives throughout the AO, commencing at 1350 hours. The 1st platoon was airlifted into XT475248 at 1350 hours, XT474248 at 1418 hours, and XT474248 at 1530 hours. No VC contact was made at the 1st and 3d objectives, but at O-4 72 the platoon spotted 3 VC running towards the north. The orbiting gunships were called in and wounded one of the VC who was attempting to hide in the woodline. A total of 7 VCS were detained and escorted to Truong Bang for interrogation. The 2nd platoon was airlifted into O-4 74, XT480256, at 1417 hours. No VC contact was made, but the platoon destroyed two VC houses. At 1550 hours, the platoon was airlifted to O-4 75, via XT461258. No VC were initially encountered but shortly after the landing, the platoon received sniper fire from an undetermined number of well-concealed and camouflaged VC. The standby platoon at Truong Bang, 3B1/27 Infantry, was immediately airlifted from Truong Bang into the O-4 area. This timely reinforcement enabled US Forces to rapidly locate and eliminate the snipers. The two platoons killed a total of two VC. At the completion of this operation, all B1/27 Infantry elements were extracted from the operational area and airlifted to Cu Chi.

01/27 Infantry remained at Truong Bang to secure the artillery base. The company established one ambush at XT495276 but did not make contact.

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Between 0730 hours and 1250 hours, the Battalion Medical Team secured by a rifle squad from B1/27 Infantry, treated a total of 73 civilians in the Trang Bane area. Most of the patients were children with minor ailments.

19 JULY 1966

B1/27 Infantry conducted aerial flights in the AO during the afternoon hours. The Battalion CO, in close coordination with A Company CO, selected a series of 8 aerial flight targets in an area bounded by coordinates XT5328, XT5828, XT5824, XT5324. Current intelligence indicated that there were no VC forces in the area. However, small guerrilla sized forces had periodically used the area for rest stops, thus possibly producing lucrative targets for a company sized operation. The eight preselected targets were located at the following coordinates: Obj 1: XT562265; Obj 2: XT534268; Obj 3: XT544246; Obj 4: XT555250; Obj 5: XT577265; Obj 6: XT575277; Obj 7: XT568278; Obj 8: XT540277.

The company had been planning the operation for two days. An aerial recon was made by the company commander and FSC the day before. Also, on 18 July, the company commander and the battalion commander had decided to hit targets one and five on the day of the operation.

The concept called for B1/27 Infantry to conduct a platoon sized lift on Obj 5. If there was negative contact at this objective, the remaining platoons would be lifted to the other selected objectives. If contact was made, the plan called for the remaining platoons of Co A to be lifted into the objective. The artillery fire support base at Trang Bane would provide fire support to all objectives. B1/27 Infantry would have two rifle platoons on immediate standby as a reaction force if called for by the battalion commander.

The C-130 aircraft carrying the battalion commander, company commander, FSC, FAC, and Army Aviation Coordinator departed Cr CHI at 1200 hrs. B1/27 Infantry touched down on the LZ in obj 5 at 1224. Upon touchdown the platoon leader reported negative contact. At 1235 the platoon leader reported receiving small arms fire which he believed to be snipers. The platoon leader reported that he could handle the situation. Based on this information the battalion commander decided to lift the 3d platoon into objective one which was done at 1239. The platoon received small arms fire prior to dismounting helicopters. The platoon advanced to a hedgerow across a rice paddy to the southern end of objective 1 against intense small arms fire. At this time the platoon leader called for a DUSTOFF for one litter case. Ten minutes later two additional litter patients required evacuation. The platoon leader next reported he had two additional personnel injured slightly, but that he was continuing to move north in heavy growth under small arms fire. This was the last radio transmission between the 3d platoon and the company commander. It was later determined that all casualties

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in this platoon occurred during the first thirty minutes of the action. The enemy withdrew after this initial engagement.

Casualties for this platoon included the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, three squad leaders, all KIA, and one squad leader KIA. In addition both platoon radios were inoperable due to enemy fire.

During the same period the 1st platoon had become heavily engaged in objective 5 and had sustained three casualties requiring "DISTRESS."

Artillery fire was placed on both objectives and the 2A1/27 Infantry was ordered to board helicopters at 1255 hours, and left for obj 5. Due to continuous airstrikes on obj 5 and artillery on both objectives, the lift was delayed by the battalion commander. In addition, there was a question as to which objective the 2d platoon should be deployed. Contact had been lost with the 3d platoon and by this time the 1st platoon was receiving a heavy volume of automatic and small arms fire and 82mm mortar rounds.

At 1430 hours the 2A1/27 Infantry touched down on an LZ (obj 5) approximately 200 meters Southwest of the original LZ. The LZ was selected in order that aircraft would be able to take off away from the hedgerows from which the enemy were firing. The 2d platoon immediately moved forward in an attempt to reach the 1st platoon's right flank, which at that time was receiving the heaviest fire. The helicopters, upon landing the 2d platoon on obj 5, were ordered to Trang Bang to pick up a platoon from "Company" to lift to obj 1.

