

15LB

MOTO 2804
Egawa Tai

Nagayama Tai (Identification on Haversack, possibly
a Company of 13th Inf. Regt.)

OKI 6251 41st Field AA Unit
OKI 9811 17th Army Communication Co.
OKI 6930 5th Ind. Rapid Fire (AT Bn.)

2. ZIETA Trail.

NUMA 8925 220th Regt.
Nakao Tai 3rd Co.
AKIRA 9018
Takeuchi Tai 1st Co.
Nakao Tai 3rd Co.
Kuroda Tai 1st Bn. MG Co.

(NOTE: 229th Inf. identifications were most numerous but this
may be due to the fact that the 229th had been on New
Georgia for some time while the 13th Regiment Units were
sent in after combat started).

3. Japanese and U.S. equipment captured, consisted of rifles
and MG's. One Chinese MG found in large bivouac area on
Bairoko Trail.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

1. Continued resistance covering trails.
2. Rear Guard defense activity covering withdrawal Northward or West-
ward.
3. Concentration in Bairoko area for further defensive action.

A. Burden
BURDEN
Major
Acting G-2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1560

HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Forward Echelon

C O N F I D E N T I A L

8 August 1943

G-2 Report

From: 1200 7 Aug 43
To : 1200 8 Aug 43
No. 3
Map : CICSOPAC Photo Map (Group of 4).

1. Enemy situation at end of period:

*toward
mt. Lihambua*

- a. At 1800, 7 Aug 43, 1st Bn., 27th Inf., and AT Co. were digging in in Jap bivouac area thought to be on MT. BAO. 8 Aug 43, "C" Co. is reconnoitering the EW Trail to the West. A second patrol is reconnoitering to the North on the 'BAIROKO' TRAIL 3000 yds. Both patrols are for the purpose of determining if Bn. is now definitely bivouacked on MT. BAO. Neither patrol has so far received any opposition. "C" Co. found trail leading off in southerly direction but is continuing patrol.

151A

D. 2 Bn New Georgia

Hyatt

*See Waller's
note, 2nd Bn
We landed late early
in the day & went
up the trail. Bob
said we'd better have
a shelter ready & I
said no - it wouldn't
rain. That night it
rained like hell, shells*

going off, - there was
a lot of fighting -
& grenades popping all
around. We were in
this hole and I slept
thru it all - while Bob
stayed awake - piqued
about the whole thing -
but, especially because
he couldn't sleep. He
was sure it was all my fault.

122 "blast caught me in mid-air propelling me into the rear of the hole. It sure did a hell of a job on that limb - looked as if a big beaver had chewed through it in about six bites."

2 Btn. Ops.

The mission of the 2 Btn. was to pursue the retreating enemy to the north and clear the area between Piru Plantation and Sunday Inlet. This operation involved twenty two miles, with no accurate maps available, across mountainous jungles and swampland which, also, made supply extremely difficult. The Btn. went into a reserve defense at the Para Drop until 6 Aug. when it moved out, at 0900, and advanced 400 yards to west of RJ-W by 1430. Lt. Col. Ben Evans took command and next day the 2 Btn. moved west on Baxter Rd. to RJ-J and then to an area between Twin Hills where the 3 Btn. was located. Orders were received to pass through the 3 Btn., the next day, and continue the advance on Zieta. About 1430, 8 Aug., the lead scouts of George Co. entered a deep ravine, flanked by precipitous ridges, and G Co. came under intense enemy fire. A vicious fire fight broke out and flanking elements were sent out atop both ridges only to discover the enemy position was held in depth and, at 1700, the attack was discontinued in favor of a night defense position. The next morning, 9 Aug., the 2 Btn. jumped off, to continue the attack, at 0930, with E & F Co.s coordinating a frontal attack. After an advance of 150 yds. Easy Co. came under heavy fire and was pinned down on the slope of a hill. Commg between the units was difficult because of the rough terrain and very thick jungle. Easy Co. was then attached to the 3 Btn., by the Regimental C.O., and the 2 Btn. was ordered to envelop the enemy's right flank and by-pass the resistance to reach the rear of the Jap positions. Co.s F, G, and Hq. were to flank while H Co. moved several hundred yds.



