

a few days, I told him I was great. I got back with the outfit in time to make two landings on Arundel and then fell on my face. At the Field Hospital I was sick as a dog and when I woke up there was Eleanor Roosevelt. She told me not to bother getting up and if I should ever have any problems to write her. When we got back to New Zealand I thought I had that Malaria whipped; however, I couldn't shake it and doctors said I'd had enough. I see the Japs, at the barbed wire, in my sleep. The real heroes, to me, were the buddies we left out there in the islands."

(Bill Naylor) "I was a Btn. commander in the 172 Rgt., which had gone into Arundel on 27 Aug., preceding the Wolfhounds, and we had been engaged by the 13 Jap Rgt., which was the same organization that opposed the 27th Inf. on Arundel. My account deals with an interview of Saishiu Kinoshita, who was commander of a machine gun co. and later, on Arundel, commander of the 13 Jap Rgt. The 13th Jap Rgt. was from Kyushu (The main Island which the Wolfhounds would later help occupy following the war.) and had served in China for six years. The strength of a Jap rgt. in WW II was 4000.

(Naylor/Kinoshita) "I was struck by the similarity of the Jap and US experience, on New Georgia; no order of battle, no maps, scanty and sometimes faulty intelligence and unreliable natives. (enemy viewpoint) When it came time to discuss the Arundel phase, Kinoshita stepped to the blackboard and without referring to a map or any notes, drew the Island of Kolombangara, the Kula Gulf, Arundel Island, Wana Wana Island, the Diamond Narrows and Ondonga. He then proceeded to outline various of our units and positions. It was remarkable for its accuracy after 41 years. The trials and hardships that the 13 Rgt. faced were typical of most Jap units in the S. Pac. At one point during the battle, Kinoshita's men complained about the lack of air support and they turned their pay back in to get air support. A single Zero came over and

waggle his wings when was of course comfort to everyone

Col. Sugg was assigned CO of all units on N. Arundel with orders to 124

contain and destroy the enemy on Sagekarasa and Bomboe Peninsula. The enemy was estimated at company strength. The Wolfhound I & R Platoon was ordered to outpost Islands 1-10 to protect the Regiment's right flank. The 2 Btn. and Regimental Hqs. moved by LCT.s to Bustling Point, on the west side of the Island, on 10 Sept., then that night and the following day moved by small craft to Bomboe. The 3 Btn. followed the same day.

2 Btn. Ops.



the 27th Infantry CP at Bomboe Village, Arundel Island.

At 0900, 10 Sept., the 2 Btn. was ordered to prepare to move with combat equipment immediately, and the CO, L/Col. B.F. Evans was ordered to Munda to make an aerial recon of North Arundel Island. The next day the Btn. ex. officers and company co.s made a surface recon at E. Bomboe and during the day the

Btn. moved from Bustling Point to E. Bomboe.

(Chaplain John Scannell) "Lt. Col. Ben Evans was given the mission of dislodging the Japs from Arundel Island in the northern Solomon Islands. Arundel is a small island about one-half mile off the south west shore of the larger island of Kolombangara.

"One company, from the 43 Div., had earlier been assigned the same mission as the 2 Btn., but it was feared that they had been totally annihilated. For some time there had been no commo contact with them at all. The directive from the Commanding General, of the 25 Div., Lightning Joe Collins, also included the instruction to strive, if possible, to contact any survivors of the lost unit and rescue them.


"In WW II, the TO for a Btn. was 1,000 men and all units in the Div. were slightly overstrength when we began our campaign on the Canal.

MM MORTAR SECTION FIRING IN
SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY AD-
VANCING ON ARUNDEL ISLAND.



Their machine gun and .37 mm fire drew the fire of practically every enemy gun. The tanks action and the locating of the enemy positions was coordinated by Capt. Ben Ferguson, K Co.'s C.O., who wrote the information on slips of paper and passed them through the pistol ports. The tanks finally ran low on ammo and had to withdraw. Several enemy pill-boxes had been destroyed, but there was no apparent let up in the intense enemy fire. Casualties were again heavy, but the aid of the tanks seemed to bolster the spirits and morale of the Troops. The next day the 2 Btn passed through the 3 Btn. lines and took up the attack with the tanks. The enemy positions seemed to have been deserted, however, and the Wolfhounds reached Zieta about 1200.