The battalion commander decided to airlift the B Company Commander and one platoon to obj 1 to make contact with the 3B1/27 Infantry. The battalion commander was concerned with the time it would take to shuttle all troops of B Company into the objective area plus the refueling time at Cu Chi.

At 1437 the battalion commander notified his rear CP to request the release of C1/27 Infantry at Cu Chi. He desired to commit it on the East of obj 5 and to sweep West and relieve the pressure on the two platoons from Company A. No aircraft were available for this lift. The brigade immediately alerted a company from the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry and the 2/27 Infantry. The brigade commander requested authority to commit the mechanized company at Cu Chi but it was decided that this was not practicable due to the late hour (1500 hours), the difficult terrain, and travel time. Additional aircraft were also requested but the exact time of arrival was not known. The brigade commander then directed the 1st Battalion to utilize his available aircraft to lift the remaining portion of B Company if he needed it; however, he directed the battalion to continue its artillery and airstrikes on the objective area and prepare to extract prior to darkness.

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1B1/27 Infantry, with the company commander, landed in obj 1 at 1550 hours. He immediately made contact with the 3A1/27 Infantry and reported finding heavy casualties. He also reported he was unable to establish contact with the VC since they had broken contact. The battalion commander then directed the B company commander to prepare the units on obj 1 for extraction. 3A1/27 Infantry was extracted at 1600 hours to Cu Chi.

At 1601 hours, the 116th Aviation Company reported to the battalion commander that he was on standby at Cu Chi and that they were refueling and prepared to move on call. At 1625 hours, the first flight of 6 aircraft began extracting 1A1/27 Infantry from obj 5 under intense enemy fire. One aircraft was unable to lift off because of hits by enemy fire. Subsequently, it was set afire on the ground by enemy tracers. The initial lift was followed in two minutes by eight other aircraft which extracted the remainder of the A Company elements from obj 5. The extraction was conducted with the support of airstrikes, gunships, and one armed CH-47. The extraction on obj 5 was completed by 1627 hours. The initial battalion report of casualties given to brigade at the Cu Chi airstrip following the extraction was 8 KIA and 23 wounded. Instructions were issued for a headcount in the battalion area as soon as practicable for gunships were orbiting obj 5. At approximately 1715 hours the battalion reported Company A present or accounted for and a stand-down order was issued. At approximately 2000 hours the battalion reported an additional 15 men were KIA and left on the battlefield. Witnesses testified that all were killed during the initial fire fight which forced the remainder of the 1st platoon to withdraw to a protective berm. They stated that the leaving of the US KIA's was a result of heavy automatic weapons fire, mortar fire, rifle and hand grenades, small arms and thrown TNT charges, which prevented the unwounded survivors from reaching the bodies. In addition, there were heavy casualties taken by the two platoons in obj 5. All squad leaders, platoon sergeants and a platoon leader were killed or wounded. The 1st platoon had only six walking personnel. This small element, under intense fire managed to drag eleven wounded to the position of the 2d platoon some 75 meters away. Upon touchdown by the extracting helicopters, all remaining personnel able to were engaged in carrying wounded to the aircraft or providing covering fire. The helicopter pilots were forced to maneuver their aircraft from point to point on the ground to pick up the troops. The extracting troops and helicopters were continuously engaged with the enemy.

Extraction of the 1B1/27 Infantry at obj 1 was completed at 1650 hours, and the platoon returned to Trang Bang. The extraction received light hostile fire.

Subsequent AF interrogation and discussion with the personnel who participated in the engagement on obj 5 established the enemy strength as one hardcore VC battalion and one local VC company. The

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estimated strength initially on objective one was one VC company which broke contact when reinforcements arrived.

The results of this engagement were 25 US KIA and 34 MIA. The VC body toll was 51 KIA (BC) and 55 (poss). Sixteen US KIA's were found the next morning and returned by the 1/5 Infantry (Mech). In addition, the 1/5 Infantry (Mech) discovered four VC bodies, one wounded and six weapons. The additional individual KIA was due to a wounded man by the same name in the 2/14 Infantry being evacuated at the same time and picked up on the A1/27 Inf roster of casualties.

20 JULY 1966

A1/27 Infantry and C1/27 Infantry remained at the battalion base at Cu Chi, with C1/27 Infantry providing security for the base camp perimeter. B1/27 Infantry continued to secure the Artillery base at Trang Bang. No VC contact was made.

21 JULY 1966

A1/27 Infantry and C1/27 Infantry remained at the battalion base in Cu Chi, and continued to improve on bunker fortifications and to clear fields of fire. C1/27 Infantry manned the base defenses. The recon platoon, with entec platoon attached, conducted a sweep west of the battalion perimeter, and destroyed two trenches, one bunker, and two foxholes. B1/27 Infantry continued to secure the Artillery base at Trang Bang and conducted a security sweep to the Southwest between 0800 hours and 1055 hours. No VC contact was made.

22 JULY 1966

A1/27 Infantry and C1/27 Infantry continued to maintain and improve upon bunker line defenses at Cu Chi. B1/27 Infantry continued to secure the Artillery base at Trang Bang. The company conducted a sweep outside their Trang Bang perimeter approximately 2000 meters to the Northwest. No VC contact was made.