First mail call on New Georgia in twelve days

HEADQUARTERS 251H INFANTRY DIVISION
Forward Echelon

13 August 1943

C O N F I D E N T I A L

G-2 Report

From: 1200 12 Aug 43
To : 1200 13 Aug 43
No. 8
Map : CICSOPAC Photo Map (Group of 4).

*New Georgia
Campaign*

1. Enemy situation at end of period:

- a. After the Artillery barrage, the tanks went into the resistance on the ZIETA Trail only to find the Nip positions evacuated. No pillboxes were found, but emplacements along side of trees showed where the Nips had been. Not being "dug in", the Artillery barrage was too much for them. LION advanced approximately 1500 yards during the previous 24 hour period ending 1645, 12 Aug 43. Positions form a box-like formation across the trail with LION Blue on the left, LION White on the right, "L" Co. on front facing North, and "M" & "H" Co's on bottom of the square. LION CP and "Cannon Co." are in the center.
- b. LION White completed their envelopment and reached the trail with no resistance. LION Blue then advanced along the trail in the lead, followed by LION White. The head of the column was estimated to be at (83.0 - 44.5). LION Blue advanced 1000 yards NW along the trail beyond the stream crossing (?) and met light resistance at 1645, stopping there and closing on the loading company, continuing the advance morning of 13 Aug 43.

2. Enemy Activities:

- a. Continued resistance along ZIETA Trail.

3. Patrol Reports:

- a. A native patrol led by Lt. Barrows and Lt. Koontz returned to LION CP around 1800, 12 Aug 43. Their route took them to TIROKAMBIA where they contacted SCHULTZ, and from there directly East to PIRU Plantation. Native scouts with SCHULTZ stated that there were no traveled trails between TIROKAMBIA or ZIETA to PIRU. All communication between PIRU and other points on NEW GEORGIA was by boat. Our patrol ran across one trail running N and S a few hundred yards west of TIROKAMBIA. No other trails were encountered until PIRU was reached. The plantation area is open with very little overgrowth. There is a rise between the eastern margins of the plantation and the beach, so that the beach area is not visible until this rise is crossed. All activity is in the beach area. Because of the activity in the area a night reconnaissance was made. There are numerous Japs in the area and much bargo activity was heard off the coast going N and S. No evidence of evacuation. There is a good road running N and S through the plantation area. Other trails are present, running in various directions and all in good condition.


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Patrol was challenged once and had to retire into the swamp area. No defenses were seen covering the rear of the Jap positions. It was not possible to determine the nature of emplacements along the coastline as reconnaissance was made at night. The Japanese are apparently unconcerned about their rear as they feel that the swamp is adequate protection.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

1. Continued resistance covering trails.
2. Rear Guard defense activity covering withdrawal northward and westward.
3. Resistance at ZIETA.
4. Organized resistance at BAIROKO.
5. Withdrawal and Evacuation at BAIROKO.

John A. Burden
JOHN A. BURDEN,
MAJOR, A. U. S.
Acting G-2



S-2 27th Infantry

to the southwest and then followed a compass course, cross country, parallel with the Zieta Trail. At 1430, the lead elements of Fox Co. surprised the outer defense of a Jap strongpoint and the lead platoon quickly pushed on to the top of the ridge. It encountered a number of pill boxes and foxholes and, in the ensuing fire fight two machine gun pill boxes were destroyed and a number of the enemy were killed.

