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U.S. Army 25th Infantry Division
Operations of the 25th Infantry Division
from 17 January 1945 to 30 June 1945

OPERATIONS OF THE
25th INFANTRY DIVISION
WIRE ONE
1000 N. PEARL HARBOR ISLAND

17 Jan 45 - 30 June 45

centers of resistance and finally broke the enemy's power to offer further effective defense by fighting its way into Kolumbana.

It was largely through the sustained drive of the 25th Infantry Division that the last vestige of organized resistance on Guadalcanal was crushed and possession of this strategically important island, so vital to projected operations, finally wrested from the hands of the Japanese on 9 February 1943.

3. The splendid results obtained are attributed directly to the superb leadership, fighting spirit and eagerness for combat inherent in the 25th Infantry Division.

A. M. DATCH
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

The 161st Infantry RCT was attached, on 22 July 1943, to the 25th Division and participated with that division in the early phases of the New Georgia campaign. The 161st Infantry RCT reverted to the 25th Division on 5 August 1943. The 25th Division Headquarters, Forward Echelon, and the 27th Infantry were committed by the Headquarters New Georgia Occupation Force to the campaign on 2 August 1943. On 25 August 1943 all organized enemy resistance was declared ended.

The 27th Infantry RCT was attached, on 10 September 1943, to the 43rd Division on Arundel Island. Enemy resistance ended on 21 September 1943. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, on 6 October 1943, moved to Kolombangara Island and was relieved of its positions there on 13 October 1943.

The 35th Infantry RCT and the 25th Division Reconnaissance Troop as the nucleus of the Northern Landing Force of the New Georgia Occupation Force participated in the conquest of Vella Lavella from 15 August 1943 to 9 October 1943.

The original plan for the New Georgia operation as promulgated by the Commanding General, USAFISPA, and the Commander, Third Amphibious Force, called for the use of the 43rd and 37th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st and 4th Raider Battalions of the 1st Marine Raider Regiment, in the combat operations. It was believed that these forces constituted a sufficient force to wrest the entire island group from the Japanese within a 30-day period. The 25th Division constituted the reserve. Subsequent developments in the tactical situation necessitated the hurried commitment into action of the 25th Division in piecemeal fashion.

SECTION II TRAINING

The end of the New Georgia campaign on October 22, 1943 marked the beginning of a long period of absence from the firing line for the 25th Infantry Division. It was also the first time the division did not have a definite mission since the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The division was reassembled at Guadalcanal in early November and started an over-water movement to Auckland, New Zealand where the division was to be rehabilitated, reorganized and prepared for its next mission. The move was completed on December 5, 1943 at which time the last echelon arrived.

The Commanding General, South Pacific, directed that the division be prepared for an offensive combat mission, then in the early planning stage, on or shortly after June 1, 1944, in the vicinity of Kavieng, New Ireland Island. The mission indicated did not involve an assault landing, hence an extensive training schedule predicated on a secured landing was worked out and put into operation.

Early in February it became evident that suitable training conditions could not be maintained in New Zealand. This coupled with the desire of higher headquarters to send the 43rd Infantry Division to New Zealand for rest and rehabilitation prompted the movement of the division to more practicable training areas at New Caledonia.

The training schedule for the month of February called for intensive individual and small unit training for six hours per day exclusive of Saturday when four hours were devoted to training. This training started in New Zealand and continued in New Caledonia as the units arrived. Individual soldier knowledge of all basic infantry weapons was stressed and a course in rifle marksmanship prescribed. The reconnaissance troop and the I & R Platoons of the Infantry Regiments began intensive practice in scouting and patrolling.

Training schedules for the Division Artillery were prepared under the direction of the Commanding General, Division Artillery. Training was coordinated with the Infantry Regimental Commanders. Recoilless Artillery ranges were established at Bourville and Ounghy.

The March training schedule directed that intensive individual and small unit training be continued on a larger scale. Night problems and exercises were carried out by all units. A very comprehensive course in first aid was given to all units of the division. The Division Signal Officer established a radio school which was attended by selected personnel. The Cannon Companies were issued the new M-7 self-propelled guns and a school established to teach personnel the operation of these weapons. The Division Commander directed that each unit of the division conduct parades on the Sun Tan Alister on selected Sunday mornings in order that the discipline might be improved.

April training was devoted to small unit training. It was also directed that six hours per week be devoted to vigorous conditioning of the men. Comprehensive training in night reconnaissance was inaugurated. A C.F.A. was conducted on April 18th to test radio and intelligence personnel. During the latter part of the month much time was devoted to training in the laying of and neutralization of mine fields. On April 23, the division was reviewed by the Commander South Pacific, Admiral William F. Halsey at which time Admiral Halsey addressed the troops and expressed his appreciation for the fine performance of the Division during its combat missions. A three day problem exercising the division in attack started 25 May with all units of the division participating.

During May unit training and vigorous conditioning of the men continued at a brisk pace. Gas schools inaugurated by the Chemical Warfare Officer were conducted throughout the division and an armorer and artificer school was begun by the 724th Ordnance Company for selected officers and men. The Division passed in review before Lieutenant General M. F. Huron, Commanding General, South Pacific on 28 May at Cua Tsa.

The division was ready for combat on 1 June as previously directed by General Huron, however changes in the tactical plan in the Pacific negated the need for sending the division into combat at this time. A short delay was indicated, however later developments pointed to a much longer delay.

The June training schedule was very full. The establishment and defense of a perimeter, strong points, organization in depth, coordination of all weapons, artillery coordination, camouflage, cover and concealment were stressed. On 15 June the division went on a three day problem which again stressed the division in the attack. The month's training ended with a five day problem beginning on 27 June. On the first day the division moved into the field with all of its equipment ready for shipment where it was inspected. On the second day a perimeter was established around the division area, each man being required to dig in, and very realistic battle conditions were created. On the 3rd day the 80th Regimental Combat Team moved out and attacked the other units of the division during the remaining days of the problem.

In the month of July the Division Commander directed that a platoon leader's test based on an Army Ground Force Training Directive dated 7 June 1945 be prepared and given to each rifle and reconnaissance platoon of the division. Initial instructions were sent to each platoon leader at his base camp by a representative of the G-3 Section. Thereafter as the platoon progressed from one control point to the next the necessary orders and instructions for continuation of the test were given by umpires accompanying the platoon.

Each Regimental Combat Team with attachments of Division troops was trained over a two-week period. A Battalion from one of the other Infantry Regiments assisted the Regimental Combat Teams in the capacity of a shore party. As each Regimental Combat Team and the attached Division Troops moved to the beach area for training the supporting shore party battalion was moved into position and given necessary special instructions. Concurrent with the training of the units medical personnel, communications personnel, and officers selected as Transport Quartermasters received special training.

Upon the completion of amphibious training at the end of the second week in November most training was discontinued as units were engaged in preparation for the Luzon Operation.

Commencing on 15 August Regimental I & R Platoons and the Reconnaissance Troop were tested in accordance with the modified Army Ground Force Intelligence Test. Training for all other units was as prescribed by unit commanders. The Division passed in review before Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area, at Cua Tsa on 15 August.

A Command and Staff School was conducted in the Division Headquarters area during the latter part of August and during the first two weeks of September under the direction of the Division Commander and supervised by the General Officers of the Division. All General and Special Staff Officers, Commanders and Staffs down to and including Battalions attended.

The purpose of the school was to train Commanders and Staffs in the tactical employment of the combined arms of an Infantry Division and in Staff Procedure.

In the closing weeks of the Command and Staff School an extensive study was made of Mindanao Island and a less detailed study of Leyte Island. These two studies were made in anticipation of the Philippine campaign and with the view in mind to the possible employment of the Division therein.

In early September the division was alerted for the Leyte-Samar operation. The mission assigned the division was that of Army reserve, with the alternate mission of securing Samar Island and San Juanico Strait. The Division was also to be prepared to seize and secure Bamon Island and the northern tip of Dinagat Island or to seize and secure Pusan Island and Pusan Strait.

Using the available maps and terrain handbooks a detailed study of the terrain and money situation in the proposed area of operation was made and presented to the Division Commander, the Commanding General Division Artillery, the General Staff, and to the Regimental Commanders. Before further plans of studies were made the Division was released from the Leyte-Samar Operation and assigned to the Luzon Operation.

Training highlights for the months of September and October were Battalion assault problems, the third two sided division maneuver, cross-armed weapons tests and preparation for amphibious training.

During the first week of October Amphibious Training Unit No. 2, Southwest Pacific Area, reported to Division Headquarters to assist in and supervise the amphibious training of the division. Prior to their arrival the G-3 Section selected the excellent beaches for this training at Presque de Vich. The training period was designed to cover a six-week period which was divided into three two-week periods.

SECTION III PRIOR PLANNING AND MOVE TO LUZON

Shortly after the division was alerted for the Leyte-Samar Operation the Division Commander directed that a "War Room" be established at Division Headquarters where the General Officers, the members of the General Staff and the Regimental Commanders and their Staffs could assemble for conferences and work without interruption. All available information was assembled and catalogued. The War Room was placed under 24 hour guard and admission limited to selected key personnel due to the necessity for complete secrecy. The room continued in operation until Division Headquarters embarked aboard the Command Ship the U.S.S. Appalachian.