23 JULY 1966

A1/27 Infantry and C1/27 Infantry continued to man the base camp defenses. B1/27 Infantry provided security for the Artillery Battery at Trang Bang, and conducted a reinforced rifle platoon sized sweep to the Northeast of the perimeter. At 0731 hours, vic XT501208, a sniper fired two rounds at the lead element, mortally wounding 1 US soldier. The platoon attempted to locate the sniper, but the VC successfully eluded the pursuers. The platoon, however, did apprehend 2 VCS in the vicinity and evacuated them to Trang Bang. A dustoff was called at 0731 hours to extract the body to Cu Chi. No further contact was made.

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12. RESULTS: **CONFIDENTIAL**

## a. Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (BC)	51	M-1 rifles	1
VC KIA (poss)	57	Carbines (US)	1
VCC	2	Chicom carbines	3
VCS	9	Bolt action rifles	1
VC houses	2		
bunkers	1		
foxholes	8		

## b. Friendly Losses:

KIA	27	cal 45 pistols	12
WIA	35	binoculars	8
M-79 Grenade Launchers	6	bayonet-scarbberd (M-16)	48
M-60 M-	3	bayonet-scarbberd (M-14)	10
M-16 rifles	15	compasses	12
M-14 rifles	5		
M-14 E2 rifles	7		

## 13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: Resupply to the 1/27 Infantry company located at the artillery fire support base, Trang Bang, was accomplished by motor convoy during the first four days of the operation and by CH-47 helicopter during the remainder of the operation.

b. Transportation: The primary means of transportation was by helicopter (air assaults and circle flights), except for movement of the security company to and from Trang Bang. The 1/27 Infantry Recon Platoon was utilized as convoy escort with a helicopter gunship team on station overhead.

d. Communications: No major communication problems were encountered during Operation HONNIEA. A Battalion Forward CP was established at Trang Bang in order to provide an alternate means of communication should the rifle company at that location lose contact with Cu Chi. In addition, the Battalion Forward CP radio station relayed sitreps to Cu Chi base as they were received from units participating in combat operations.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Two ambushes were conducted near Trang Bang whereby ARVN fortified outposts were utilized as patrol bases. On two separate occasions, early in the afternoon, an ARVN truck convoy was utilized to carry a 1/27 Infantry rifle platoon from the artillery fire support base at Trang Bang to the outpost. The reinforced platoon consisted of 60 men. The troops

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stayed inside the outpost for about two and a half hours at which time the convoy returned to Trang Bang. A stay behind platoon of 40 men plus one 81mm crew remained at the outpost. The convoy presented the appearance of US troops returning to Trang Bang. The stay behind platoon stayed out of sight during the remainder of the daylight hours. After dark, a reinforced rifle squad departed the outpost and established an ambush. The force in the ambush served as a ready reaction force to aid the squad if necessary. These two platoon sized operations contributed greatly to the morale and professional education of the ARVN troops stationed at the outposts.

15. COMMANDER ANALYSIS: This was the battalion's first experience in operating out of the Cu Chi base camp and conducting daily combat operations in an AO located several miles away. This type of operation provides for somewhat better living conditions for the troops and allows the battalion to maintain the base camp defense line in a manageable state of repair during the rainy season. However, the battalion can never really get the feel of the district and its people. To be completely successful, the men and their leaders must become area-oriented. Intelligence must be developed, utilizing battalion resources, district advisors, and ARVN counterparts. The battalion must be in a position to instantly react to intelligence whenever and wherever possible. The positioning of a battalion in an area where the people are on the borderline of marching forward with the GVN provides that last bit of emphasis needed. The Trang Bang area has made great advances toward ultimate pacification. An infantry battalion working on the ground can greatly assist the district authorities in extending the area of GVN influence from the major governmental center of Trang Bang to the far reaches of the district. It will take patience on the part of all concerned, but the concept has been proved correct.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Whenever possible, a mechanized infantry platoon should be attached to the battalion task force assigned S&D missions. This allows for greater flexibility, shock action, and a ready reaction force.
- b. Whenever pacification becomes a major aspect of any operation, it is essential that an engineer element be attached to the infantry battalion to aid in construction.
- c. That the battalion commander make every effort to develop a good rapport with his ARVN counterparts in the AO. This is extremely important if complete cooperation between district officials and US personnel is to result.
- d. Psywar activities, to include loudspeaker aircraft, leaflet drops, "helping hand" projects, posters, and MEDCAP are most important and should receive maximum usage.


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e. Base flights should be initiated early enough in the day to permit extraction or to reinforce as the situation dictates prior to the hours of darkness.

f. Only one base flight target should be searched at a time when lift aircraft and reinforcement aircraft are limited.

g. That small helicopter "snatch" teams be organized and dispatched to objective areas which have already been searched. 1/27 Infantry has found that the VC will return to an operation area late in the afternoon in an attempt to find out from the people what the Americans said and did while on the ground. Many times, this snatch team can successfully extract a VC off the ground.

  
ALVIN L. O'CONNEL  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Commanding

Annexes:

A-Operations Overlay