



Wolfhounds Earn Their Badge



In Nov., 1944, the Rgtl. C.O. was informed that the Rgt. would be engaged in the Luzon Campaign of the Philippine Liberation Operation, code name: Mike I of Musketeer III. The Div. was scheduled to land over the beaches at the south end of Lingayen Gulf with the mission of Sixth Army reserve. The Tropic Lightning was assigned a landing date two days after the Target Date, or 11 Jan. 1945, and inasmuch as the Div. constituted a floating reserve, provisions were made for landing on either a friendly or hostile beach. Fortunately it turned out to be a "walk on".

On 15 Dec. 1944, the Rgt. moved to the Noumea Dock area and was divided into Btn. landing teams and loaded onto the ships of Transport Div. "Baker".




210  
... of the six convoys in which I sailed during the war the last was the largest - over 160 ships. The Navy coddled the Army, placing all Army personnel in the center of the convoy. The Navy was escorting three Infantry Divisions, plus many special troops, such as Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Medics. Being in the center of the convoy all we could see, as far as the eye could reach, was ships -- each in its proper place. Each ship was zigging and zagging to confuse any enemy subs that might be lurking nearby. As I gazed at that vast expanse, it made me think of a soul, sailing life's stormy sea in it's search for eternity. Many of these men were literally sailing into eternity. We travelled from Noumea, New Cal, on 17 Dec. 1944, and landed at Lingayen Gulf, on the west central coast of Luzon, 11 Jan. 1945."

(Ernie Lucas) "We shipped out of New Cal and to our practice landing on the Canal and I wish I could remember the name of the ship I was on, Latimer, - Oxford - the Comet - the Navajo Victory - it was one of those; but, I can't remember which. From the Canal we went across the bay to Florida Island, and refueled, then to Manus Island. After leaving Manus, Lt. Kaza came to us and asked if we would consider helping the Navy pull Tub Watch. They were on four hours and off four. If we would help we would all be on four and off eight hours. We were happy to do so. The swabbies taught us to change barrels on the 20 mm - to load magazines, how to work the earphones, to use the Navy binoculars for looking into the sun, and how to communicate with the OD. They even let us practice firing at the sleeve being pulled by a plane.

"My sister had sent me a box of cookies and my thoughtful brother-in-law had included a pair of bright red panties. I was standing in the Gun Tub with the head phones on and the panties in my pocket. My Navy buddy asked me what in the world I had in my pocket. Without saying a word I pulled them out and he grabbed them offering me \$5.00 for them. I told him he could have them so he grabbed the headphones and got permission to leave the Tub for five minutes. When he got back we could smell the perfume on the panties even before he got into the Gun Tub.

ing his arms he shouted to get everyone's attention, waving them 211  
e wind. Everybody started yelling 'Where is she? Where is she?'  
when he knew he had everybodys attention he started chewing on them  
en drew the attention of the men on the ships on both sides of us  
hey all wanted to know what was causing all the commotion. It was  
of fun and just the relaxer we all needed - even the Captain."

ed landing on Luzon.



(Phil File) "We were  
whipped back into shape too  
late for the Leyte invasion  
and were rescheduled for  
Luzon. We were denied the  
honor of the beachhead land-  
ing, being landed in the  
second echelon on 11 Jan. W  
embarked in Dec., spending  
Christmas aboard ship. We

abled in a harbor south of the Philippines and one morning I climbed  
he crow's nest to find ships as far as I could see over the horizon.  
ooked as if all the allied shipping in the world was converging on  
spot. Our landing in Lingayen Gulf was without incidentl We rec-  
d a few rounds from some coastal arty in the hills east of the  
ing zone, but a few salvos from our warships silenced those guns  
kly."

-Day, for the invas-  
of Luzon, was 9 Jan.  
and the Tropic Lig-





"around from place to place. We knew we were guarding someone at San Jacinto one night, the scuttlebutt was that it was the one-and-only 'Dug-




out-Doug'."

(Tony Crnko) "Later on in the year 1944, we had amphibious training from the British ship HMS Battleaxe, which lived up to it's name.

"On 11 Jan. 1945, the beachhead on Lingayen Gulf was established and we set

-while, across the road, Arty kept up a barrage.

up AA positions and worked three days unloading supplies. We had a couple of air raids, but no damage. At night we were shelled by enemy 12 inch guns - but, again, no damage."




(Les Thomas) "While unloading five thousand rounds of 155 mm ammo we kept hearing planes overhead. My thoughts were that I would rather have been in the first wave. My prayer was, "Lord, let me get my feet on dry ground.. The second night on shore the Navy was shooting it's

big guns all night, shaking the earth and raining fragments. My prayer was, "Lord, let me get inland."