War Rooms were subsequently established at the command posts of Division Artillery and the Infantry Regiments where subordinate Commanders and their Staffs carried out their planning. The same rules for admission and guarding were adopted as applied to the Division War Room.

The composite field order for planning purposes received from the Commanding General, Sixth Army, directed the Commanding General 20th Infantry Division, in Army reserve afloat, to prepare plans for participation in the Luzon Operation. The order directed the Division to be prepared to:

1. Reinforce either the I or XIV Corps in the Lingayen Gulf area with:
 - a. One Regimental Combat Team on S plus 2.
 - b. The remainder of the Division by S plus 4.
2. To reinforce the 100th Regimental Combat Team in its initial objective area with one Regimental Combat Team.
3. Land in the Dagupan-Manila area, commencing on S plus 2 and move to an assembly area in the general Binamon area.

Numerous staff and commanders conferences were held by the Division Commander following receipt of the Army Order. The G-3, G-4 and the Division Signal Officer were called to Headquarters Sixth Army in Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, on two occasions for further conferences. The final large Staff and Commanders Conference was attended by Major General William H. B. Smith Army Headquarters on Leyte Island in early November. As a result of these conferences and of Staff and Commanders' recommendations it was decided to load each Regimental Combat Team and Division Troops on the assigned shipping in such a way that any element could be withdrawn, unloaded and employed separately without affecting the Division. The Division Commander further directed that each Regimental Combat Team be prepared to execute an assault landing if necessary.

attack the known enemy defensive line to its front. The 27th Infantry Regiment secured the high ground 1000 yards NW of MINULI by executing a wide envelopment to the WEST of strong enemy positions located 1000 yards SOUTH of MINULI. The resistance by-passed in this maneuver was reduced on 18 March 1945 by using teams over increasingly rough terrain.

When this point was reached the Division began to receive Japanese artillery fire in large quantities as had been indicated by the captured Japanese Artillery Defense Plan. This fire continued until the Japanese were actually overrun by the Infantry or destroyed by mortar and tank fire. The Japanese 1st and 2nd Battalions were destroyed on 18 March 1945. April 1945 with some concentrations of 400 to 400 men were destroyed.

As previously discussed the road along the OLD SPANISH TRAIL was abandoned on 15 March 1945. (At this time the Division Commander ordered the 35th Infantry Regiment to block the SPANISH TRAIL with one Battalion until further orders, and with the remainder of the Regiment advance across the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY to a point 3 1/2 miles EAST of PUTAN. From there the Regiment was to attack to the NE along a heavily wooded ridge paralleling the PUTAN RIVER and then NW across the river and continue the attack NW to KAMUTO MOUNTAIN and the main SALETTE RIDGE. The Division 35th Infantry Regiment was to attack along the SPANISH TRAIL.

The gase got underway on 16 March 1945 with the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment in assault. The 2nd Battalion, with the mission of securing the supply road, moved into position on 16 March 1945.

The advance continued against very light resistance until 19 March 1945 and covered a distance of 7000 yards. At this point enemy resistance stiffened and only 500 yards was secured by nightfall, 20 March 1945. For the next two days gains were measured in yards until a strong Japanese block supported by numerous MGs was contacted which prevented further advance. The night of 22-23 March 1945 the enemy launched six counterattacks during which over 200 rounds of knee mortar, and twelve 90mm mortar shells were received by the lead company.

The following morning patrols were sent out to find the enemy flanks. The patrols reported that all routes of approach to the enemy positions were up precipitous slopes completely covered with interlocking fire.

During this period block along the bulldozer road a serious supply and evacuation problem had been created by the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY. To cross the valley the road was forced considerably out of its way. In addition, the valley was especially vulnerable to infiltrating Japanese mine-laying and demolition parties, approaching from the SPANISH TRAIL area. The Japs were active laying mines all along the road at

night and using demolitions by day. In a two-day period they succeeded in severely damaging two bulldozers and four trucks. To relieve the critical supply situation and overcome the wounded the Engineers erected a hand operated, 600 foot, rope trolley system across the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY.

The attack continued until 28 March 1945 without meeting success at which time the Division Commander elected to abandon the advance over this route. Several factors prompted this decision: First, was that the casualties incurred in continuing the advance would be prohibitive as the terrain permitted no room whatever for maneuver; Second, the supply problem could get out of hand should the Japs elect to attack in force using the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY as a route of approach; Third, a desire to keep the division front as tight as was tactically practical.

Elsewhere in the Division Zone of Action the attack continued to make progress. In the 27th Infantry Regt the advance continued and by 28 March 1945 succeeded in securing all terrain features SOUTH of a point 1200 yards SE and 3000 yards EAST of KAITUMALAN against exceedingly strong enemy resistance.

The action consisted of a series of close-in engagements against enemy strong points in the draws leading to Highway #5 from the EAST. A steady push up a long ridge running NE from the Highway to MOUNTAIN, the main ridge in the area running NE towards SALETTE RIDGE. Construction of the route was initiated, one paralleling Highway #5 and another up the ridge leading to MOUNTAIN. The MOUNTAIN ridge attack was designed to envelope SALETTE PASS from the EAST. This action will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. During the period the 27th Infantry Regiment repulsed four strong enemy counterattacks.

The 1st Infantry Regiment began its attack along the ridge paralleling Highway #5 on the WEST on 18 March 1945. The objective was a high densely wooded knob some 1500 yards SOUTHWEST of KAITUMALAN, subsequently named MOUNTAIN.

The attack, with the 1st Battalion in assault, supported by air strikes, artillery, M-7 and assault guns continued to make good progress and by 17 March 1945 reached the first heavily manned Japanese defensive line on the WEST side of the Highway. The Japs were organized in the bottom of a saddle just before rising onto the heavily forested knob where they could deny access to the hill and covered the approaches with heavy machine gun fire.

On 18 March 1945 the 1st Battalion sent one company up a ridge paralleling MOUNTAIN RIDGE about 2000 yards to the WEST, which was secured by the knob by the above mentioned saddle. This company continued to the MOUNTAIN finally arriving at a Y, the SOUTHWEST fork of which led

to the highest MOUNTAIN ridge and the EAST fork of which sloped down on a narrow ridge to a rounded hill about 900 yards due NORTH of MOUNTAIN and 1000 yards WEST of KAITUMALAN.

The attacking company surprised the Japs and secured the Y on 20 March 1945. The Regimental Commander immediately dispatched the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, to hold the area, prepare to attack MOUNTAIN and MOUNTAIN and to coordinate the operations of the Regiments. The Japanese apparently realized the situation and responded by inflicting a series of strong night counterattacks which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

Between 18 March 1945 and 28 March 1945 the 1st Battalion continued to attack the enemy in the saddle leading to MOUNTAIN RIDGE, but with little progress. During this time air strikes, artillery, 4.2 mortars, assault guns, and 81mm mortars pounded the entire area. On 27 March an attack supported by M-7 tanks and a tank dozer was launched against the saddle and succeeded in routing the Japs. The attack continued the exception of one strong point which was eliminated the following day. During the night 28-29 March 1945, a strong enemy counterattack was repulsed.

On 28 March 1945 when it became apparent that the wide enveloping maneuver of the 35th Infantry could not succeed without taking prohibitive losses, and as the advance of the 27th Infantry Regiment up MOUNTAIN was setting with success the Division Commander ordered a redeployment of the Regiment.

The 35th Infantry Regiment was ordered to maintain contact with the enemy in the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY area until the morning of 31 March 1945, thereafter to block the EASTERN approach to the valley with one Battalion using patrols, snipers and body traps; and to relieve the 1st Battalion 27th Infantry Regiment along the EAST side of Highway #5 by 30 March 1945; and to extend astride Highway #5 by a series of close-in engagements clearing the Highway, and to block any offensive thrust from the MOUNTAIN along Highway #5.

The boundary between the 27th Infantry Regiment and the 35th Infantry Regiment was designated as the high ground on the EAST of Highway #5 giving the head of all draws leading to the Highway to the 35th Infantry. Between the 1st Infantry and the 35th Infantry the boundary was the topographic crest of the first high ground immediately WEST of the Highway.

The 27th Infantry Regiment was ordered to continue the attack MOUNTAIN up MOUNTAIN RIDGE to envelope SALETTE PASS from the EAST and to construct a road along the route of advance.

The First Regiment, 25th, which was attached to the Division on 25 March 1945, was ordered to continue to block the OLD SPANISH TRAIL with one Battalion replacing the 3rd Battalion, 35th Infantry, place one Battalion for security of Highway #5 from PUTAN to ANABAI and patrol EAST on the CAUGUELA MOUNTAIN road to the HAINAN RIVER and to protect artillery batteries located in the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY and to patrol SOUTH to ANABAI with the other Battalion.

The advance by all elements of the Division from 30 March to 22 April 1945 was very slow. The elements making the flanking maneuvers were operating over exceedingly difficult terrain. The Japanese were precision and organization of this advance was of a very high order. The Japanese were organized in a series of strong points, each with elaborate interlocking systems of interlocking snipers, pillboxes, and emplacements. A complete fortification of our artillery and aerial support was evidenced by the presence of a large number of their artillery in caves which offered excellent protection against bombing and mortar artillery fire.