(Weidle) "About noon we hit Zieta Garden which had been an abandon banana plantation for years. The native scout said the swamps were tabu and this is it and left us. From then on we used native scouts from the Canal. We had Lt. Col. Bush as Regimental C.O. at this time as Col. Suggs was on Guadalcanal suffering from a bad jungle rash. Suggs



Jap hut at Zieta

> himself. With sticks and poles we were able to mark swamp trees with white cloth so the Btn. could follow us to high ground and not fall into the holes of stinking, dirty water."

At 1300, 15 Aug., Love Co. was ordered to move west, along a trail leading from Zieta, to locate H Co.'s block. This was accomplished,

"came back later."

"Now came the recon job with Lt. Koontz, recon scouts, and natives. Koontz gave me a pair of signal wire cutters to cut barbed wire and I could have cried. Evidently they ^{it} were all that were available. We entered the swamps with orders that if attacked it was every man for

"Now the Btn. had scarcely 250 men left, including two cooks. After the Guadalcanal Campaign plus two more months of fighting on New Georgia attrition had been heavy due to battle casualties and tropical diseases: malaria, dengue, jungle-rot, C-ration quick step and the like.

"Now cooks are soldiers, too, and well trained in the use of weapons other than pots and pans. Since they would not be cooking, they became infantrymen. For food we were issued C-rations of varied fare. Our Btn. had been moved from New Georgia Island in Higgins Boats, manned by Navy personnel, to the east end of Arundel. We landed on a small peninsula, unloaded our ammo and supplies and, after setting up a perimeter defense, dug in for the night. There was no other unit of the Wolfhounds in direct contact with the enemy, at the moment, so I went with the 2 Btn. as Chaplain.

"The next morning we were to advance as skirmishers, and the men were spread eight feet apart so that none of the enemy would be bypassed. The only difficulty was the island widened rapidly as we advanced and our right flank was soon in the air precariously. All the Nips had to do was get around this flank and we would be trapped. I asked permission from the C.O. to accompany the troops and it was granted with the admonition to stay out of trouble.

"We jumped off (Army term) 11 Sept., 1943, at 0730, and it was a beautiful tropical day. Through the dense jungle and huge trees one could even see, occasionally, a spot of blue sky. The temperature was 120 degrees and the humidity 100%. About an hour later an infantryman to my left called me over and asked, "Padre, do you see that coral snake curled up on the ground?" Due to the darkness in the jungle and because the snake had the same color as the ground, of coral composition, I had difficulty focusing my eyes. After about ten seconds of hard staring I was able to see the snake. There are several species of coral snakes in the tropical world, I am certain every herpetologist would agree that every coral snake has a very distinctive head. To my knowledge this is the only venomous reptile in the Solomon Islands. The

trooper smashed the snake with the butt of his rifle and we moved on. I forgot to ask his name and - I forgot to ask that Wolfhound how he spotted that snake in the jungle gloom. 176

"We had been advancing about three hours when suddenly there was a burst of fire to my right. We had encountered a Jap outpost. One G.I. had been hit, not critically, thank God. We continued our advance until about 1600, when the decision was made to set up a perimeter defense and bivouac for the night. As it turned out, we were only about 100 yds. from the enemy force, and didn't know it.

"On the following Thursday, in a fierce enemy attack, our front line was breached for about 100 feet, but we plugged the gap as well as we could and the fighting went on. The C.O. very probably knew, by this time, that the Japs far outnumbered us and he called for reinforcements from Div. Hq. He also asked for tanks, but the request was denied, since Hq. was of the opinion that tanks could not be used in dense jungle. Lt. Col. Evans persisted and his request was finally granted. We had no tanks with our Div. at this time, but Gen Collins was able to get the services of six light Marine tanks, manned by Marines, attached to us. Our situation was desperate but we held on because it took the better part of a week for the rest of the Rgt. to arrive along with the tanks.