(Phil File) "That night it was brought home to me the difference between the carbine and the M1 Garand. Hitting power! When the carbine was issued to platoon leaders as a replacement for the .45 pistol I thought it was just the ticket for long range foot patrolling. That first night ashore, 11 Jan., a Nip came toward my position and, when I shot him in the midsection, he kept coming. I pumped another round in him and still he came on. I then shot him in the head and he dropped in front of me. In the morning I looked him over and he had two holes about an inch apart just above his navel. One slug from an M1 in that spot would have paralyzed the strongest man. I got a truck driver to swap his Garand for my carbine and that rifle never failed me. We moved south and east and I was scouting in front of the Rgt. and enjoying the war. I was working behind enemy lines continually, rotating my patrols to give the men as much rest as possible. I got my rest riding in vehicles between CP's."

Below: "Tropic Lightning" GI's examine a captured Japanese tank in Binalonan.



On 16 Jan. (S+7), advances thru the mountains to the north and east had progressed at a snail's pace against well dug in enemy resistance. To further strengthen the attack the CG, 6 Army, released the Tropic Lightning (less 35 Rgt.) to the CG, I Corps. During the morning, of 16 Jan., a warning order was received, from Div., to be prepared to move in the

probable direction of sector Pozorrubio- Binalonan, then San Jose. At 0200, 17 Jan., a movement order was received directing the Rgt., less 3 Btn.,

to move east toward the Binalonan-Urdaneta Rd., seize the north-south road exclusive of Binalonan and Urdaneta. At 0700, the 2 Btn. moved out to the east and the 1 Btn. followed, turning north at Santa Ines, and at 1430 the 1 and 2 Btn.s were in place on the "New Cutoff" of Hwy. 3. The Rgtl. CP was set up near the barrio of Santa Ines and the 3 Btn. moved into Manaoag. The first enemy contact occurred on 18 Jan. when an A Co. road block, located south of Binalonan, destroyed an enemy Medium tank, killing the five crew members and two enemy riding on the outside.

(Phil File) "On the road to Binalonan our sweat on the .37 AT training, back in Paradise, paid big dividends. We were rolling down the highway toward town when a tank came out to meet us. We did not recognize it as enemy until he opened fire. My gun crew executed perfectly - as if they were on drill. The driver made a sliding 180 turn, slinging the gun around to point toward the tank while the crew leaped off with ammo and went into action with the breech - pumping nine rounds into that Nip tank before it rolled to a stop."



Figure 58.—Model 94 (1934) medium tank, left front. Note exterior turret machine-gun mount.

The first job for the 25 Div., in I Corps' center, was to secure Rte. 3 from Pozorrubio south thru Binalonan to Urdaneta - a road distance of ten miles. On completing this assignment the drive would extend eastward to San Felipe and Bactad anchoring its left on the foothills of the Caraballo Range. The terrain of advance was flat and open with no

cover or concealment for Infantry, but good tank country. A good road network also existed in the Div.'s ops area. The town of Binalonan, and surrounding area, was held by remnants of the Shigemitsu Detachment. Under orders to move up to Binalonan, from San Manuel, the enemy had evidently started its move on 16-17 Jan.; but, ceased when Gen. Shigemitsu learned that Americans were within a mile of Binalonan.




Mac seemed pleased when Col. Dalton and Gen. Mullins briefed him

Manoas and that day I was a flank guard and saw a lot of dead Japs. The next day we left Manoas for Cabilroan, a five mile hike. On the 20th, we moved to Bugnyous, and set up a Btn. defense, a march south of nine miles."

Orders were received to advance 6000 yards east of Urdaneta, and on the 19 Jan., the 1 Btn. on the north and the 2 Btn. on the south completed this advance. Recon was then made to the Agno River to locate a suitable site for a ford near Santa Maria.