Restrictive Japanese ammunition expenditure by their headquarters was heavily felt. On 1 April 1945 the ammunition was cut to one-tenth of normal of the day, which necessitated careful planning and strict rationing of ammunition to the artillery units. The practice of having ammunition dumps was completely discontinued. The Japs brought down on pinpointed enemy installations under actual attack and answered to and proved an acceptable solution.

The 35th Infantry Regiment, to carry out its mission, began to get into position on 28 March. The 1st Battalion left the lead company at the farthest point of advance along the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY road and the remainder of the Battalion moved back to an assembly area along the PUTAN RIVER VALLEY road 3 1/2 miles S of PUTAN. Shortly after dark on 30 March 1945 the company maintaining contact with the Japs received a vicious attack from three sides which continued throughout the night. In the morning the company began to withdraw to the road, and immediately came under attack by about 150 enemy in three separate groups. On withdrawal from the assembly area but could not reach the beleaguered company due to three Japanese road blocks across the bulldozer road. The remainder of the battalion, less one company, was brought up and at 1200 succeeded in reducing the blocks. The battalion then withdrew.

The 3rd BN, 35th Infantry Regiment, relieved the 27th Infantry elements in the Regiments new zone of action on 30 March and prepared to advance.

During the period 1 April to 5 April 1945 the 35th Infantry Regiment was engaged in attacking a mass of caves and pillboxes organized in dense jungle along a ridge running EAST-WEST from Highway #5 to a point 1200 yards S of MOUNTAIN.

In the attack, which was heavily supported by air strikes, the 3rd

Petrels were dispatched to find avenues of approach for an envelopment from either side of the ridge. Heavy destructive artillery fire and mortar attacks were placed on successive zones along the ridge, clearing the jungle and opening up sufficient visibility for limited objective attacks within the cleared zone. These attacks were supported by heavy, direct BAC, Cannon, and Mortar fire. The 80mm Recoilless Rifle was used as anti-tank fire from a base of fire established at the WILSONS KNOB to the SE. With the expenditure of 22 rounds of all types of artillery and mortar ammunition and over 22 days of heavy fighting the WEST slope of the objective was secured on 8 April 1965.

When the 3rd Battalion reached its objective they were relieved by the 2nd Battalion, who until 23 April 1945, were engaged in securing the remainder of the hill mass, the reverse slope of which was fearfully defended by Japanese in huge caves.

To support the 161st Infantry Regiment in this phase of the operation, the Engineers constructed a road leading down WEST from Highway #1 crossing the DIGBY RIVER and continuing on up the ridge line to NORTH KNOB where it swung NORTHWEST and continued to the I. & N. bridge. The terrain traversed contained many steep slopes. In places, it was so steep that the bulldozer had to be chained forward by cables to the I. & N. bridge to accomplish their mission. Along the steep declines, the I. & N. cable had to be attached up at one end to the top of the gradual slopes which would enable the bulldozer to pull itself up.

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The terrain along the ridge line leading to the first prominent high point on MYOKO MOUNTAIN, a distance of 5000 yards NORTHEAST from Highway #6, was characterized by steep slopes of approximately 80% and for about half the distance covered with dense rain forest.

The absence of lateral fingers or more gentle slopes prevented any appreciable flanking movement, and the only alternative was a direct drive along the ridge line. It was a problem in engineering as well as in tactics. The tank could not go over the ridge if the attack was to be successful.

The attack continued against heavy resistance up terrain, which at times required the Infantry to negotiate it on their hands and knees until, on 29 March 1945, the 2nd Battalion reached the first of prepared defenses at a point 4500 yards along the ridge from Highway #5.

On 31 March 1945 after an airstrike and artillery preparation, the 3rd Battalion supported by an M-4 tank and employing a close-in flanking maneuver, attacked the enemy position. The tank was jockeyed into position and advanced along the ridge line, which was so narrow that at times only half of each track rested on the ground. The Infant followed the tank closely and by nightfall, 1 April 1945, the entire strongpoint had been reduced.

The tanks also had a psychological effect on the enemy.

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The rate of cargo unloading is given in Chart III.

General Orders #9, Headquarters Sixth Army attached the 25th Infantry Division, minus the 35th Infantry, to I Corps on 18 January 1964. On this date the Division G-4 contacted the I Corps G-4 regarding Corps policies as to levels of supply to be maintained, evacuation of casualties, burials, disposition of captured equipment, salvage and disposition of POW's. Administrative orders published thereafter were based on information gained at this conference.

In planning for the next objective it was seen that for an efficient supply the dumps would have to be pushed forward again, therefore areas were selected at Santa Maria and the dumps were moved to this area on 30 January.

On 28 January a Provisional Truck Platoon was formed consisting twenty-four 2 1/2-ton cargo trucks and sufficient personnel to operate on a twenty-four hour basis. Personnel and trucks were placed on temporary duty with I Corps and this severely hampered transportation problems within the Division.

front line units. Permission was secured to issue weapons as bridge guards and many Filipinos were recruited for this purpose. The beginning these guards were armed with captured Japanese weapons, however the Guerrilla units grew until stocks of captured weapons were soon depleted. Permission was then secured to issue arms to Guerrillas from organization stocks on a loan basis. Also at this time authorization was received from the Corps to issue individual clothing and equipment.

The Umingan and Lupao operation was supplied from the division d in Santa Maria and when these objectives were taken and plans for the next operation were known, all dumps were moved to the vicinity of San Jose on 10 February in order to supply the operation along Highway #5.

This level of supply was not great enough to allow advance Regimental and Battalion dumps. A request was submitted to Corps for permission to maintain a level of 5 days emergency rations and 2 U/F to support combat operations. This proved its value when various combat roads became impassable for 3 and 4 days at a time due to heavy rains.

On the 26 of February the supply route of the 35th Infantry was cut by the Japanese forces, necessitating air supply of this unit for a day. The air drop was made on 27th February, with one hundred percent recovery of all supplies dropped. The Japanese road block was knocked out on the 28th and normal supply resumed.

As the Division advanced north along Highway #5, the terrain along the Highway became more rugged. Therefore it became necessary to use Filipino carriers to move rations from Battalion dumps to the Company camps on the front lines. At times all types of supplies were hand-carried for entire regiments. East of the 100th Division

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1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046	2047	2048	2049	2050	2051	2052	2053	2054	2055	2056	2057	2058	2059	2060	2061	2062	2063	2064	2065	2066	2067	2068	2069	2070	2071	2072	2073	2074	2075	2076	2077	2078	2079	2080	2081	2082	2083	2084	2085	2086	2087	2088	2089	2090	2091	2092	2093	2094	2095	2096	2097	2098	2099	2100	2101	2102	2103	2104	2105	2106	2107	2108	2109	2110	2111	2112	2113	2114	2115	2116	2117	2118	2119	2120	2121	2122	2123	2124	2125	2126	2127	2128	2129	2130	2131	2132	2133	2134	2135	2136	2137	2138	2139	2140	2141	2142	2143	2144	2145	2146	2147	2148	2149	2150	2151	2152	2153	2154	2155	2156	2157	2158	2159	2160	2161	2162	2163	2164	2165	2166	2167	2168	2169	2170	2171	2172	2173	2174	2175	2176	2177	2178	2179	2180	2181	2182	2183	2184	2185	2186	2187	2188	2189	2190	2191	2192	2193	2194	2195	2196	2197	2198	2199	2200	2201	2202	2203	2204	2205	2206	2207	2208	2209	2210	2211	2212	2213	2214	2215	2216	2217	2218	2219	2220	2221	2222	2223	2224	2225	2226	2227	2228	2229	2230	2231	2232	2233	2234	2235	2236	2237	2238	2239	2240	2241	2242	2243	2244	2245	2246	2247	2248	2249	2250	2251	2252	2253	2254	2255	2256	2257	2258	2259	2260	2261	2262	2263	2264	2265	2266	2267	2268	2269	2270	2271	2272	2273	2274	2275	2276	2277	2278	2279	2280	2281	2282	2283	2284	2285	2286	2287	2288	2289	2290	2291	2292	2293	2294	2295	2296	2297	2298	2299	2300	2301	2302	2303	2304	2305	2306	2307	2308	2309	2310	2311	2312	2313	2314	2315	2316	2317	2318	2319	2320	2321	2322	2323	2324	2325	2326	2327	2328	2329	2330	2331	2332	2333	2334	2335	2336	2337	2338	2339	2340	2341	2342	2343	2344	2345	2346	2347	2348	2349	2350	2351	2352	2353	2354	2355	2356	2357	2358	2359	2360	2361	2362	2363	2364</
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Supplies needed by one Infantry Battalion (500 men assumed in line) for attack for one day operation	Carriers Necessary	Weight		Unit Carried Per Man	Total Weight Carried
		Per Man	Per Man		
		Man	Man		
60 cs C Batches	60	42 lbs	1 case		2820 lbs
16 cs Gal. 30 Rifle Ammo	100	22	5 bands		2200
16 cs Gal. 30 MG Ammo	32	38	2 chest		1216
			500 rds		
180 rds 50mm mortar	30	27.3	6 rds		810
200 rds 61mm mortar	80	28 lb	2 rds		2300
		29 lb	3 rds		180
20 cs hand grenades	40	25	$\frac{1}{2}$ cs		1000
1000 gals water	50	47.6	5 gal can		2382
2 cs (40 rds) 2.36 rocket	8	17.5	8 rds		140
6 rls W-130 on TM-8	3	34	2 rls		102
6 BA-70 batteries	3	44	2 bats		264
6 BA-62 batteries	3	34	3 bats		68
6 BA-40 batteries	2	34	3 bats		68
12 litter	12	22	1 lit		264
500 pigs	2	22.5	200 pigs		45
Assorted Medical supplies	5	30			150
Assorted Individual equipment	5	30			150
TOTAL	456				13579 lbs
Average pay load per man = 31.5 lbs					

PREPARATION

The Commanding General, Division Artillery, and his staff conducted a series of inspections of the Headquarters Battery and the four battalions to determine the condition of all unit equipment, the status of ordnance of such equipment, and the shortage of individual equipment. Division Artillery Headquarters also provided instructions in the use of maps and codes to be employed in the forthcoming operation. From the 1:50,000 maps of Luzon, the Division Artillery Headquarters compiled a list of check points which covered every possible sector in which the artillery would possibly operate. Battalion commanders and other staff officers were fully oriented in the details of the I-41 operation, in the latest estimate of the enemy situation then prevailing on Luzon, and in the connection this headquarters constructed a relief model twelve feet square of the entire Lingayen Gulf Area.