Co. G then came up but no further progress could be made, since the enemy still held the commanding ground, and, with darkness at hand, the

Btn. went into night positions. On 10 Aug, the Btn. was drawn back so the enemy stronghold could receive arty fire. This saturation continued through the entire day. The attack resumed, at 0730, the next morning and, after advancing 300 yds., extreme resistance was met and then the Japs launched a counter attack against F Co's right flank. Fox Co's weapons platoon and all of G Co. were committed and the combined fire power succeeded in driving the enemy back. Repeated attacks were launched against the Jap positions, through the balance of the day, but no progress could be made and only heavy casualties were sustained by both sides. That night was relatively quiet, for the lines being so close (a few yards apart), but, about 0400, the Nips started throwing stones at our front lines and the Wolfhounds braced for a counter attack, which did not materialize. On the 12th, with drawl was again necessary pending the use of arty as soon after daylight as possible. Intense concentrations were laid down the entire morning and a coordinated attack by both Btn.s was ordered. At 1200, the 3 Btn. attacked astride the trail while the 2 Btn. maintained contact and moved along the high ground to the left (west) of Zieta Trail. Upon reaching the position of enemy resistance it was found the Japs had withdrawn and the 3 Btn. began immediate pursuit. The 2 Btn. assembled near the Zieta River and went in reserve while maintaining contact with 3 Btn.

During 13 & 14 Aug., the situation remained static; however, a platoon sized patrol from How Co., established a blocking position in a very

During the night a seven man carrying party, of Japs, was wiped out and the next day the roadblock patrol was relieved by another H Co. platoon, led by Lt. Johnson. Shortly after 2400, of the 14th, a Jap company sized party bivouaced a short distance from the trail block and the following morning they broke camp and moved down trail directly into the Wolfhound roadblock. Taken completely by surprise the leading enemy troops were literally mowed down by our machine guns. After this initial shock the enemy launched vigorous attacks on the totally encircled platoons all round defense. After five and a half hours of continuous fighting the platoon had only two grenades and a few rounds of ammo left and, not knowing that help was on the way, Lt. Johnson succeeded in breaking his men through the enemy circle and returning to the Btn. At a cost of two men KIA and seven wounded, the platoon had eliminated 60 of the enemy and wounded many more. That same morning the 2 Btn., preceded by light tanks, passed through the 3 Btn. and attacked enemy positions which had held the 3 Btn. for the previous three days. No resistance was encountered and the Btn. reached Zieta Village by noon. Patrols from both Btns. were dispatched immediately to maintain contact with the enemy and locate the 3 Btn, 148 Inf., somewhere in the vicinity. West of H Co.'s trail block the 3 Btn. elements again made contact with the enemy and the 2 Btn. patrol located the 148 Inf. troops, which had been on a hill overlooking the area for some time. The next day 2 Btn. relieved the 148 Inf. troops and continued the all points patrol activity. This same day a recon patrol, from the I&R Platoon, reported the presence of Japs at Piru Plantation, but none at Sunday Inlet. The Div. C.O. then ordered the 2 and 3 Btn.s to continue their movement to the north and west and capture Piru Plantation and thereby deny the enemy use of the Diamond Narrows, a narrow channel of water separating New Georgia from Arundel Island, as an evac route. Air recon of this area showed an apparent strip of high ground leading

- d. LYNX, moving through LION, proceeded northward along BAIROKO Trail encountering no enemy resistance.

4. Miscellaneous:

- a. Operations for LION Blue included the following: Captured 5 chests of documents and maps. Killed 47 Nips. Lost 1 officer and 6 enlisted men. Had wounded 6 officers and 44 enlisted men.
- b. According to an order issued by the 229th Infantry, an INDIAN AA UNIT composed of 28 men was sent to MUNDA on 7 May 43 with the 13th Infantry.