(Tony Crnko) "We departed Lingayen for San Jacinto, by motor, and had air raids that night (14 Jan.), but no damage. On the 17th, we left San Jacinto to occupy





~~S E C R E T~~

RBR:

Auth: CG 25 Div

Init: *R/R*

Date: 17 Jan 45

FIELD ORDER)

NUMBER 2)

HEADQUARTERS  
Twenty-Seventh Infantry  
0200, 17 Jan, LUZON P I

MAPS: LUZON 1:50000

1. a. (1) Current summaries.  
(2) Undetermined number of enemy w/Tks in URDANETA.  
b. (1) 25th Inf Div to Adv to the E and seize sector of ARMY BEACHHEAD LINE.  
a. 161: See Opns Overlay.  
B. 35 : Army Res in present location.  
(2) 1st Inf to seize URDANETA.  
c. MAP COORDINATE CODE GROUP: CUMBERLAND. (Thru 18 Jan.)
2. 27th Inf less 3/27 in Div Res will Adv to the SE and secure assigned sector of ARMY BEACHHEAD LINE.  
a. Date: 17 Jan 1945.  
Hour: 0700.
3. See Opns Overlay.  
a. 2/27: Furnish Adv Gd for Regtl Column and secure sector of Final Obj.  
b. 1/27: Secure sector of Final Obj.  
c. 3/27: Move to MNAOAG, secure town, and await orders from CG 25th Div.  
d. 8/ : D/S 27.  
e. L/27: Two 1-Plat patrols as shown on Opns Overlay. Plat's revert to Regtl Res upon completion of patrol missions.  
x. (1) Order of March: See Opns Overlay.  
(2) Coordinate movement by liaison with preceding unit.
4. a. Regtl DP initially in same location.  
b. Other administrative details the same.
5. a. Current SOI.  
b. Regtl CP: Mobile until (25.91-38.05.)  
c. Others report.

BUCHANAN  
Commanding

OFFICIAL: *3*

PAYNE  
S-3

Dist: Special

C-v

(File) "The next day the Div. advanced to Santa Maria, from where they attacked Binalonan. Entry was effected against light opposition.



The C.I.C., at Division Headquarters, screened hundreds of Filipino farmers who said they were Guerrillas, and wanted to join us.

This eastward advance was to cut the Binalonan-Urdaneta Road in two places and denied it's use to the enemy for north-south movement of troops and supplies. Later in the day I was making a patrol when we surprised some Nips at the edge of a field.

One of the Japs escaped and I tracked him until I came upon a group of Filipinos who had cornered him when he tried to hide in a dry well about ten feet deep. They threw burning rice straw on him and jabbed him to death with poles as he tried to climb out. And did they ever enjoy it!"


(Ernie Lucas) "Somewhere south of Binalonan, or west of Sumbnit we were held up and Lt. Kaza disappeared. When he returned he had two cases of 10 in 1 rations from the Navy. We got busy frying bacon and eating all the goodies before anyone found out what we had. We were lying around with our tummies full and Lt. Kaza came hurrying back with two Filipinos and told us to pile all our gear together, take a full belt of ammo, water and grenades. He said we were going after a reported twelve man Jap patrol behind our lines. Off we went, following the two Filipinos down the road, across the rice paddies, until we came to a small barrio. We formed a line while Kaza and the recon man, who went with us, and the Filipinos tried to talk to the people in their bamboo hut. Kaza motioned half of us to the right and the other half to the left. There was a high bank in front of us curving to our left and the recon man started crawling up the bank - on the other side a Jap was

"doing the same thing. They came face to face at the top scaring the hell out of each other. He hollered and away we went, over the bank into a dry irrigation canal.. Three Japs came toward us jumping into a square hole about five feet deep; but, we'll never know why. They got a gaggle of grenades right in on top of them. We cut after the rest of them, running in the other direction, following their footprints in the sand. They turned out of the canal and ran into a cane field with Wolfhounds right in after them firing from the hip. We got one, in the canefield, while the others broke into the open about 75 yards away. McAllister (our flamethrower) was carrying a M3 and he opened up on them first. The .45 slugs were hitting way behind them and he threw the grease gun away, in disgust, and told Kaza to get rid of those "pop guns". Kaza had to remind him that he chose it himself. Meanwhile, we had opened up with M1's and BAR's and popped three more while two disappeared around some hutches. We were about halfway through another cane field when we heard a "pop" and we ducked and ran - realizing it was a Nip grenade being armed. When it went off we could tell it had not been thrown. We went back and found a Jap with half his head blown off. I got a flag off that Jap and my grandson has it hanging on his wall. We went on searching and, as we stood on the edge of a dry rice paddy, an arm suddenly rose out from a levee looping a grenade at us. We jumped for cover and as soon as it had gone off we started pumping lead into the spot of origin - we heard those slugs hitting something besides dirt. We took a look and found a dead Jap Sgt. He had maps with some of our positions marked on it. One of the other boys got a nice flag off of him. The recon man found some important papers also. We were told there had been twelve Japs; however, nine was all we found and we felt certain that was all there were. We incurred no casualties and, when we got back to our area everyone was gone. We were left a note to stay put and, when it was nearly dark, we were picked up and taken to our new area. We arrived waving our Nip flags and shouting "We got nine of

"those son' s of Nippon!" and were congratulated by everybody.