"We had been fighting for about ten days when our commo Sgt. luckily picked up a weak radio message from the remnants of the "lost company". Directions were received plus the information that there were twenty two e.m. and one officer left. We were asked to please try to rescue them. Our C.O. formed a squad of about 18 men and armed them with B.A.R.s so they could move light and fast as well as a considerable distance behind enemy lines with the maximum fire power he could provide. In a brilliant piece of rescue work the 23 men were located and returned without further casualties. They were forced to bury their one mortar and the ammo. It was feared, at the time, that those shells might come back to haunt us and this is exactly what happened on the

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"On Sunday, 15 Sept., the attack on the enemy positions was planned to jump off at 1300. Everyone was getting behind trees and into foxholes, awaiting a Jap counter-attack. I was looking for a good tree for protection and came upon two corporals who were behind a good sized jungle tree. They very politely invited me to get in there with them and I accepted their kind offer. I had barely gotten in there when an overpowering urge in my soul told me that if I stayed in that place I would be killed. What could I tell the two corporals? I had absolutely nothing upon which to base this intuition, yet I felt that if I tried to explain my feelings they would think I had gone Section Eight - as we used to say when a soldier had broken under the strain. Two, or three days earlier we had three men who broke under the stress of combat - and one of these had received the Silver Star for gallantry on the Canal. When I heard his Confession he calmed immediately. I felt that I simply could not let the rumor get out that I, the Chaplain, had gone psycho. I told these two men that I wished to talk with an officer behind another tree, I was dismayed when I came to the other tree since it was smaller than the one I had left and there were four men behind it. These jungle trees have great supporting roots growing up to the trunk and often these roots started thirty feet out and became so high at the trunk a man could not see over the top.

"I had no sooner gotten into position than a mortar smoke round fell among us. (I had to take my hat off to the Nips they were good soldiers and were right on target.) The Japs had found the buried arms and, as soon as the smoke round fell ten rounds of HE followed in rapid succession. I lay next to a Lt. Wilcox, of the 65 Combat Engineers, and he got hit by a thin fragment in his right wrist. It was not too serious but there was a streamlet of blood. I said "I've been hit too!" I could feel warm blood running down my right leg. A shell fragment about the size of a dime had pierced the canteen I was carrying on my right hip and the warm water was running down my leg.

...when I discovered what had happened - afterward. I had learned on the Canal always carry two canteens - one on each hip. I had once been caught with only a pint of water to last 36 hours. The Japs had cut us off and the terrain was so bad that native carriers (the Cannibal Brigade) were unable to get supplies up to us.

"There was a lull after the last shell had fallen and then I heard a call for help. I was paralyzed with fear and, to my shame, I must say that I lacked the courage to crawl out there alone to a wounded man. This was the only time it happened. I looked around for someone to be miserable with me and I asked Lt. John Flowe, from S.C., if he would go with me. He agreed and we made our way to the wounded Wolfhound. My fear left immediately and I stood up and asked Lt. Flowe to stay with the man and I would go for a stretcher. I didn't call for a medic since he was busy elsewhere. I went for the stretcher, about 100 yds. away, and on my way I passed the two corporals I had left. To my sorrow they were both dead - literally riddled with mortar fragments. They were the only men killed by the mortar barrage of our own shells.

"My feelings were inexpressible and, as I walked to the aid station, I said a prayer for their souls. I grabbed a stretcher and headed back to the wounded trooper. He had been hit in the middle of his back and it was a bloody wound about six inches in diameter. Lt. Flowe and I placed him on the stretcher, carried him to a jeep and told the driver to rush him to the rear for medical treatment. As I pondered what had happened, I marvelled at how the Lord had spared me and why. There was little time for thought, though, since our tanks began their assault and the Wolfhounds were right with them. Within two hours the battle was over and the enemy had been routed.

"War brings nightmares and I thank God that my last one came Nov. of 1969. Before then they would occur every two, or three years and were always identical, down to the last detail; however, they had noth-

ing to do with the events on Arundel Island. The locale was the Island of Luzon and happened a year and a half later. On this particular day, in Mar. 1945, we had about 125 casualties - one of our worst days. I was so tired I was unable to dig a foxhole. I simply wrapped myself in my blanket and lay down on the ground, even though the enemy mortar barrage was expected. It was near 2000 and there was a full, very bright tropical moon. About 0100 I could see an enemy soldier crawling toward me to stab me. I made a loud cry and woke myself up. I was bathed in sweat and very embarrassed and listened for a while to see if my scream caused any commotion. My apprehension was met only with thunderous silence. That was my nightmare and from that time on I understood the shrieks I heard, at night, at different times, during combat. My buddies, also, were having their nightmares. What I saw some distance away was not an enemy soldier but an American soldier lying on the ground, plainly seen in the full moonlight, wrapped in his blanket."