Personnel of the headquarters and headquarters battery embarked upon three ships: The USS Zeila, the USS Jackson, both assault transports, and the USS Appalachicola, a command, communication, and fire control ship. On this last ship were the Division Artillery Commander, two staff officers and sufficient enlisted personnel from the operations and radio sections to provide liaison for supporting naval gunfire should the need arise.

The battalions were split according to the division plan, and loaded by battalion landing teams. While this was not periodically desirable from an artillery point of view, it was necessary in order for the division to be prepared to perform any one or several of the various landings for which it was directed to plan. Last minute changes in available shipping and tonnage requirements necessitated splitting batteries in a number of cases. Had an opposed landing materialized, it is believed that this situation would have delayed seriously the placing of effective artillery support.

LUZON OPERATIONS

On the 17th of January 1945, the division entered the battle on the Central Luzon Plain. This phase of the operation was directed against a strong Japanese delaying action based on strong points situated in towns striding critical roads. The majority of fires delivered during this period were directed at fortifications and weapons within these towns and against troop and supply movements along the connecting road nets. Principal strong points were encountered at Binalonan, San Manuel, Urdaneta, and Lopez. At San Manuel, the division artillery was first confronted with support of an attack on a strongly fortified area whose defense was based on dug-in tanks, 75mm and 47mm guns, and machine guns, all of which took full advantage of the excellent fields of fire

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afforded by surrounding rice fields and of the excellent natural camouflage of bamboo thickets and high butt. This position was reduced by the infantry-artillery-tank team after a week-long battle whose intensity equaled that of any battle in Luzon. The battle reached its climax on the night of 17-18 January 1945 when the Japanese executed a coordinated counter-attack employing an estimated battalion of infantry supported by a company of tanks. Two battalions of light artillery fired their normal barrages which were instrumental in repelling the attack and bringing the total Japanese losses at San Manuel to 735 counted dead, 41 medium tanks, 3 light tanks, and 4 75mm gun destroyed. In support of operations in San Manuel the division artillery fired the following:

	105mm howitzers	105mm howitzers
US	2207 rds	1441 rds
Phil	376 rds	7 rds

The same pattern was followed at Urdaneta and Lopez; envelopment and encirclement tactics coupled with effective tank, artillery and air support resulted in heavy losses to the Japanese garrisons in these two battles. On the night 29-30 January, a Japanese motor column was trapped between two road blocks near Rosales and destroyed by artillery fire and direct fire from Infantry M-7 SP 105mm howitzers. A total of 8 tanks, 20 trucks, 15 full tracked prime movers, 8 105mm howitzers, 2 soldiers, and 1 57mm AT gun were destroyed in this action.

After securing Highway 48 and occupying San Jose after its capture by elements of the 6th Division, the 25th Division was ordered to advance within its zone to secure the road junction at Digdig. Highway 56 from San Jose to Digdig passed through a valley dominated by mountainous ranges on either side rising to 2700 feet. Contact with enemy forces supported by heavy mortars and artillery was made at Rosales where the highway left the flat Central Plain and entered the mountains. To flank this strong position one regiment with two 105mm howitzer battalions attacked and won a wide envelopment from Rosales to Digdig via Pantabangan and Carranglan. In the meantime the remainder of the division and artillery was engaged in destroying in detail the enemy in the mountains east of San Isidro and in the Lumbay-Panaga area. In this latter area the engagement at Digdig half of the 1st Bn and all of the 2nd Bn of the Japanese 10th PA Regt were destroyed. This defeat opened the road to Digdig and Carranglan and set the stage for the assault on the enemy's main line of defense of Highway 56 - Balet Pass.

At Balet Pass Highway 56 crosses the rugged Caraballo Mountains and descends into the fertile approaches to the Dagupan Valley. From a military standpoint this pass is a perfect defensive position. From Digdig to Balet Pass the road rises steadily, sometimes

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following the bottom of the narrow valley, other times hanging precariously on the mountainside with precipitous slopes above and below the road. Between Paltan and Balet Pass the road and valley are dominated on both sides by a series of ridges which become successively higher until the pass is finally reached. Throughout this advance our forces continuously found the Japanese occupying the superior observation. The capture of a ridge would disclose another ridge a few hundred yards ahead and usually a few hundred feet higher.

At the beginning of the operation the available maps were so inaccurate as to be worthless, hence aerial photos, resists, and E-CO oblique taken by the artillery liaison planes were used. Vertical photo coverage was poorly planned and consisted of a hodgepodge of varying scales. Coverage, scales, and overlap were unsuitable for construction of controlled models, so observed fire sheets were used almost exclusively. A great handicap was the lack of vertical control in this area where operations were conducted on mountains which towered 3000 feet above the artillery positions. Three subsequent editions of the map still failed to produce anything useful by the artillery. Target area survey was limited, hence practically all preparations had to be previously adjusted by all units firing.

In the assault on Balet Pass the division artillery first encountered enemy artillery in force. Captured documents revealed the enemy's artillery plan for defense of Balet Pass (See Annex 1) including an order of battle and general locations of enemy batteries.

The first plan of attack called for one regiment to attack north along the Spanish Trail from Carranglan while two regiments thrust attack striding Highway 56. Initially employment of artillery posed no particular problem but as the attack up the Spanish Trail progressed, it was necessary to shift two light battalions to direct support of this regiment. It was seen that this scheme of attack the pass was not feasible if one division hoped to capture the pass it would have to be done by placing all possible strength along Highway 56. The other plan was abandoned because it caused overextension of lines and failed to provide maximum economy of force.

The Japanese appreciation and utilization of terrain was of a high order. All commanding terrain was organized in detail and consisted of an elaborate integrated system of interconnected caves, pillboxes, and emplacements. Relieving our artillery and aerial supremacy, the Japanese artillery was employed in cave positions which afforded excellent protection against bombing and counter-battery fire. While these positions limited the traverse of their artillery, this fault was alleviated by the fact that our approaches were obscured by the terrain. Moving firmly entrenched himself

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in these positions, the enemy was content to remain on the defensive, conducting local counterattacks which, while vigorously executed, were seldom of a magnitude to influence our operations.

On Myoko Mountain the Japanese reacted violently to the occupation of a portion of the hill mass and counterattacked six times during one night. These attacks were supported by mortar and machine gun fire and hit the infantry perimeter from three directions simultaneously. The forward observer with this unit called for his normal barrage, which it is by sound so that it covered two sides of the perimeter and was of material assistance in breaking up the attack.

In only one case did the Japanese artillery obtain direct or effective counterbattery fire against our artillery. In this case, due to an overestimation of our line, he was able to employ a 75mm gun on a heavily wooded hill so that it could deliver direct fire on three artillery battalions from a range of about 3000 yards. This fire succeeded in causing some casualties and in putting three of our howitzers temporarily out of action. Two of the battalions were displaced before this gun was finally knocked out. The remainder of the fire enemy action against our artillery positions consisted of organized infiltration attacks using hand grenades and mortar and charges and ineffective counterbattery fire. One mortar battalion was attacked 12 times in 30 nights. That these were coordinated attacks was proved by captured orders and sketches of our positions found on Japanese killed during the attacks. In only one case was one of these "Wildcat" attacks successful. While the battalion was firing a mission, the enemy infiltrated the position, damaged some tractors and caused some casualties, but was unsuccessful in damaging our howitzers. With the present 7/0 an artillery battery is unable to maintain a tight perimeter, particularly when firing, without additional personnel.

The reduction of the defensive positions at Balote Pass was accomplished by a series of envelopments directed along ridge lines with massed artillery fire paving the way. The majority of fires were prearranged and fired on call when the supported infantry was ready to attack. Targets of opportunity were limited by poor visibility, heavily wooded areas, and the enemy's reluctance to expose himself.