"We were being moved around , from sector to sector, searching hutches for snipers and enemy supplies. In one large house we found a huge ammount of some kind of plastic items. Some appeared to have horns on them and a few of the guys said the plastic items were devil suits; but, it took Fireball Keith to figure out what they were - they were protection covers for horses. We decided the rest of the pieces were for the Japs to wrap up in and we wondered if they had gas in mind. No matter, we dumped a goodly batch at the CP and never heard anymore about it."

Small scattered groups of enemy were contacted in various parts of the Rgtl. sector; however, they offered no threat to any installations. The 1 Btn. moved to Asingan and A Co. was dispatched to Santa Maria; however, because of a fierce battle of the 161 Inf. in San Manuel



Hull down Jap tank defense - as at San Manuel

to the north, the Btn. was withdrawn in order that a comparatively even sector could be maintained by the Div. The movement to Asingan had caused a wide northwest-southeast gap between the two regiments.

(Phil File) "One day I was directed to go to Santa Barbara, about five miles west of Mapadan, to

make contact with a guerilla unit, the 101 Guerilla Squadron, commanded

~~SECRET~~

220

FIELD ORDER)

CP CT 27

NUMBER 3)

APC 25

MAP: LUZON, 1/50,000

~~29 Jan 45~~

1. a. See Overlay.
  2. 27th RCT (-3/27 (-2 Plat's L/27): Will secure objective line by 1800, 19 Jan, reconnoiter to AGNO RIVER, not to exceed one company to be used for forward reconnaissance at any one time, and garrison URDANETA.
  3. a. 1st Bn (Plat/Cn/27, Plat/B/65 Engrs): Secure objective line in zone of action by 1800, 19 Jan 45, establish road block at (35.3-39.4,) maintain present block at (34.0-39.7) until relieved by 3/27, and report completion of patrolling sector bounded by PAO-BINALOHAN Highway, "v" road, MITURA RIVER, and National Highway, URDANETA-BINALOHAN Highway by 0930, 19 Jan 45.
  - b. 2d Bn (Plat Cn/27, Plat AT/27 atchd): Secure objective line in zone of action by 1800, 19 Jan 45; seize phase line in vicinity of URDANETA designated by CO/1; garrison URDANETA with one reinforced company which will patrol roads to BINALOHAN and BACTAD; and accomplish patrol missions designated by green arrows on overlay.
  - c. 1 & 3 Plat's/L/27: Remain in URDANETA as Regtl Reserve.
  - d. I&R Plat/3/27: Run road net to BINALOHAN and 1st Bn CP.
  - e. B/65 Engrs (-1 plat): Priority of missions:
    - (1) Improve detour for heavy vehicles around 3d bridge SE of present Regtl CP.
    - (2) Prepare fords or bridges across streams on URDANETA-BINALOHAN National Highway.
    - (3) Assist platoon attached to 1/27 in constructing supply road behind 1/27 advance.
  - f. C/25 Mod: Move to area in URDANETA designated by S-1/27 at a time specified by Exec/27.
  - g. Cn/27-: Move to area designated by S-1/27 at a time specified by Exec/27.
  - h. AT/27-: Atch one 37mm AT gun to B/27, remainder of company move to area in URDANETA designated by S-1/27 at a time specified by Exec/27.
  - x. (1) Important bridges will be guarded against sabotage by the unit nearest to each bridge.  
(2) The size and missions of distant patrols will be prescribed by S-2/27. Local security patrols will be prescribed by unit commanders.
4. DP vicinity of URDANETA.
  5. Regtl CP - URDANETA.