u This move was accomplished afternoon, Lion White passing thru 141
Lion Blue.. About 1430, the lead scouts of George Co. entered
a deep ravine, flanked by precipitous ridges, and G Co. came under
intense enemy fire (at 82.1 - 44.9) in the form of MG in a pillb-
ox. Ten enemy troops were killed while G Co. lost one man KIA.
Fox Co. moved around on G Co.'s left flank - coming in from the
west.. F Co. ran into a second MG nest which they knocked out..
Even so, a vicious fire fight had developed and flanking elements
were sent out atop both ridges only to discover the enemy position
was held in depth and, at 1700, the attack was discontinued in fav-
or of a night defense position. The ~~next~~ morning, 9 Aug., the
2d Btn. jumped off, to continue the attack, at 0930, with E & F Co.s
coordinating a frontal attack. After an advance of 150 yds. northw-
ard, to the west of the Zieta Trail, Easy Co. came under heavy fire
and was pinned down on the slope of a hill. Commo between the
unitss was difficult because of the rough terrain and the very
thick jungle. Easy Co. was then attached to Lion Blue (3 Btn.),
by the Rgtl. CO, and the balance of Lion White (2 Btn.) was ordered
to envelop the enemy's right flank and by-pass the resistance to
reach the rear of the Jap positions. Foxx Co. passed G Co.. and
proceeded northward to the East of the Zieta Trail but ran into
resistance which held them up. George Co. and Hqs. Co. were to
flank while How Co.. moved several hundred yds. to the southwest
and then followed a compass course, cross country, parallel with
the Zieta Trail. By 1200, George Co. was still held up but plans
were being laid to by-pass the resistance to get northward and
engage a group of Japs, estimated at company strength, reportedly
digging in along a river north of Zieta. This info came from a
patrol of 3/148 Inf..

X

across the swamp which surrounded Piru Plantation; however, this proved to be high grass and not dry ground. After several days of frustration, trying to find a crossing, Col. Sugg ordered a trail be blazed directly through the swamp using the same route followed by the recon patrol on 10-12 Aug. On 22 Aug., the 2 Btn. proceeded across the swamp and arrived 800 yds. to the rear of the plantation, opposite Cutter Point, that same afternoon. At 0700, the next day, the lead elements of the Btn. entered Piru and pushed on to Hathorn Sound. One company advanced to the north and two companies made a sweep south through the entire plantation discovering the enemy had evacuated the previous day.

This was evidenced by many supplies, dead beef cattle and prepared defensive positions left behind. The 2 Btn. manned the beach defenses facing Kula Gulf and patrolled the area; however, with the exception of frequent bombings by enemy aircraft, there was no enemy resistance and, until 10 Sept., all active operations for the 2 Btn ended on New Georgia Island.

Third Battalion Ops.

On 3 Aug., 1943, an Item Co. patrol moved north, from RJ-W, along the Bairoko Trail about 500 yds. where they encountered an enemy machine gun position and bivouac area. I Co. was ordered to move up and establish a defensive block just short of the enemy position, there to await further orders. King Co. moved to RJ-W to defend that spot and, also, maintain a road block at Baxter Rd. while the rest of the Btn. remained at the para drop. The following day I Co., on the Bairoko Trail, made contact with the enemy and located the Jap flanks but could not envelop them due to the company's small numbers. Around 1300, I Co. was relieved by the 1 Btn. and then retired to bivouac, in the old 148 Inf. C.P. area. King Co. was ordered to move west to locate the Zieta Trail; but, in doing so, encountered small active groups of the enemy and, by contacting these groups, K Co. could not reach its objective so it was ordered to return to RJ-W and go into bivouac with I and

4. 000, K Co. was ordered 400 yds. up the Bairoko Trail and Love Co. was to move up the Zleta Trail and establish the block K Co. had been unable to. At 1630, lead elements of the Co. ran into strong Jap resistance and, because of the time of day, withdrew to RJ-J and dug in for the night. On 5 Aug, the entire 3 Btn. was consolidated at RJ-J and orders were received to attack and seize Twin Hills about 400 yds. to the north. Lead elements of K Co. made contact at 1500 and well protected enemy machine gun emplacements were attacked with 18 Japs killed. At 1100, the second platoon of L Co. was sent on a wide envelopment on the left ridge from which further ops could be effected against the Jap positions. This platoon gained the high ground without opposition and joined the rest of L Co. west of the saddle. While making this envelopment the second platoon encountered a full platoon of the enemy. The Co. C.O. wanted to use the first platoon to reinforce the second platoon, but this was denied by Btn. and the attack was continued as planned. By 1600, the enemy was dislodged leaving about six dead. L Co. was then ordered to leave a security detachment on the high ground and push east to the saddle. Both Love and King Co.s succeeded in taking their objectives but did not make contact at the saddle on this date. I Co., less weapons pltn., followed L Co. and, on reaching them, helped organize the position for night defense. A Jap Btn. sized bivouac was captured with many maps and much booty.