On 15 May Balote Pass was captured and Highway #6 opened as a supply route. With the fall of the pass Japanese resistance west of Highway #6 and south of the Villa Verde trail seemed to collapse. Forces in this area withdrew to the east making a short but determined stand in the Bolong basin before retiring to the high ground east of the Samal River. During this withdrawal Japanese artillery became active at night. Reports indicated that this artillery fire was delivered by weapons previously unlocated. Since all artillery previously identified had been accounted for, it was evident that additional artillery had been committed. This assumption

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air section was often called upon to provide planes for surveillance of air strikes and reconnaissance flights for infantry and engineer commanders which were particularly valuable considering the poor quality of available map coverage. Night surveillance flights were made during both the operations on the plains and in the mountains. Night landings initially were made by jeep lights, using flashlight markers. Later, marking lights were installed on one field. These night missions were successful in bringing fire on mortar and tank columns and in silencing enemy artillery.

2. **A-40 PHOTOGRAPHS:** The Division Artillery took 8-40 aerial photographs during the operation, from which a total of 6000 prints were distributed. These were particularly valuable in terrain analysis, for designation of front lines and targets among infantry commanders forward observers and liaison officers, fire direction center, and air observers. In spite of the volume of prints distributed, both infantry and artillery felt the need for more, necessitated by the Division's wide front and shortage of air photo coverage. Shortage of photographic materials prevented the supplying of these photos in the quantities requested. It is felt that the addition of a photo section to the Division Artillery Headquarters for use with the air section will fill a long felt need, provided that sufficient photographic supplies can be made available. In most cases it was impossible to obtain pictures through normal channels in less than three days. The artillery often placed prints in the hands of front line troops in six to ten hours. The vital need for photographic equipment lies in the fact that photographs from required angles of numerous areas cannot be obtained quickly enough through Air Force coverage. Artillery cameras reduce the time from days to hours.

3. **ATTACHED ARTILLERY:** For the first time the Division Artillery was augmented with light, medium, and heavy artillery attached from higher headquarters. In previous operations in which the Division Artillery was engaged, supporting fires from adjacent divisional artillery and, on occasion, Marine Corps heavy artillery were available. In this operation, particularly in the action to reduce the Balote Pass defenses, the north of the 155mm gun, 8 inch howitzer and 240mm howitzer were clearly demonstrated. In this action, all artillery fires were concentrated in a relatively small area. Consequently, organic battalions and attached units were able to fire on the same targets. The divisional artillery participated in counterbattery and the heavier caliber attached units joined in preparatory and close support fires. Under these conditions the attached units operated directly under Division Artillery control, eliminating Group Headquarters, as such, from the chain of command. A team from Group Headquarters was employed to study all factors of Japanese artillery fire and to provide a Fire Direction Center for separate attached batteries. This proved highly valuable in the location and elimination of enemy guns. The system was entirely satisfactory, the 8-40 section experiencing no difficulty in coordi-

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tion was confirmed by subsequent identifications of the 2nd and 4th Batteries, 2nd Mobile Artillery Regiment. By this time the sound base had been moved to Balote Ridge where conditions were more favorable. Numerous plots were obtained and fired on; however, a search of the reported locations the following day failed to disclose any evidence of enemy positions. Subsequent capture of the 75mm self-propelled type 90 guns explained the numerous plots obtained during this period.

On 29 May the 37th Division passed through the 26th Division and continued the attack north along Highway #6 against the flexible resistance offered by remnants of units defeated and virtually destroyed at Balote Pass. Action in the division sector was limited to mopping up isolated pockets of resistance and patrolling to round up stragglers. Artillery targets became almost nonexistent giving artillery personnel a "breather". All units of the division artillery had been actively employed against the Japanese since 17 January; the prospect of the forthcoming relief was a pleasant one, however, another mission was yet to come.

It was decided that the Spanish Trail area lying east of Highway #6 was a threat to the security of that vital supply route and orders were issued to clear this area of Japanese. One regiment with a battalion of 105mm howitzers and a battery of 155mm howitzers attached moved north to Artao and attacked south along the Old Spanish Trail while another regiment attacked north along Carranglan. Under this pressure the Japanese defense collapsed, survivors withdrew to the east into the mountains and all organized resistance in the Balote Pass area came to an end.

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. **AIR SECTION:** Throughout the entire action all liaison planes were under the control of the Division Artillery and operated from a centrally located field which substantially was outside enemy artillery range. Where terrain permitted, advance fields were constructed for use during daylight hours. This system provided maximum economy of aircraft and pilots and without it the constant daylight patrol which was maintained for the five and one half months that the division was committed would have been much more difficult and less effective. All planes in the Division Artillery (including those of attached units) operated on a common channel which, though occasionally overloaded with traffic, provided the required flexibility. Any air UP could contact any battalion. In addition, the planes also carried the liaison channel of their organic battalions allowing air-ground communication to forward observers and liaison officers. The intelligence value of the continuous air patrol cannot be overestimated. A SCR 563-B was kept at the Division Artillery G-2 desk to monitor the air channel and was particularly effective in counterbattery work. The

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meeting the fire of six battalions and three separate batteries with the additional personnel from Group Headquarters. In situations of this kind it is believed it is more efficient to attach units directly to the Division rather than to Group and the Group to Division. In situations where the Corps Artillery Section takes over responsibility for counterbattery fires, and more units are available than can be efficiently controlled by Corps Artillery, Group Headquarters can and should be used.

4. **AMMUNITION:** Restrictions imposed on ammunition expenditure at the beginning of the campaign were not critical until the assault on Balote Pass. During this period the allowance was cut to one-month U/P per day. This stringent restriction was actually felt; careful planning and strict rationing of ammunition to the battalions was the rule. Artillery ammunition was initially to be distributed two U/P with Division, one U/P in AGP and two U/P in rear areas. It is believed a more satisfactory solution would be one U/P with Division, two U/P at AGP and two U/P in rear areas. Two U/P with Division necessitates a division dump or battalion dumps. Since organic loads provide for movement of a little more than one-half a unit of fire displacement of battalions necessitates extra guards until all ammunition is moved with a constant serious threat of destruction by infiltration groups. While the total rounds fired would probably not have been much greater for the period with a less severe or no restrictions, the restrictions imposed did reflect adversely on artillery support. The more stringent restrictions were in effect during the most critical stages of the operation when the greater supply was needed. At times the ammunition supply seemed to break down. The system of allocations proved inflexible in that it failed adequately to take into account that ammunition that was expended between the time a report was submitted and an allocation made, and the time at which ammunition would be drawn from the AGP to cover the expenditure listed in the report. This time lag resulted in low ammunition levels at the time on numerous occasions, despite the fact that ammunition records of all sections were in agreement and up to prescribed levels. Ammunition in transit or on allocation cannot be fired. Also ammunition frequently was not available in the dumps when needed, although an allocation had been requested. Again due to lack of sufficient personnel to handle properly artillery ammunition, AGPs received shipments with small amounts of numerous lot numbers. Personnel in higher headquarters handling artillery ammunition must be impressed with the difficulties and possibility of serious losses of infantry troops by a failure to supply ammunition in large quantities of the same lot number.

5. **FIRE DIRECTION:** Direct lines were maintained to all organic and attached artillery units and to the Air Support Party. These lines were tied into a WFOF switchboard; this arrangement proved highly successful in conducting all massed fires. The present 7/0

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personnel is not sufficient to properly control fires when additional units are attached, particularly where counterbattery missions are involved.

6. **ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY:** 90mm AA guns were employed both for direct and indirect fire. The direct fire weapons were placed on a high ridge in a sandbagged emplacement and a field of fire cleared, and controlled by infantry units. This weapon with its high velocity and flat trajectory, proved valuable in the reduction of cave emplacements not defoliated from these guns. Indirect fire, primarily for interdiction and harassing was valuable because of the added range. W. Fuess are not advisable enough on distant targets due to the flat trajectory. Experiments were conducted in radar location of enemy artillery. Several rounds were placed up, and general direction of the piece firing obtained. The inherent slowness of operating manual controls during search and the narrowness of the beam prevents the present radar from being of much value. The tests indicated that, with modifications to increase the speed in picking up projectiles in flight, and a more portable installation, the radar has great possibilities in preventing enemy artillery fire.

7. **OBSERVATION PLATOON:** An observation platoon was employed in the division order. Results obtained by both sound and flash methods were of little value because of the narrow valleys and rough terrain. Echoes in the mountainous terrain prevented accurate sound plots and flash results were limited by masking hills. Throughout the engagement the enemy was reluctant to move his artillery, even though it had been located and was receiving heavy counterbattery fire. A POW explained that positions took so long to construct that it was impracticable to move and prepare alternate positions; rather, they elected to stay in place until overrun or destroyed. As a result plots furnished by the observation platoon usually confirmed previous locations rather than locate new ones. Results were improved when Bullets Ridge was captured and the bases established there.

8. **USE OF ATTACHED ARTILLERY:** The phase of the operation during the time additional artillery was attached to this division the area of combat was largely a narrow corridor partially open for several miles and then heavily wooded and rugged mountains covered by rain forest on each side of the corridor with the high ground at the far limit of the area.

Two possibilities for the major use of the limited artillery ammunition available were apparent. One to use heavier caliber ammunition primarily for counterbattery missions and light and medium caliber for direct and general support missions; the other to use heavy caliber ammunition to reinforce general support missions. While the amount of enemy artillery fire was large in some portions of the area, the resulting damage was extremely small. In view of this fact, together with the heavy growth and well

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developed defensive positions encountered, the heavier caliber weapons were used primarily for general support and secondarily for counterbattery missions. Destruction of enemy artillery positions was not attempted until the critical shortage of ammunition was alleviated.