BUCHANAN  
Commanding

OFFICIAL: *Payne*  
PAYNE  
S-3

Dist: Special

~~SECRET~~

C-vi

"by a Capt. Arellans, who later became the Philippine C/S. I took a patrol consisting of seven men and we moved thru enemy lines to the Agno River at Santa Barbara. When we reached the river a group of Filipinos ferried us across on bamboo rafts. Entering Santa Barbara I met the Mayor and other city officials and they showed me where they had dynamited a big house where they feted a large bunch of Jap officers. The Filipino girls entertaining the Nips had been sacrificed as part of the price for success. I was informed I would have to go to Baloy, a barrio about two miles south, to meet Capt. Arellans and we left escorted by hundreds of civilians. When we reached Baloy the crowd fell back to let us proceed alone and, at the outskirts of the barrio, the Guerilla Squadron was drawn up in parade formation with the American and Philippine Flags posted. I called the patrol to attention and trooped the line, rendering honors "in proper fashion. After the formalities, we were informed that dinner would be served soon and perhaps we might like to bathe before dining (I don't think it was an aspersion on our aromas!). Having had nothing but a few salt water baths for the last month, we thought it was a capital idea. While we bathed the women washed our fatigues which we put back on - wet. We were then treated to roast duck, rice, sweet potatoes, fried bananas and other dishes I'm not sure I wanted to be identified. At the feast's conclusion they broke out the 'piece de resistance' in the form of a box of Havana Cubanas they had been saving for the first Americans to return to their town. Now you might imagine cigars kept unsealed in the tropics for three years; but, we made a great show of enjoyment puffing heartily. After the cigars we were informed it was dance time so across the field we went to another barrio where the dance was conducted under the stars. We were seated on one side of the floor and a bevy of beauties was presented to us. They placed leis over our shoulders and then the dancing started. There were about 30 girls and as soon as a GI sat down one of the Guerilla officers would bring another girl and say, 'You must dance with this one.'"

"Baloy was a refugee camp for the wealthy and talented of Manila, and these were sophisticated people, wearing clothes that had been hidden from the Japs. The Philippine opera star sang "Stardust" for us, the most beautifully I've ever heard it sung. Capt. Arellans had no children of his own but a niece he was very fond of was introduced to me. She was the prettiest girl I have ever seen. She was, also, accustomed to hard work, because to avoid the Japs she had spent the war years dressed in rags, and working in the fields. If I had not already been engaged I would have been sorely tempted. About eleven at night the first group of girls disappeared and another bunch came on duty. We were not permitted to sit down <sup>but</sup> kept dancing with first one and then another. It was a scene of complete unreality. The sky was like black velvet, with the stars shining so bright they looked almost within reach, the packed earth dance floor lighted by fluttering candles and flaring torches, the khaki uniforms of the Squadron officers contrasting with the bright colors of the ladies gowns. Miles to the north of us we could hear the thunder and see the flashes of arty. Occasionally we would hear the crackle of Jap machine guns and the solid thump of the mortars. Filipinos would ride in on ponies, report to the Squadron CO, the fade back into the night. By 0200, we were just going on nerves. I hadn't laid down to sleep since leaving the ship and my men weren't much better off. The hosts brought in the third platoon of girls to dance with us until just before daylight, when the festivities were broken up and we wended our way back to Baloy. The Squadron formed up and moved out with my detail in the vanguard, Old Glory and the Philippine Flag flying at the head of the column. I don't know what the Japs must have thought of the procession but they never bothered us and we returned to our own lines without incident. As soon as I completed my report it was decided to displace the Btn. forward immediately."

(Tony Crnko) "On 18 Jan., we left Manoas for Cabilroan and marched five miles. Two days later we advanced to Bugnyous where we set up a Btn defense, then moved to Binalonan 4 miles away, on the 21 Jan. . .

"in to 2 Btn. Hqs. While getting some breakfast we got a radio message to rejoin our Btn. as soon as possible. The platoon Sgt., AT Platoon, was a buddy of mine and I asked him to have one of his drivers take us back up the road to our own outfit. We loaded into a ton and a half Dodge prime mover and took off at a good clip. We were sitting in the back of the truck, joking and laughing and enjoying the wind blowing the stink off of us when we came to the bridge. The driver didn't slow down and when the wheels hit the bridge approach every face blanched and every mouth was shut. When we cleared the span every man let out a "Whooo!" No one spoke of it but the same thought had crossed every mind at the same instant - we hadn't checked the bridge for mines. It was an error of an elementary detail caused by fatigue."

---

On 24 Jan, a base was set up by sixty men from the Rgtl. I&R Pltn. and the attached 269th Squadron of Filipino Guerillas. This camp was established approximately five miles beyond our forward elements in enemy territory. From this base which was equipped with an SCR 694 radio smaller patrols were dispatched to observe enemy movement on the roads leading from Tayug. In addition, the patrols located enemy concentrations and supply dumps, and long range arty fire was placed on these areas. Ambushes succeeded in destroying enemy personnel and material.

On 26 Jan, the 3 Btn. was designated as I Corps Reserve and moved into an assembly area near Pozorrubio.

From the time the initial assembly area was left until a further advance to the east was ordered, patrol action accounted for 54 enemy killed and two POW's taken.