(Kinoshita/Naylor) "Kinoshita became Regimental CO, of the 13 Jap Rgt. on Arundel after his two predecessors had been killed during the Arundel fight. It was agreed by the Rgtl. officers that the men should fight to end. During the fight with the 13 Rgt., it was wondered how they could concentrate so much fire power and Kinoshita said that he had 80 machine guns at his disposal and, being a former machine gun company commander, he knew how to use them."

At 0730, 12 Sept., the attack, of the 2 Btn., jumped off with E and G Co.s advancing abreast in a line of squad columns. Fox Co. followed about 300 yds. behind in a reserve status. The flanks were secured by the north and south shores of the peninsula. By 1030 the Wolfhounds passed through a company sized Jap bivouac, about 2000 yds. east of their landing point, which was deserted. Another vacated position was passed through and from this time on light, delaying resistance was met at regular intervals, every two, or three hundred yds. and quickly over-

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versus the Greys. After all, the American Civil War had only been over
eighty-odd years then. We heard talk of 'nigger lover' and 'nigger hater'.

Sometimes they were short on rations, and bullocks and vealers were
bought around the district. Once they bought a vealer from me, and a
group of them arrived bristling with knives. But when it came to the
actual killing I was asked to do the job. Some of them looked like New
York taxi-cab drivers and were not exactly used to slitting the throats of
cattle.

When soldiers from the 25th Division arrived for R & R after being
involved in heavy fighting for Guadalcanal, they looked like zombies.
They had been through traumatic times and stuck to their camps and to
their bunks. In some cases their companies had been decimated by the
Japs in Guadalcanal. It took them a while to understand that we were
offering them hospitality when we invited them into our homes. On one
occasion when we had some of the boys here one soldier left a two-dollar
note under his plate. But with time they got to know us and accepted us
as friendly natives.

When the boys came back from the battle zones they were bristling
with guns of all sorts and liked to go shooting for rabbits and goats. I took
some of them with me on a rabbit-hunting foray over my own property
now and then, but, man, they scared the shit out of me. Their guns were
pointing in all directions and I reckon I was lucky to get out alive. One
day I was coming in through my gate and I heard *plop, plop, plop* ahead
of me. I knew someone was shooting nearby. I counted what I thought
was a magazine full, then put my heels into my horse and went like hell
for home. Yes, there was always some sort of activity going on, legal and
illegal — life was never dull down our street in those days.


I remember one day watching a line of soldiers moving down our road
and I could see the forward element moving over the brow of the hill a
mile away. They must have had a battalion of men moving in single file
in manoeuvres. Every camp had an outpost set up on the hills. Even
today you can see the foxholes commanding a view of the road to the
north. They had dispersal areas round the camp in case of air raids and
there was a complete blackout at nights. The Navy had a station over the
water from Leigh at Cape Rodney — obviously a radar unit. The house
is still there, a great big place with big rooms to take many cots. The
infantry were all through the Waiwhiu Valley on manoeuvres, up to the
Wayby Valley, back through to Whangaripo over to Matakana and then
home. I don't know how many miles they did, but they were always
absolutely jiggered when they got back — really flaked out. They did
night manoeuvres — you never knew when you were going to have them
around you.

There were quite a few American troops killed here one way and
another, with road accidents, two killed on a goat-hunting expedition, and
there were a few shootings and knife incidents. But it must be remembered
that these men had been brought back from sustained battle actions and
some were under stress. I know I made a bit of a fool of myself one day.
I had been away for a while and when I came back into one of the camps
the soldiers were all looking very glum. Jokingly I asked, 'Who's dead?'