(Bill Weidle)"It must have been 5 Aug. I joined the 3 Btn. At a starting point, before moving up to what I called Hill K, a Wolfhound, Lt. Greene, died with about ten dead Japs around him. After moving up on the hill we had a very nice double top hut to sleep in, but from then on - very little sleep. The next day (6 Aug.) I went to the hut Davis was in to get our orders for the day - it was to attack. Suddenly there was an explosion in the hut. I thought it was a smoke round which would be followed by HE mortar shells. We all got out some how - double quick. What had happened was a Jap sniper fired a bullet and hit flare equipm-

was kept by the enemy. We started the river then and I was with the
lead elements most of the time."

Early on 6 Aug., Item Co. rejoined its battalion and with King Co. ¹⁶⁶ secured the saddle between Twin Hills. The Btn. was then ordered to move cross country to secure Zleta and, at 1600, Love Co. moved up the Zleta Trail, about 600 yards and established a block without any opposition. The following day the rest of the Btn. moved up toward L Co. with I Co. in the lead. They encountered sniper fire and I Co.'s CO, Capt. David Baird, was wounded and Lt. Williams assumed command. This same afternoon, 7 Aug., in order to maintain contact with the main enemy body, I and L Co.s moved another 1600 yards up the trail and established a bivouac in a small banana grove, but met no opposition. When they moved on, 8 Aug.

was uneventful but on the next day the 3 Btn. made contact with the 2 Btn. and went into position on where the 2 Btn. had been held up by strong enemy resistance. On 10 Aug, Item Co. moved east through dense jungle, at 0900, then turned north to attack in a north west direction, against the enemy's left flank, while Easy Co. attacked frontally. By 1300, I Co. reached a narrow ridge top held by the enemy. The attack continued at 1400 and had gone but a short distance when enemy machine gun positions were encountered and, because of the denseness of the jungle and intensity of the fire, an order was given to dig in for the night and establish a cordon defense.

(Weidle)"About 10 Aug. my uniform and equipment were wet but I did have a compass reading for Sgt. Gile which I gave to a Hq. Recon. man. My compass was broken but, with Lt. Hooks getting readings, I didn't need mine. (Lt. Hooks was the Intelligence Officer for Mjr. Davis' 3 Btn. He was also a map expert. He was a fine officer, but his thick glasses kept him from making patrols.)"

About 1100, the next day the attack was pushed vigorously, using smoke grenades and intense basic weapons fire, forcing the enemy back and destroying several machine gun emplacements in the assault. Tanks were heard coming up and the attack was not followed up since plans

On the 12th, the attack was delayed, while arty delivered a 90 min. preparation, until 1100, and then proceeded until the troops reached the Zieta River. After a brief halt the companies were reorganized and the advance continued with L Co. reaching a position about 1000 yds. south of where Zieta was supposed to be located. Enemy elements were then discovered and two platoons of L Co. were advanced into strong resistance. Two casualties were sustained with one of them being L Co.'s C.O., Capt. Oliver Roholt. The lateness of the day required the units then go into night defense. Lt. William Stroh was given command of L Co., on 13 Aug., and, after a Btn. withdrawal to allow for an arty preparation, which started at 1100 and lasted twenty minutes with the attacking companies, L and K, moving as close to the fire as possible during the last minutes, discovering the enemy had moved up with them during the barrage and it became a fight just to get to the LD (Line of Departure). The Btn. ran into intense enemy resistance and because of the dense jungles, swampy ground and the depletion of the unit strength (50-60 men per company) flanking movements could not be made. For example, Easy Co., re-attached to the 3 Btn., had tried to sweep around the right flank of Love Co. in the afternoon, but was kept from enemy contact by a swamp. The Btn. retired to their positions of the previous night. It had been a day of heavy casualties for the Wolfhounds.