While counterbattery results with the heavier elements available were excellent, unquestionably an adequate amount of ammunition during the critical stage of the operation would have permitted a much earlier elimination of enemy artillery and would have been, in the whole, a most valuable contribution to the early success of the operation. The basic principle of utilizing heavy artillery primarily for counterbattery should be adhered to.

9. **COMMUNICATIONS:** Normal employment of communications was effected throughout the Lason campaign. Neither wire nor radio systems presented any major difficulties. Radio communication to the artillery battalions was little used, and practically no code transmissions were made. FO was not used, as the two metallic voice circuits to each battalion proved sufficient. These circuits at times were of excessive length, and in one instance measured 24 miles to a distant outlying battalion. This necessitated the employment of RE-49 repeaters. These are not included in T/S allowance and should be added. Approximately 100 miles of wire were laid, and the wire net in one installation measured 215 miles. This presented a problem of maintenance with only 7/8 allowance of personnel. More men should be added to the wire section. Aggressiveness on the part of every individual coupled with planning provided a wire net that was rarely interrupted for more than a few hours. Construction bulldozers were the greatest cause of broken circuits and interrupted service. An innovation which substantially contributed to efficient fire direction was the installation of a RE-49 outboard with RE-49 telephone plugged to a separate panel from each battalion or separate battery. This provided a highly flexible system and required a great deal of equipment, but it is believed that it was entirely justified. In one instance FDC handled twelve units with ease. The entire communication system was adequate and no major fault found therein. Basic concept and principles were sound, which with adaptation to terrain, organization, and the tactical situation proved quite successful.

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LESSONS LEARNED

Current field artillery methods were adequate and sufficiently flexible to meet any of the varied problems encountered in this campaign.

There is no satisfactory solution to the problem of ensuring early employment of artillery in a landing operation when it is loaded on APs and ARs and shipping is not unlimited.

Operation of all liaison aircraft under Division Artillery control is desirable from the standpoint of economy of effort, coordination, and reinforcement and deprives the battalions of no essential service.

The liaison plane furnishes the most reliable all around observation in wooded and mountainous terrain.

The L-4 cub is not as good as the L-5 for operation in mountainous country due to a slower rate of climb and less power.

Army trailers do not stand up under even moderately heavy usage and should be replaced by trucks - preferably four 5-ton trucks in lieu of six Army trailers.

Ammunition racks for trailers are not of sufficient value to warrant retaining them in the T/Ss.

Tables of organization do not provide sufficient personnel for the close-in defense of artillery positions when operating against the Japanese nor for the proper installation and maintenance of the extensive wire nets required in the normal though not best solution. Up to one hundred attached guerrillas per battalion were required and employed in this campaign.

K-20 cameras, photographic laboratory, and adequate supplies should be available within each division.

Lack of coordination in aerial photography and aerolossy flame missions produce results of a value inconformable with the time and effort expended.

Japanese artillery can be accurate, but it lacks punch and is unimaginative. It often remains in unselectable positions and, like the Japanese infantry, fights and dies in place. Jap artillery encountered so far indicates effective fire may be expected in prearranged impact areas; that practically all of the Jap fire is controlled by Regiment and very little artillery fire is encountered in other than prearranged impact areas and

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little if any in direct support of the Jap infantry.

Japanese artillery of all categories is habitually employed in elaborately dug-in positions difficult to eliminate.

The American soldier is prone to put off digging-in until he has been hurt.

The most serious and prolific violation of sound military doctrine is the habit of all personnel from senior commanders to privates of exposing themselves on the skyline of ridges and in the immediate vicinity of DPs thus inviting serious losses and particularly rendering the ground valueless for observation.

Present ammunition is neither flashless nor smokeless which makes enemy identification of our artillery locations extremely easy and accurate.

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AIR SUPPORT

The 28th Division used air power to a great extent during the LUZON Campaign. The division was extremely air conscious and used air power strategically to soften up Japanese defensive positions far ahead of the troops to give close support in bombing directly ahead of the troops, and to bomb Japanese artillery positions.

During the campaign 4,745 individual sorties were flown, 2,791.5 tons of bombs were dropped and 181,170 gallons of napalm were used.

Due to the fact that the drive for MANILA and the battle to the East of MANILA was the army's first priority, this division during January, February and March was allotted for its use only a small number of planes. During April and May, when it became very important to take BALETE PASS and open a road to the AGAYAN VALLEY, more and more missions were flown so that during these months the division averaged 89 sorties per day. During June due to the rainy season and due to the Army priority being given to the forces pushing up the AGAYAN VALLEY, only a small number of missions were flown in support of the division.

During the month of January, the division used its limited air power as long range artillery to soften up Japanese defensive installations in the towns of the CENTRAL PLAIN in front of the division axis of advance. On 18 January 1945, 8 P-51's and 4 P-40's of the 308th Bomb Wing, 6th Air Force, flew the first mission in support of the division. The target was SAN MANUEL where the Japanese had numerous tanks, gun positions, and fuel dumps. Six additional missions were flown during the remaining days of January. Targets were Japanese defensive positions in the towns of SAN MANUEL, SAN VICENTE, ZAYUE, NATIVIDAD and UMINGAN.

The first close support airstrike was flown for the 27th Infantry Regiment prior to its attack on UMBURAN on 1 February. Up to the last week in February only a few missions were flown for the division. The planes were used to soften up Japanese defensive positions and bridges in the mountains SOUTH of SAN JOSE along Highway #6. A-20's and Marine SB's were used on these missions.

Our air war was stepped up during the last week in February as missions were flown by A-20's and SB's every day against the Japanese holding force in the vicinity of FONGAR and LUMBOY. 241 sorties were flown in February, 80% of these were flown during the last week of the month.

On 7 March the first large heavy bomber airstrike was flown in support of the division. Six groups of B-24's from the 8th Bomb Command bombed Japanese defensive positions along Highway #6 from the PULAN BRIDGE to SANTA FE. 467 tons of bombs were dropped resulting in many large flash explosions and large fires throughout the target area.

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No further airstrikes were flown until 11 March when 9 SB's hit Japanese installations in the vicinity of MISULA. From 11 to 20 March, a small number of missions were flown daily against targets in the MISULA-MAHAT area. On 20 March seven missions were flown in support of the division involving 65 planes. This was the first large direct support mission.

On 22 March a second large bomber attack was obtained. Seven flights of B-24's pattern bombed Japanese bivouac and defensive areas in the vicinity of BALETE PASS. During the remainder of March the 161st and the 27th Infantry Regiments received the greatest proportion of air strikes in their advance on both sides of Highway #6 toward the strongly defended BALETE PASS. Usually three missions were flown daily, although on several days five missions were flown.

During the first nine days of April, 152 sorties were flown for the 27th and 161st Infantry Regiments. The 27th Infantry Regiment used the planes in softening up the Japanese defensive positions along their axis of advance, WOODY RIDGE. The 161st Infantry Regiment used the planes in close support missions in their advance on B-601 Hill, WEST of Highway #6.

On 10 April, the SB's of Marine Air Group 24 began to fly solely in support of this division. They were used against Japanese defensive positions along WOODY RIDGE. Flight leaders recommended the target in case for five days and 54 SB's did an excellent job of bombing. On the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th of April, 56 P-51's of the 6th Fighter Command also supported the 27th Infantry Regiment. On 17 April, 70 P-51's again bombed WOODY RIDGE. From 18 April to 24 April only 180 sorties were flown due to adverse weather conditions. The greater part of those were flown in support of the 27th Infantry Regiment against Japanese artillery targets.

On 27 April, 118 planes flew in support of the division and from then until 30 May, the division received an average of eighty planes a day. These planes were fighter bombers from the 308th Bomb Wing and the 6th Fighter Command. The 27th Infantry Regiment received daily support in the drive to take BALETE PASS and the high ground NORTHWEST of SANTA FE. One hundred fifteen sorties were flown for the 27th Infantry Regiment on suspected Japanese defensive positions in the high ground WESTERN of SANTA FE and the 27th Infantry Regiment secured this objective. The 161st Infantry Regiment received daily air support in its drive to reach the VILLA VERDE TRAIL. The 161st Infantry Regiment was supported by 135 sorties in its task of clearing Highway #6 to SANTA FE. This vast amount of air power used to bomb every Japanese defensive position in front of the infantry played a vital part in the division being able to accomplish its mission successfully.

Since 17 May, the 161st Infantry Regiment had used 34 to 36 planes daily to soften up Japanese defensive positions on the high ground

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NORTHWEST of SANTA FE. On 22nd, 23rd, and 24th May, every ravine and wooded area from BALETE PASS to SANTA FE NORTH of the VILLA VERDE TRAIL was bombed by a total of 468 planes in preparation for an attack by the 126th Infantry Regiment on the high ground WEST of SANTA FE. On the 22nd and 23rd May, 163 A-20's and B-25's were employed to augment the fighter bombers.

Two large napalm strikes were flown to further soften up this objective area. On each day the objective area, marked by two leaders of white phosphorus, were struck by 144 P-51's and 48 P-47's dropping two 165 gallon tanks of napalm each. Following this, 45 A-20's flew over the burned out area at low altitude and dropped eight 100 lb pen-demolition bombs each. The bombing was excellent and the whole target area was covered by flaming fires with smoke rising to 4000 feet. These two large napalm strikes were part of an experiment by the 6th Air Force in the use of napalm. Following this tremendous air preparation the 126th Infantry Regiment seized the high ground from BALETE PASS to SANTA FE against light opposition and the Corps objective was secured.