#### Pemienta

(Phil File) "One afternoon the 1 Btn. was ordered to move ASAP to block a road junction at the Barrio of Pimienta. Cutting across rice fields, which were fortunately dry, we moved a distance of about 14 kilometers in just under two hours. The foot troops beat the vehicles



"We stayed there a few days and then went to Pozorubio, by truck, as a reserve for the 43 Div. On the 27th we were ambushed by Japs and sustained three Co. M Wolfhounds KIA: S/Sgt. Heron, Benny Aubia, Irwin Nelson, and WIA were Cpl. Lucas and Johnny Oliver. The next day we returned to Binalonan and, on the 29th, went to Balingayan - a twelve mile truck ride."

(Phil File) "I got a fresh patrol and moved out to guide the Btn. over the route we had just covered. The next day we crossed the river (Ago?) at a shallow ford where we skirmished briefly. Going thru Santa Barbara I was seen By Capt. Arralens nephew, who jumped on a pony and took off as soon as he recognized me. An hour later, as we moved thru the barrio of Baloy, the Capt.'s niece met me and informed me that she had prepared dinner. Would I stop to eat? I looked behind me at a long line of troops depending on me to guide them and had to decline her kind offer.. After all, my job was to fight a war, not cement American-Filipino relations. On Saturday night we fought our way into a town that had not suffered much damage and my platoon worked it's way to a Methodist Church where we dug in. During the night the Japs withdrew so Sunday morning things were quiet and the Filipino congregation started coming to church. The elders of the church approached me to advise me that their pastor had been killed by the Japs two weeks past and they would like to have an American deliver the message. The men in the platoon started razzing me and I finally said 'Ok, you SOB's don't think I'm up to it, do you!' I flipped the pages of the St. James Version and the pages stopped turning at Ephesians, Chap. 6. I took my text from para. 1, Chap. 6 - 'Honor thy father and mother', and preached solid for an hour.

"I was sent, one day, down a piece of highway to make contact with 2 Btn., Wolfhounds. We ran into resistance at a bridge across a stream too big to wade. By the time we eliminated the opposition it was dark so we spent the rest of the night feeling our way down that road and *scouting both sides but several hundred yds. At daylight we reported*

129  
"to the target. We assembled about 300 yards from the rj where we were screened by trees growing beside a small stream."

(Les Thomas) "Charley Co. was walking thru rice fields approaching nearby hills and we were plenty apprehensive. They just HAD to be there. We had Filipino helpers carrying ammo and they continued with us until we were about two miles from the town of Pemienta then, knowing the Nips were close by, they took off. At first we didn't have too much trouble. We dug in in front of a bamboo clump where Sgt. Moyer got it - he was the first shell shocked victim I'd ever seen. Neither one of us was hit by the shell but he was out. My ears were ringing and I noticed our bamboo clump was gone. An enemy tank unit tried to get past us, but we were extended south of the village and A and B Co.s got the brunt of it - I wish we had been nearer to the road. A lot of arty was trying to get into the act, and some of it did - point blank."

(File) "As we started to move to the rj (road junction) a litter jeep came tearing out of Pimienta heading west. Our approach was from the north on the stem of an inverted T. About a kilometer west of the rj the road went up a grade into a heavily wooded hill. The jeep



One night a huge Jap convoy of tanks, infantry, and artillery on its way to Umingan roared into a hamlet called Pemienta,

disappeared into the woods where it was met with a burst of small arms fire. The jeep popped back out of the woods and came barrelling back down to the junction. It was getting dark by that time and the Btn. Hqs. set up a defensive perimeter at the stream. The rifle companies moved past the rj and

set up a position in the barrio of Pimienta. Sgt. Sessom's gun crew (two 37 mm guns) went into a blocking position on the west side of the

"rj. The road was built up on a causeway across the plain so the guns  
were below the road level - one on each side. A machine gun squad from  
Dog Co. was attached to make a total of fourteen men in the block."

"road junction"

Orders were received from the CG, 25 Div., to continue the advance  
to the east from the Agno River. The 1 Btn. proceeded cross-country to  
Baligayan, and dispatched C Co. to Salvador for securing the Manila  
Railroad at that point. From Baligayan the 1 Btn. was then to join  
C Co., advance on Femienta, and establish a road block to deny it of  
enemy use from any direction. The 2 Btn., at Baligayan, was ordered to  
prepare to reinforce the 1 Btn. The 3 Btn., released from I Corps  
Reserve, was to assemble at Baligayan.