(Weidle)"On 14 Aug., Gen. Collins came up and talked with Davis and Capt. Bayless. The Japs must have thought we had our chief there and all hell broke loose with machine gun fire. We pushed on toward Zieta with scouts who were New Georgian Natives. I had to watch myself pretty close as, after several bouts on the Canal, I knew I was malaria prone."

On 14 Aug., the attack was resumed with the same results; however, this day .81 mm mortars dropped rounds behind the Jap lines and then walked them forward. Despite this tactic progress was not made and so


300 yds. until they encountered enemy sniper fire. About this time King Co. arrived and Mjr. Davis directed that the two companies attack the enemy position. The assault commenced until heavy machine gun fire and rifle fire were encountered and the companies were instructed to dig in for the night while harassing arty was placed 400 yds. to the enemy's rear throughout the night. The next morning, 16 Aug., the attack resumed and the companies passed through an enemy bivouac, that had been deserted, and continued on, arriving at Lulu Channel, where a block was established to deny the enemy further use of the docking facilities. The following day the Wolfhounds were relieved by units of the 148 Inf. and returned to Zieta where the nights of 17 and 18 Aug. were spent.

(Weidle) "On 16 Aug. we hit dry ground and when I opened a can of

C Rations Koontz jumped me for throwing the can on the ground. I then buried it - I should have known better. During this time Lt. Koontz sent me out to find a trail. After some distance I could locate no trail, since the maps were too old and growth had covered everything over. I wasn't doing too good. I heard something of a Jap patrol inside Piru and all I had was a carbine - wished I had my M1. I wasn't supposed to fire anyway so as not to give away the big attack on Piru. I don't know how long I stumbled around; but, I didn't panic since I had gotten a reading when I left camp. I finally ran into swamp ground, and had some idea where I was, and came out facing a Wolfhound with a BAR. He wasn't trigger happy, ^(But) and I was afraid he had thought I was a Jap. When I got back I met with Koontz and it was decided I and a native scout would cut the wire. I cut the wire while the other scout held it, so to elim-

A Wolfhound rests in a Jap hut





2. ZIETA Trail.

NUMA 8925 220th Regt.
Nakao Tai 3rd Co.
AKIRA 9018
Takeuchi Tai 1st Co.
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Kuroda Tai 1st Bn. MG Co.

(NOTE: 229th Inf. identifications were most numerous but this may be due to the fact that the 229th had been on New Georgia for some time while the 13th Regiment Units were sent in after combat started).

3. Japanese and U.S. equipment captured, consisted of rifles and MG's. One Chinese MG found in large bivouac area on Bairoko Trail.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

1. Continued resistance covering trails.
2. Rear Guard defense activity covering withdrawal Northward or Westward.
3. Concentration in Bairoko area for further defensive action.

A. Burden
BURDEN
Major
Acting G-2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Botanical Gardens, Manurewa, Auckland. The site of the gardens back in the war years was used for Camp Orford, home for hundreds of American servicemen.

25th Division US Army (Tropical Lightning Division)

This division was stationed at Schofield Barracks Pearl Harbour when Commander Fuchida emerged from northern skies to bomb the American Pacific Fleet on 7 December 1941. Almost a year later elements of the division landed at Guadalcanal to relieve the 1st and 2nd Marine Corps Divisions and later the Americal Division. Following the securing of Guadalcanal, elements of the division moved to Russell Island, to Rendova Island in the New Georgia Group, and were later involved in the attack on the Munda Airfield. There were mopping up operations in Vella Lavella, Arundel Island and Kolombangara Island. The New Georgia Group was declared cleared by October 1943. The division returned to Guadalcanal and prepared for movement to New Zealand for R & R combined with some training. The rear echelons had reached New Zealand by 5 December. There was training for a projected landing against the Japanese at Kavieng New Ireland.