ome. The advance continued until 1600 when the entire Btn. went into a cordon defense for the night - having covered 3000 yds. in their east-erly advance that day. The next day the advance was continued and, at 0930, 130 commo wire was found by Easy Co. and contact was attempted with elements of the 172 Inf. From this point on enemy resistance became increasingly heavier with G Co. becoming pinned down and E Co. advancing to the northeast until they reached the crest of high ground. After a short advance the Btn. was pinned down and went into a night defense. On 14 Sept., the Btn. was ordered to hold in place while a patrol from L Co. was sent out, at 0730, to by-pass the resistance and try to contact the elements of 172 Inf. This was established about 1100 and the depleted American Unit was attached to the Wolfhounds with orders to attack on an azimuth of 290 degrees and contact the right flank of the 2 Btn., 27 Rgt. Heavy resistance was met immediately and the only way to effect the mission was to by-pass the resistance. This was accomplished and the 172 Inf. remnants entered the 2 Btn. perimeter at 1730 hours. On Sunday the Japs were shelled continuously by arty, 4.2" and .81 mm mortars. An attack was launched by the Btn, at 1150, but was unsuccessful and the Nips counterattacked in force and succeeded in driving a wedge in Fox Co.'s line. 43 Div.s recon platoon reinforced F Co. and they drove the Japs out of the original positions. On 16 Sept. the enemy was again heavily shelled and, at 1300, the 1 Btn., with the AT Co., arrived with orders to attack the next day. At 1630, six light tanks entered the defense position, during a rainstorm, which deadened the sound of their arrival making their use a total surprise to the enemy.

1 Btn. Ops.

(File) "The only thing we could get on the radio was "Tokyo Rose" dishing up nostalgic music and the latest news - with a slant. We never felt that she did any harm to our morale because most of her news was such a bald faced lie that we got our kicks and we actually enjoyed the music.



MANTRYMEN READY TO BE
CROSSING FROM ARUNDEL
STEPPING STONE ISLAND.

"If the Japs had known what a morale booster she was, they would have stopped using her; however, one night she gave out some disquieting news. Elements of the 43 Div. had been beat up on the Island of Arundel - losing their mortars and machine guns in the process. Rosey had a special message for 'you gallant men of the 27th Inf. Rgt. The Wolfhounds are going to Arundel where the 13 Japanese Inf. Rgt. will destroy you completely.' Sure enough, the next day we loaded on a barge and moved over to Arundel Island to join the second and third battalions who had arrived earlier. We later learned the 13 Jap Inf. had the 1 and 4 machined gun companies and one AT Co. attached to make their forces several times the size of ours. This was 16 Sept. and I had two of the original men left in my platoon, Cpl. Swede Swanson and Pfc. Pociacha. Other Rgtl. platoons were as bad off.

"Arundel was a low island, with fairly even terrain, solid coral rock with a few inches of dirt so that digging in was a matter of picking up loose rock and piling it up in front of you. We had light Marine tanks attached to us and they did yeoman service in the ensuing scrap. With the guns the Nips had captured and their own auto weapons it seemed that every other Jap had a machine gun and they kept a steady rain of fire on our positions. It was all sighted hip high so, at least, we could crawl around underneath this hail of lead. Using our tanks as mobile pillboxes, we encouraged the Nips to make frontal assaults. They were then driven back and we could hear them shouting instructions while regrouping. Someone, from Dog Co., shouted "We're out of machine gun ammo!" The supply dump was just a few yds. behind the forward units and everybody in the C.P. group, including the Btn. C.O., rushed up with all the ammo they could carry. It was distributed just before the Nips made their final attack. It was a hot time in the old town tonight. There was a Jap heavy machine gun blasting away in front of me and I crawled up to have a look and saw the gunner hunkered over the gun, traversing and searching, while his number two attached strips of ammo together to feed the gun. I shot the number two and the gun ran out of bullets right now. The gunner turned and, seeing his

number two indisposed, decided to take off. I shot him as he was getting to his feet and he went at least six feet off the ground.


"I had missed the first phase of our landing on Arundel because the Btn. surgeon had evacked me with fever and after effects of by "ration tree" fall. I was sent back to Munda where the field hospital was completely disorganized. They hadn't taken my clothing and equipment "from me yet so, at the opportune moment, I caught the next boat going back to Arundel. I got back just in time to catch the tail end of the Arundel action and was able to stay with the outfit for several days before the surgeon found out I had gone AWOL to get back with the outfit. He ordered me back to the hospital under threat of courts-martial. I was going through periods of blackout and wasn't too well organized. Just after I got back with the outfit, Swede, Pociacha and I were trying to dig into the coral. Swede was trying to dislodge a rock where he wanted his hole and I heard a "clink" when he stuck his entrenching tool. I went over to find out he had been pecking away at a dud 105mm mortar round buried in the coral. Swede decided it wasn't where he wanted his hole."