With 75 Guerrillas of Squadron 269, the 1 Btn. moved to the rj 600  
yards west of the barrio of Femienta. This move was accomplished,  
without making contact, at 1345, 29 Jan. 1945. A patrol of C Co.,  
moving in advance of the Btn., detected an undetermined number of the  
enemy inside the barrio about 1300. The balance of C Co. moved east  
and at 1410, the forward elements started to receive small arms and  
"knee" mortar fire. Able Co. was ordered to envelop the left flank,  
and the company moved across a rice field 300 yards off the highway to  
a wooded area, the only available terrain that could locally conceal  
such a move. The attack jumped off and continued until 1750 at which  
time 75 per cent of the village had been taken.

During the attack the enemy had employed flat-trajectory field pieces,  
or dug in (hull down) tanks to fire point-blank at the lead elements  
of A and C Co.s. At 1800 this fire increased in volume and was joined  
by more mortar fire.


Charley Co. formed a strong point on the south side of the road,  
extending well into Femienta and following a wood line. A Co. organized  
on the north of the road, also extending about three quarters of the  
way into the barrio. A block was placed on the east road, by two 37mm  
guns, while a third AT gun was place in the B Sector, and another block  
*we established 800 yds. to the west of the village. Around 1915 . . . .*

the troops in the barrio began to receive intense fire from the direction of Umingan (east).. The character, of which, seemed to be 90mm mortars and field pieces - 75mm size? For about five minutes thirty rounds per min. fell in the area causing 15 casualties, mostly from tree-bursts. After this concentration the fire became intermittent for the next three hours.

(File) "Shortly after sunset, 2000 hours, a full moon rose and we heard tank engines to the west of us. When they came down the hill from the trees and started across the plain toward us we could see them with field glasses - Jap infantry marched four abreast down the road ahead of the motor column. The gun commander quietly gave his fire order - 'Five rounds of canister. Muffle your loading. Fire on my command.' The breechblocks of the two guns made a barely audible 'snick' as they were loaded and closed. The Japs had no scouts out, nor other

"point protection, and they seemed to be completely unaware of any American presence. The gun commander let them march in close formation until they were almost between the guns before he called out 'Fire!' The two 37 mm's spewed out five rounds of deadly canister as fast as the crews could pump them in. The Japs that were left retreated to the vehicles and one of the tanks came down the road, feeling for our position; but, the moon being at our backs, he could not see us and his fire went over our heads. When he got between our guns we shot into his underside and cooked his goose. Six more tried to pass the first tank and got the same dose. Then the biggest tank I'd ever seen

50 MM GRENADE DISCHARGER, TYPE 89 (1929)



50 MM GRENADE DISCHARGER, TYPE 89 (1929)  
Above at the right is shown the standard high explosive round. The propelling charge is contained in the base of the shell and when ignited expands the rotating band against the rifling of the tube.

"came down the road and our armor piercing bounced off like hail. As



The Jap commander burned to death in his sedan, while his artillery, and armour piled up along the road behind him.


it pulled adjacent with us, Miller, one of the gunners, got disgusted and climbed up on the back of it. The hatch was open and the tank commander was standing up with his head and shoulders sticking out. Miller jammed the Nip's

head down inside the hatch and then dropped a grenade down through the hatch. The explosion popped the Jap commander out like a toy; but, the damned thing kept rolling down the road till it got around a curve where it stopped. We could hear the Japs working on it and they finally got it, started again and it rumbled off. Then the Nips unlimbered

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Miller serves a pineapple to the Nips

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


their arty which they fired point blank in our direction - again, all too high. We expended all our gun ammo and our rifle ammo was getting low. A phone call from Btn. gave us the word, 'Hang on till daylight

"and we'll come and bring you home.' When daylight came (1/30) we found the Nips had bypassed us on foot, leaving us with no casualties. Jap confirmed losses were 126 KIA, 7 tanks destroyed, four 77 mm field pieces and one 47 mm AT gun abandoned and 26 vehicles destroyed. Not a bad nights work!"

To meet and reinforce the defense against the enemy column, from the west, the A Co. CO shifted his heavy guns, including one M7, with a

105mm, to that direction and the combined effort halted the enemy. the Japs then placed three 10 cm howitzers in the rice field, echeloned 100 yards on the left side of the road, bringing point blank fire on the Wolfhound positions. Groups of the enemy made "Banzai" charges until nearly 0430, 30 Jan., at which time the remaining Nips withdrew, apparently taking their wounded with them. Flanking fire from the M7



The Model 38 (1905) 150-mm howitzer on an improved Model 97 (1937) medium tank chassis.



so all that was left of a once mighty force was smoking wreckage, and mutilated flesh.

near San Jose

in the vicinity of the Btn. CP, 60 mm and 81 mm mortar fire, and arty were brought upon the enemy until the end of the engagement at 0430.