The air effort during June was greatly hindered by the rainy season. Only 233 sorties were flown in June. Targets along the CLO SP. RIVER TRAIL were bombed for the 27th Infantry Regiment and four objective hills in the PULAN RIVER VALLEY were bombed for the 161st Infantry Regiment. The last mission was flown on the 22nd of June 1945.

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PHILIPPINE GUERRILLA FORCES

A total of five thousand five hundred Philippine Guerrillas served with elements of the 25th Infantry Division during the Luzon Campaign. Their combat efficiency varied from poor to first class fighting men (Squadrons 101, 309 and 1st Company (CIMA)). The majority of the forces were elements of the Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces under the pre-liberation leadership of Major Robert Lapan and Major Barry McKenzie.

Various missions were assigned these units according to the combat efficiency of each unit or the tactical situation.

The First Guerrilla Regiment (LCAF) was attached to the 25th Infantry Division on 18 February 1945. This unit was well organized and had a high combat efficiency. The First Regiment operated administratively and tactically independent, although the 1st and 2nd Battalions were attached to various Regiments for a short period. The 3rd Battalion was given the mission of securing the right flank of the Division from positions on the Old Spanish Trail (JICA) of Carangian. In this position the 3rd Battalion successfully performed its mission even though the enemy made several determined and well organized attacks. The First Regiment numbered 3000 officers and men including its own artillery and hospital.

The First Provisional Battalion of the First Pangasinan Regiment was attached to the Division on 10 March 1945 and after a short training period by the 35th Infantry Regiment were attached to the 161st Infantry Regiment and were employed on security and reconnaissance patrols and security of supply roads. The Battalion had a mediocre combat rating due partly to difficulties in securing their recognition and pay.

The 12nd Battalion (LCAF) joined the Division on 1 March 1945. Its mission was to protect the Division Command Post. It satisfactorily performed this mission by a perimeter at night and patrolling by day.

Squadron 101 (LCAF) numbered 250 men, and was attached to the Division on 20 January 1945. It was first employed to guard the Division rear Command Post and to secure the Usung-San Jose road by patrols into the Caraballo Mountains. Its last mission with the Division was the security of the Davao-Dalican area where they killed an average of 10-15 Japs per day. The combat efficiency of this unit was very satisfactory.

Squadron 309 (LCAF) was a Chinese unit which joined the Division on 31 March 1945 and served with the 161st Infantry Regiment on patrols and occasionally as an assault company. The combat efficiency of this unit was excellent.

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The First Company, Chinese Overseas Maritime Newkian Military Organization, was another Chinese Company which also served with the 161st Infantry Regiment from 8 May to the end of the campaign. It also was rated as an excellent combat unit.

The Pangasinan Scouting Squadron, served with the 35th Infantry Regiment from 25 January to 30 June 1945 and was rated as an excellent combat unit.

The following units served with various artillery battalions and service troops: Squadrons 1, 102, 215, 216, 220, 245, and Company 2 of the 35th Infantry.

These forces rendered valuable service and were instrumental in the success of the 25th Infantry Division, due to the fact that without their employment the Division would have had to divert so many combat elements, for protection of lines of communication, that the accomplishment of the mission would have been compromised. Throughout they had little discipline, slightly trained and often poorly equipped they served as well as they knew how. Many were killed and wounded, and a good number received decorations for gallantry in action and meritorious service.

There were 22 Silver Stars and 55 Bronze Stars awarded to Guerrillas by the Commanding General.

SIGNAL ANNEX

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SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

DEBARMENT, ASSEMBLY, UNLOADING OF SUPPLIES

Communication was established by SCR-300 between Regimental Commanders, Commanding General, and the Assistant Division Commander immediately upon arrival at Transport Assembly Area. This voice net was used until vehicles were unloaded and additional equipment obtained at which time a CW Net was opened to the Regiments in addition to the FM voice net.

Wire equipment arrived morning of 12 January and wire communication was established to all Regiments by noon that day.

Lack of small boats caused unloading to be slow and required close coordination between Transport Quartermasters. It was necessary to establish a voice radio net with an SCR-300 on each ship and an NCS with the Division Transport Quartermaster. This net furnished the necessary control to the Division Transport Quartermaster and was invaluable in expediting the unloading of priority equipment.

Although signal equipment was slow in coming ashore, there was very little loss or damage and by 16 January all units had ample equipment to commence their attack.

THE ADVANCE ACROSS THE PLAINS

Wire was the principal means of communication within the Division and to Higher Headquarters throughout the campaign. Radio was used as a secondary means of communication only.

Normal wire circuits and radio nets were maintained throughout the period with relatively little difficulty encountered.

THE DRIVE ON BAILEY PASS

During the attack North on Highway #3 normal wire circuits were maintained, but at times with considerable difficulty as a result of extremely long lines, limited routes of supply, lack of alternate wire routes, and an occasional enemy road block.

Radio served as secondary communication, but was difficult because the mountainous terrain reduced the effectiveness of ground waves and forced reliance on sky waves for communication over any distance.

VHF Radio served as communication to Corps until after Bailey Pass was captured.

The Reconnaissance Troop was given missions requiring long

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patrols on foot. To meet the requirements of this work they were issued four SCR-604 and eight SCR-300 radios.

TECHNICAL NOTES OF INTEREST

Teletype proved invaluable for transmitting daily G-2, G-3, G-4, and Liaison Officer reports to higher headquarters.

All W-110 field wire used had very poor insulation. Often the insulation could be crushed with the fingers of one hand. This fact required that all lines be laid with great care. Basket ties were used habitually.

Field wire was called in numerous instances when several lines followed the same route. Cabled lines received more respect from the Engineers. However with the poor quality of the wire used, it was found advisable not to place more than four or five lines in a single basket tie. When wires were used the tie often cut through the insulation of the pairs in the cable. This was especially true for long spans.

Grass fires were one of the major hazards to field wire. Division Artillery Liaison planes cooperated by reporting the details on all grass fires to Division Artillery Headquarters. The Division Signal Office was notified and wire crews dispatched when necessary. When it was possible tactically, the first wire crew over a route often sent a crew ahead with a blow torch and burned the area off before the first wire was laid.

As in previous operations it was always found necessary to patrol all lines in order to discover the intentions of Engineers in the vicinity and to re-route lines before they were destroyed. Liaison and cooperation with Corps Engineers, who were often working well forward in the Division zone, was much more difficult than with the Division's organic Engineer Battalion.

There was not a period during the entire campaign but what it was necessary to maintain numerous long lines. Greater talking range was obtained by loading W-110, loading W-145, or by using Telephone Repeater BR-89 on W-110. It was found that repeater W-110 was superior to the other two methods because it was more reliable and was more flexible when a circuit was lengthened. It was found almost impossible to put a repeater on a loaded line to increase its range, and it was impossible to extend a loaded line with repeaters W-110. However a repeatered W-110 line could be extended with ease by lengthening with W-110 and adding one or more repeaters.

Radio Notes:

To maintain continuous long (15 to 70 miles) range communication over mountains it was found necessary to use two frequencies. A

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2000 KC frequency at night and a 4000 KC frequency during the day were found satisfactory.

Half wave antennas, cut to frequency, were found absolutely necessary to get maximum output for radios SCR-103 and SCR-604.

The most favorable antenna for the SCR-309 was found to be a coaxial fed half wave doublet. One such antenna out for 3800 KC and with a twenty foot coaxial feeder could be efficiently loaded at frequencies from 3200 KC to 4600 KC. Broadcast quality voice communication was frequently established day or night between Pullen and Manila (about one hundred airline miles) using this antenna.

In mountainous terrain the Artillery often found it necessary to supplement its FM radio nets with more powerful voice nets. Additional SCR-604 proved invaluable in providing communication in these cases.

SUPPLY

The Division came ashore with a thirty day maintenance level of all expendables except wire. This level was sufficient to maintain the Division until Army was able to stock its depots.

Major items of equipment such as SCR-610 and SCR-644 Radios destroyed in combat could not be replaced until after S plus 24.

No difficulty was had in obtaining all the W-110 wire needed. However on several occasions the entire Division was dangerously low on W-130 before it could be made available. A large percentage of W-130 wire was issued on DR-4 reels and had to be rewound onto DR-8's by the Division Signal Dump.

This Division, as did others, found it necessary to maintain a stock of all expendables in a Division Signal Dump and issue to units from that stock. The time required and the uncertainty of obtaining items at Depots when needed made a Division Stock necessary in order to keep units supplied smoothly.

Repair in the Division was operated on an exchange basis. By having sufficient spare equipment of each type in the Division Signal Dump, a unit bringing a piece of equipment in for repair could be given a working piece in exchange. This gave the units the fastest possible service and allowed repairmen to utilize their time more efficiently by being able to complete each job without frequent interruptions to take care of emergency repairs.

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MEDICAL SERVICE, M-1 OPERATION

Preparation for an assault landing was made according to SOP, 7th Fleet. Briefly, medical service was broken down into BLT's, with 1/3 collecting company attached to each. The battalion medical section carried 24 hour supply of organic equipment, plus another three days' which were dropped on the beach. The provisional collecting platoon gathered the three days' supply at a central dump at the collecting station. Another 10 days' supply was carried as hold cargo by each BLT. The balance of 30 days' was under division control.