3 Btn. Ops.

Maps of Arundel Island were issued to 3rd Btn. at the time the official warning order was received, on 10 Sept. 1943, while the Btn. was still at Firu Plantation. Little was known of the situation existing on Arundel Island, and part of what was known was later found to be false. The Btn. completed its move and consolidated on Bomboe Peninsula by 0900 12 Sept. The maps disclosed a small "Stepping Stone" Island midway between Sagekarasa and Bomboe Peninsula and this appeared to offer the best route of approach to the Btn.s objective. A careful recon was made by the Btn. officers and it seemed certain that wading would be the best way to get to Stepping Stone and then Sagakarasa. After first landing at Bustling Point shuttling of troops began to Bomboe

Peninsula and by 1700, 11 Sept., Companies I, K, and half of L had been moved to a point about 2400 yds. east of Bomboe Village where an all round defense was set up while the rest of the Btn. bivouacked back at Bustling Point. The next day the rest of the Btn. was brought in and consolidated by 0900. Twelve men were furnished to Rgt. I&R to recon and seize islands 1-10 extending west of Sagekarasa Island. At 1430, Love Co. was ordered to place a block on the Jap north-south trail across Bomboe Peninsula. This was accomplished before nightfall, with blocks emplaced on both ends of the trail. On 13 Sept. the Btn. moved out early, following the route taken by Love Co. the day before, and reached L Co.s block at about 1000. They remained at the site until 1100, when orders were received to proceed to the vicinity of Stepping Stone Island. This was accomplished about one hour later and an immediate recon was made of the area. The Btn. had been given the mission of seizing Sagekarasa Island and Stepping Stone Island seemed the best route of approach. Mike Co. was to prepare 81 mm mortar positions on the peninsula with the mission of placing fire anywhere. The Co. started clearing firing positions and it became necessary to cut a number of large trees plus dense foliage before any firing could be done. Baker Co., 82 Chem. Btn., attached to the Wolfhounds, likewise started preparing their positions.

The Attack, by Item Co., jumped off at 1450 and the advance proceeded very slowly since the channel to Stepping Stone proved to be almost neck deep and rather swift. The scouts led with the Company arriving at 1530. A brief halt was made, while a recon was conducted, and then the advance continued. The channel to Sagekarasa was not as deep and the advance progressed without



Item Co. Wolfhounds cross from Stepping Stone Island

oppositon until the north shore was reached at 1630. King Co. followed Item and the two consolidated before going into a cordon defense for the night. I Co. also established a block opposite Stepping Stone. Three Japs walked into this block during the night and two were killed. In the center of the island, at 2230, a K Co. machine gunner observed a column of Nips approaching from the west and, as the moon was near full, he let them get within a few feet and then opened up. The first five in the column were killed, with the others scattering to the west. The remainder of the night on this flank was quiet. OP's which were located on the north flanks of both co.s noted extensive barge activity through the night in Blackett Straits, which lay between Sagekarasa and Kolombangara Island to the north. Several times during the night a Jap float plane was observed landing and taking off near the southern shore of Kolombangara. Artillery was requested from the 169 F.A.B., which was in support of the Wolfhounds, however, the guns would not register on the targets so as not to expose their position to a Jap observation plane in the vicinity.

On 14 Sept., shortly after daylight, Japs were seen infiltrating from the west towards K Co. and a brisk fire fight ensued. It was still in progress when the balance of the Btn. arrived on Sagekarasa. In order to prevents the Nips from cutting the commo line M Co.s machine gun section was placed in the gap and intermittent fighting took place all day along this western line. At 1330 a platoon from I Co. was sent along the southern slope of a small east-west ridge near the middle of the island. A large enemy bivouac was located and the patrol succeeded in surprising the Japs in this camp killing five and then withdrawing to our line with the enemy following them as they pulled back. The sporadic fighting which had been taking place all day intensified as the Nips tried to work their way into K Co.'s lines. Although the denseness of the jungle permitted the enemy to get very near to the Wolfhound positions the use of light machine guns

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and hand grenades prevented the Japs from penetrating the lines. K Co.'s line was reinforced for the night by all available Hqs personnel plus five men from Item Co. It was known, from captured enemy maps, that a barge landing was located on the northern shore of Sagekarasa and, accordingly, all mortars were registered along that area. Signals were arranged so that barge concentrations could be put down in this entire area in case the Japs used these facilities for reinforcing or evacuating.