By the end of February 1944 the 25th had quit New Zealand and was en route to New Caledonia where it continued to train for Kavieng. This invasion was cancelled on 1 June. However, the division was alerted for participation in the Philippines operation. The unit left New Caledonia on 17 December 1944, practised assault landings on Guadalcanal, reloaded ships and sailed for the Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, in the Philippines, via Manus Island in the Admiralties, to arrive off the Gulf on 11 January 1944. The division was to spend the next six months in the mid-north of Luzon fighting the enemy down Highway 5 and over to the west coast at Dingalan Bay. By the end of June 1945, the Philippines campaign was over and again the division was alerted for its next objective, the invasion of the mainland of Japan. The Japanese circumvented this attack by capitulating, and so the 25th was designated as part of the Occupation Force of Japan.

37th Division US Army

This division first went into combat with the Marines at Munda, New Georgia, Solomon Islands. Following this the unit was a back-up division for the 3rd Marines Division at Bougainville and was later engaged in front line fighting against the Japanese in that campaign. From January to August 1945, the 37th was part of the invading forces in the Philippines and helped seize and liberate the walled city of Manila.

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
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PFC. Wm. F. Weidle

that it would look like it was and hadn't

been cut. All that was necessary was to touch it and it would fall down. We then hid behind a large rock and figured all we had to do was wait as we were exhausted.

During the night, rifle fire occurred behind us and I knew it was a Garand. We sweated a while and then I finally went to sleep. The native stayed awake and told me that some Japs shook the wire but didn't see what we had done. At dawn the

Wolfhounds came up and I asked Lt. Koontz

if I could go in with them but he said my job was done. The rifle shot, during the night, had hit Sgt. Paul and it had, also, given away our plans. The Japs evacuated to Arundel Island."

On 19 Aug., the 3 Btn. moved to Fox Co.'s bivouac, 1600 yards to the northwest, and remained there through 20 Aug. sending one patrol west trying to get to Piru Plantation and another patrol was sent north to locate Mt. Tirokambia. Other security patrols were also sent out. Only the second patrol was successful.

(Weidle) "I think it was 20 Aug. the engineers gave up on trying to build a cord road - too much mud. They wanted to get 155 howitzers up to support us. On 22 Aug., the 2 and 3 Btn.s reached Piru Plantation, following our trail across the marked places, and the occupation of Piru Plantation meant the end of the Wolfhounds campaign on New Georgia Island. It was just in time for me for I had developed a bad swamp rash and my malaria had come back. It was the hospital for me."

On 21 Aug., at 0700, the 2 Btn., followed by the 3d, proceeded into the swamp and a distance of one thousand to fifteen hundred yards was crossed in mud from knee to waist deep with full combat equipment, and by afternoon, of the 22d, the Wolfhounds arrived 800 yards in the rear of

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Early the next morning lead elements of the 2 Btn. entered Piru and then pushed on to Hathorn Sound. Patrol activity combed the plantation for the enemy, but the position had been evacuated the previous day leaving food, equipment, and their defensive positions - all of which had been pointing out to sea. The Wolfhound Btn.s prepared beach positions and patrols were sent out as far as Sunday Inlet. Aug. 23 brought



Railroad tracks running along a narrow peninsula leading from Piru Plantation to the sea.

to a close the drive in the northwest sector of New Georgia - which was reduced to inactivity.

The main body of Jap survivors had slipped out of both Zieta and Bairoko. On 5 Aug., Gen. Sasaki felt he could no longer defend New Georgia Island. He sent the 13 Inf. to Kolombangara and his remaining Infantry units to Baanga.

Arundel Island

The 172 Inf., of the 43 Div., invaded Arundel Island on 27 Aug.; however, the Japs offered slight resistance and was soon overcome. The Island was declared "clear of the enemy". A few days later, however, strong enemy positions were encountered on Bomboe Peninsula, at the northern end of the Island. This was the situation when the 27th Inf. was attached to the 43 Div. and the Wolfhound Commander was given control of all units on North Arundel. With the Wolfhounds were two Btns. of 169 Inf., one company of the 103 Inf., B Co. 82 Chemical Btn. (debut of the 4.2 mortar in the Pacific), the 43 Recon Troop and six Marine tanks had to be committed. On 8 Sept., the indefatigable Sasaki sent the 3 Btn., 13 Inf. from Kolombangara to strengthen Arundel and the balance of the 13 Rgt. on 14 Sept.