The clearing station was opened on the day of arrival and the portable surgical hospital a few days later. With the rapid advance over the Central Plain it was necessary to leapfrog these units. A clearing platoon and a portable surgical hospital were moved together. The third portable was kept in reserve. After the fall of Ikingan, Lopez and San Isidro, the division front was wide as one clearing platoon and one portable were used to cover each flank. When the supply and evacuation route to Carranglan was cut, the reserve portable surgical hospital was flown into Carranglan and all patients were flown out. This was a most satisfactory means of evacuation. When the fighting proceeded up the valley, clearing stations were as far forward as possible, usually in the vicinity of the division forward CP. Because of enemy artillery fire one clearing station site had to be abandoned.

First echelon of evacuation was generally well performed. Company aid men and litter bearers repeatedly disregarded their own safety to evacuate casualties despite heavy sniper, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire. The high quality of first aid reflected the intensive thorough training the men received in New Caledonia. Aid stations were generally at Battalion CP's and were dug in as thoroughly as rapidity of movement allowed. In the later phases of the campaign, most of them were dug in deeply and covered with logs and sandbags.

Collecting stations were usually at Regimental CP's. The litter platoon was frequently used forward of the battalion aid station to supplement the battalion's litter squads. At the collecting station, patients were redressed and treated for shock as necessary. Whole blood was used extensively in collecting stations and played a great part in getting patients out of shock. A device was placed in each ambulance to permit administration of plasma while enroute.

During the operation the following statistics were compiled:

Admissions, disease and injury (loss NP)-----	4358
Admissions, (loss CP) battle casualties-----	3378
Admissions, CPO battle casualties-----	632
Dispositions to duty from aid stations-----	2394
(Battle Casualties 1000, disease and injury 1994)	

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Dispositions to duty from Clearing Station-----	4253
(Battle Casualties 260, disease and injury 3973)	
Dispositions, evacuated-----	4033
(Battle Casualties 2566, disease and injury 3467)	
Dispositions, returned to duty from evacuation-----	3812
(Battle Casualties 650, disease and injury 3274)	
Dispositions, died-----	165
Neuropsychiatric patients admitted-----	389
Neuropsychiatric patients returned to duty-----	504
Neuropsychiatric patients evacuated-----	64
Ratio of NP: NP-----	4:1

The incidence of malaria was low initially, rose to a peak in late March and early April with a secondary, lesser rise in late May. The relation of atabrine discipline to malaria incidence has been clearly shown.

Intestinal disease was a problem in April and May. Because we were operating over territory previously occupied by the enemy and hostile fire prevented proper care of money and food, the fly population was high. When this was corrected, the intestinal disease rate decreased markedly. There were four episodes of acute food poisoning, none of them widespread nor severe.

Infectious hepatitis appeared in March and increased rapidly in April. Since then the rate has remained constant. No conclusions as to mode of transmission can be drawn from our observations.

A working quarantine was established for 1400 replacements who had been exposed to mumps. The need for men in combat areas because so acute that these individuals had to be replaced before the end of the quarantine period. There were no serious consequences, there have been three secondary cases, widely scattered.

Two cases of scrub typhus appeared in March and five cases in June. One of the latter died.

Veneral disease appeared first in February, reached its peak in April, and later subsided. Control consisted of education of personnel, control of personnel going into civilian-occupied areas, and closing up of the only town in the area. The civilian authorities cooperated by isolating and treating infected women.

Other communicable diseases appeared but none were of significant incidence. They include dengue, upper respiratory diseases, and a few isolated cases of pneumonia.

Because the T/O of the regimental medical detachment does not include enough litter bearers, it was necessary to supplement medical troops with infantrymen cuts down the fighting strength of the unit.

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Numerous men and officers were lost by illness, wounds, and rotation. Replacements were few and many of the enlisted replacements were not suitable for front line duty. With the concurrence of the Commanding General, the medical department transferred riflemen to the detachments and supplemented their personnel. This has been a highly successful procedure; many riflemen had an interest in and aptitude for medical work and have become excellent company aid men.

Casualties in medical department troops were high. Thirty three men were killed and 235 officers and men wounded, many of them more than once. A large number of officers and men were decorated for gallantry and heroism.

Losses by illness and rotation accounted for many key officers and enlisted men including the division surgeon, CO and executive officer of the medical battalion, two regimental surgeons, division artillery surgeon, division dental officer, neuropsychiatrist, medical battalion S-2 and S-3, division surgeon's office executive, and their general duty medical officers. A large number of key enlisted personnel was lost also. Experienced, well qualified individuals were available within the division to make up most of these key losses.

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into the flamethrower but managed to spray the position with fuel which was then ignited by tracer bullets. The operation was successful. Seven Japs were killed.

c. **PURKAN**- 19 February 1945. In this action, a large cave about 40 feet long had been dug under a boulder at the top of Hill 2500 about 1000 yards SOUTHEAST of PURKAN. The cave was brought under fire and the flamethrower operator advanced to within range. He then fired two short bursts into the cave. Twenty six Japs emerged, some of them on fire. All were picked off by the supporting riflemen. Another Jap attempted to leave the cave by an undiscovered rear exit close to the flamethrower operator who had moved away from the cave mouth. The flamethrower gas-wetted the operator through the Jap on the head when the flamethrower gun, killing him.

d. **PULIAN**- 18 March 1945. The third battalion sent a flamethrower to reduce a cave in a road out near PULIAN. Air pressure in the flamethrower was low and only a small stream of burning fuel was discharged of insufficient range to reach the cave. The Jap inside was panic-stricken, however, and ran out to where he was debilitated by the supporting riflemen.

2. Actions by the 27th Infantry.

a. **UNIMAN**- 3 February 1945. An "L" shaped tunnel at the bottom of a hole was discovered and a flamethrower advanced to a point blank range under cover of supporting riflemen. The flamethrower was emptied into the tunnel and six Japs were killed.

b. **NEAR PURKAN**- 24 February 1945. A cave was discovered in a hillside SOUTH of the village of PURKAN which had not been reduced by other weapons. A flamethrower got within short range (estimated at about 10-15 yards) and fired into the cave. Screaming was heard inside and an explosion involving rotines and grenades was noted. No effort was made to enter the cave so the number killed is unknown.

3. Actions by the 35th Infantry.

a. Flamethrowers were not extensively used by this organization. Two actions were reported.

b. **LUPAO**- In the mopping up stage, the 3rd Battalion attempted to use a flamethrower team to destroy a Jap tank previously knocked out to prevent it from being used again as a sniper position. This failed because of a faulty pressure tank on the flamethrower.

c. **MAXINGALU**- A flamethrower team from K Company used the flamethrower to flush several Japs from a deep tunnel in the vicinity of MAXINGALU with good results. Number of Japs killed was not reported.

B. Flamethrower Tank Operations.

On 28 April in the vicinity of Myoko Mc. a flamethrowing tank of C Co, 775th Tank Battalion, supporting E Co of the 27th Infantry, was called upon to clear out an enemy position. An extract from the Division G-3 Operations Report, dated 1500 28 April states: "By dark, 28 April, the E Co attack had advanced 200 yards and reached its objective. The support of the attack by an M-5 flamethrower proved most effective. Although the number of burned enemy bodies were few, the action of the flamethrower forced the enemy to flee their positions making it easy to cut them down with small arms fire. A total of 55 enemy dead were counted in the 200 yards taken by E Co. Our casualties for this period were none."

On 23 May 1 flamethrower tank operating with two cannon-firing M-5's engaged a machine gun emplacement just east of Highway 5 about 1000 yards North of the Balote Pass Rest House. The cannon-firing tanks fired all morning without reaching the positions. The flamethrower tank arrived about 1500 and fired at a distance of about 50 yards, spraying the area with short bursts to clear the vegetation. During this operation, a small arms dump was set on fire. The Japs reacted more strongly against the flamethrower than the cannon-firing tanks apparently directing their fire against the flamethrower itself. After emptying the fuel tank, the flamethrower tank withdrew. Jap casualties were not known as the position was not immediately occupied by U. S. Troops. Fuel used was 5% M-5.

C. Air Operations.

M-5 bombs were used by supporting aircraft several times. They materially assisted burning out Japanese entrenched in the town of Unagan on 1 February. Similar incendiary attacks were made on Unagan near Tawa Isidro on 5 February and near Pusan on 16 March. A number of strikes were made against enemy positions in the Corabelle Mountains in the vicinity of Balote Pass.

At 1400, 26 March, six P-51's dropped M-5 bombs, presumably belly tanks, on a heavily wooded hillside 2000 yards west of Kapintalen in support of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry. The area covered straddled the crest of the hill. Four of the bombs dropped on the observers side, two on the far side where the effect could not be observed. Direction of the planes was parallel to the ridge. The weather was warm, dry, light cumulus clouds. Slope of the hill was estimated at 45 degrees. The first observable bomb landed near the crest of the hill. There was a very large burst of flame accompanied by a flash of white smoke, then a dense cloud of black smoke. The flame appeared to have a height from the ground to over the tops of the trees. When the bomb burst, the burning fuel ran down the side of the hill, covering an area about