(Kinoshita/Naylor) "Kinoshita decided to withdraw from Arundel but had to contend with the US Navy, which patrolled the Kula Gulf; however, their patrol pattern did not vary and so this permitted the evacuation to be scheduled during those gaps."

The registrations were completed on the afternoon of the 14 Sept. and a FO, from the 192 FAB, arrived on the Sagekarasa to adjust fire on the western part of the island. At about 2115, OP-1 reported several small landing craft were seen approaching the northwest corner of the island and the barge concentration was immediately laid down. No determinations were made on this fire; but, the barge activity continued through the night. a few minuts after daylight, 15 Sept., the Japs attacked along the western line concentrating on the high ground in K Co.'s area. Due to a lack of clear fire fields the enemy was able to work within grenade distance of our lines. Also, considerable sniper fire and heavy machine gun fire was laid on the Wolfhound position. All men who could be spared from M Co.'s mortars, plus Hqs. Co. men who had been carrying supplies, were sent in to reinforce the Btn. A request was also sent to Rgt. that Love Co. be returned as soon as possible. With this help and with the help of grenades and light machine gun fire, the lines were held while Item Co. began preparing a secondary defense line to the rear of King Co.'s line. By 1150 the new positions were ready and K Co. was ordered to retire to the new defensive positions. Item Co. took up the fire fight, during the movement, and about noon a platoon from the 169 Inf. arrived and were


followed minutes later by L Co. Using a single mortar with HE light ammo, an observer from M Co. started adjustments west of the new lines and near the center of the island. This fire was then walked in until it was falling on the Nips 100 yards west of I Co. Ten rounds were fired for effect and then was brought in 50 yards closer. During this concentration, I Co. laid down a volume of rifle and machine gun fire so that the Japs could not pull out of the impact area. This mortar fire was walked around, within 35 yards all up and down the Wolfhound front, and continued the rest of the day and during the night. All enemy activity ceased to the west and both flanks were quiet for the rest of the night.

On 16 Sept., after a mortar preparation, which was started close to our lines and then walked westward about 200 yds., the attack jumped off and progressed steadily until it had passed through the area of enemy activity yesterday, and then came under hostile fire. The fire increased in intensity until the entire advance was pinned to the ground. It was decided to pull back and saturate the Jap position with mortar fire. The withdrawal was made and then discovered two Wolfhounds from L Co. were pinned down out there. After all attempts to rescue the two men had failed mortar fire was adjusted on the enemy position and a barrage laid down.


During the afternoon a .37 mm AT gun was brought up along with two .50 cal. machine guns and set up and cleared fire lanes along the shore line. At about 2130, that night, OP-1 reported a string of six barges approaching the north shore and the barge concentrations were called in. As the barges pulled away the OP passed on this information to the new gun crews and the 37mm opened fire on the string and got a direct first hit on the lead barge. The second HE round was also a hit and the 50 cal.s also raked the line of barges. This activity proceeded through the night. Registration of the 105's by the LO from the 169 FAB finally started that afternoon, and was completed just before dark. The registration started from 150 yards in front of our lines to the west end of the island. On 18 Sept., the AT Co., as a rifle co., was attached

to the 3 Btn. with the mission of establishing a block on the east end of the island. AT Co.'s advance got off at 1100 and, having met no opposition in their assignment, they proceeded to establish the block and then cross to the west end of the Peninsula and establish another block there. After two recon squads were sent out, and returned, the co. came under a sudden and intense enemy attack losing two machine gun positions, before they could be established, and having the fire field of a third severely restricted. The position soon became untenable and, at 1600, the co. was ordered to withdraw while covering fire from 2 Btn.'s machine guns, on Arundel, was laid down across the AT Co.'s front. This fire was effective in distracting the Japs and aided materially in the maneuver. The withdrawal of the AT Co. was completed in about 45 min. and they went into a defense position, with K Co. and the platoon from 169 Inf. About 1200, 18 Sept., the Btn. was informed that A and B Co.s, 27 Rgt., would be attached and an attack was ordered as soon as possible after their arrival. The attack jumped off, at 1545, but after advancing 75 yds. came to a standstill due to intense enemy machine gun fire. On the 19 Sept. the attack was attempted again, but with the same results and even flame throwers could not displace the Japs pillbox. That night barge activity was observed again and one Wolfhound, on outpost, sighted an enemy landing craft about 25 yds. away and started firing, with his carbine, at the boat. He scored on the boatman and started the entire shore line firing with the result that the boat was sunk. Other barges were fired upon but with unobserved effect. About 2215, the barge concentration started and this drew the response of Pistol Pete from Kolombangara, which gave the area a through shelling - most of the rounds being long and falling in the rear area. At the height of the shelling all commo lines were lost and out until daylight. At 0900, 20 Sept., the attack to the west was again launched, with the lead elements feeling their way slowly through the dense undergrowth. The main line of enemy resistance, the

past two days, was reached and passed without opposition, while the western half of Sagekarasa was subjected to intense harassing mortar fire. The rate of advance increased as the undergrowth decreased and all mortar fire was lifted. At 1405 the western end of the island was reached and contact was made with the OP on Island 1. At about 1700 the defense of the western part of Sagekarasa was taken over by A Co., 169 Inf. On 21 Sept., the Btn. plus attached units crossed to the peninsula and repeated the same movement as the 20th until they made contact with the 43 Div. block and then went into defensive positions. Food and water was brought in to the troops by boat, using the south lagoon, and nothing of consequence occurred during the night. The 3 Btn., upon being relieved by the 1 Btn., moved via Stepping Stone back to the bivouac area on Bomboe Peninsula. Their active part of this campaign came to a close.



Supplies and troops arrive at Arundel by LCT as the last Japanese were being forced off the northern sector of the island by the 27th Infantry.



Papakura Military Camp and surrounding areas, with some units in Warkworth, and again in March 1944, when it remained for around four months. The 152nd FA Battalion and the 103rd Infantry Regiment were in Warkworth for their second stay in New Zealand.

The 25th US Army Division (under Major General J. Lawton Collins) was camped in the greater Auckland area and Warkworth from 7 December 1943 to 24 February 1944. General Collins later became a corps commander in the war in Europe, followed by the appointment as chief of staff in the war in Korea. The division establishment comprised three regiments: the 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhound), the 35th Infantry (Cacti) and the 161st Infantry Regiment (National Guard). The first two were permanent units within the American forces. In the Auckland area the troops were mainly camped in the Papakura Military Camp, Cambria Camp, Puhinui, and the Pukekohe-Tuakatu area. The 25th Division of 10,227 officers and men was reinforced by 5000 men by the end of February 1944. The establishment of the full division is shown in the Appendix.

The 145th Regiment of the 37th US Army Division, from Ohio, was the first US Army infantry unit to arrive in the South Pacific. These were also the first US Army men (as opposed to Marines) to come to New Zealand. There were several changes of plan, for initially the Advance Detachment of the Division set out for Melbourne on 20 April 1942. Then the commanding general, Major General Robert Beightler, was informed of a change of destination to the Fijian Islands. While the division was southbound for Fiji, ships carrying the 145th Regiment and auxiliary troops and their escorts received orders to divert to Auckland. Fiji was unable to accommodate the full division until such time as occupying New Zealand forces were repatriated to form the nucleus of the 3rd Division 2 NZEF.

The main body of the 37th, in the *President Coolidge* escorted by HMS *Leander* and two American destroyers, arrived at Suva on 10 June. (It was the *President Coolidge* that was to shuttle the Kiwis in Fiji back to New Zealand, and later return the Americans to man the sectors vacated by the New Zealanders.) The Advance Detachment had travelled from Melbourne to Auckland in late May. The convoy carrying the 145th passed down the Rangitoto Channel at twilight on 12 June 1942.

The 145th Infantry Regiment and division artillery command posts went into barracks at the Papakura Military Camp, the 1st Battalion 145th to Manurewa, the 2nd Battalion to Pukekohe racecourse, and the 3rd Battalion to Camp Karaka North. The 37th Signal Company settled in at Camp Orford, Manurewa, Companies B and C of the 117th Engineers Battalion went to Camp Hilldene, the 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion bivouacked at Camp Helvetia, and the 135th Field Artillery were at Camp Opaheke. For the 37th it was a very brief introduction