It was later found that elements of the Jap 2 Tank Div. had been engaged. It was, also,

felt the Jap 10 Div. was



22

Umingan

Following the road block action at Pemienta the CG, 25 Div., assigned the 27th Inf. the mission: "Block SanQuintin - Umingan Road with one reinforced co. Attack Umingan from the northwest following an air strike and arty preparation."

Charged with the defense of Umingan was a Jap force, totalling nearly 500, composed of elements of the 2 Co., 63 Inf.; the 3 Btn. and Heavy Machine gun - AT Co. of the 26 Independent Mixed Rgt.; and the 1 Btn. Mobile Inf. of the 2 Armrd. Div. The enemy had prepared fortified positions against an attack from any direction with gun emplacements situated to shift to concentrate their firepower.

The Wolfhound CO, Col. Buchanan, directed that all Btns. send combat and recon patrols into the area to destroy enemy immediate to our forces, find a suitable roadblock site, and determine the enemy's location and strength. It was determined that Umingan was held in force and the strongest positions were on the fringes of the village. At 2400, 31 Jan. 1945, orders were issued for the 1 Btn. to attack from the west, 3 Btn. from the north and was to be connected with the Cacti Rgt. blocking the exits from Umingan.

(Phil File) "Two kilometers past Pimienta was the town of Umingan, to the east, which we suspected was being heavily fortified by the Nips.



Ground O.P.s tried to spot enemy gun positions.

I was detailed to recon. the town and get an estimate of the force we could anticipate meeting. I had a somewhat mixed group for the job. Five of my own men plus a lieutenant sent along to learn the trade and some civilians who knew the town. Moving out shortly



---

" after dark I quickly lost faith in the scout dog. I could smell a Jap but the dog didn't alert us until the Nip started moving about. The moon was rising, but this time in our faces, which was bad because it blinded us while making us visible to anyone watching from town. When we got as close to the village as I thought prudent, I had the lieutenant form a defensive perimeter with my five men and the dog handler. I took the two civilians and eased my way into town. The Nips had positions and covering tanks dug in under houses. They were, also, dismantling the bridge across the creek on the north side of town. Outside one of the houses we came upon a man, a woman and two teen-age girls who had just been stabbed and/or bayoneted. The two girls were still alive but too far gone for me to help. Hearing moans from the house, I climbed the stairs to have a look. When I pushed open the door, the moon shone on a scene I will never forget. There, lying on the floor, was a boy about 10 or 11 years old. The Japs had run a knife, or bayonet into his hands splitting his palms out between his finger bones. Kneeling beside him was another boy about four with a pan of water bathing the older boys face. I had the two civilians with me carry them back to our aid station. I wandered around the town for about an hour and then rejoined my group. When I reported back to the CP I was told that a patrol from the 35 Rgt. had gone into the town and reported the place evacuated. The decision was made to plan on that report. The attack was soon bogged down. Baker Co. especially got chewed up by machine gun fire from the left flank. When I mentioned that I had probably seen that gun being dug in the night before, I was detailed to go knock it out. It was just where I thought it was and, after knocking it out, I took a short cut back to the CP and spotted a Nip telephone wire laid into a clump of bamboo. Following it, I came upon a Jap officer and an enlisted man directing arty fire. The officer had a beautiful sword which I intend to place in the Div. museum. He also had a good silver pocket watch (Juvenia Chronometer).

*an excellent time piece which I carried with me until the surrender*  
*An excellent time piece which I carried with me until the surrender*

"from shell burst stopped it five years later in Korea."

To prevent enemy reinforcement from San Quintin, the 2 Btn. was directed to cut the Umingan-San Quintin Road with one reinforced co. The remainder of the Btn. reverted to Rgtl. reserve, prepared to support the attack of either of the assault Btn.s

At 1030, 1 Feb., B-25's made a low level attack on Umingan, but the greater part of their load fell in the center of the town and not



The 27<sup>th</sup> dug its positions before Umingan, while Piper Cubs studied the situation,

on the fringes where it was needed. The air strikes were followed up by an arty preparation and the 1 and 3 Btn.s started their advance across the adjacent open fields. The 1 Btn advanced with Baker Co. on the north and C Co. on the south - abreast. Initially, A Co.

remained in reserve. The advance moved within 250 yds. of the village, without opposition, but when the arty was lifted they were immediately pinned by intense rifle and machine gun fire.

Troops were in the open with no cover other than shallow irrigation ditches six to twelve inches in depth. The Rgtl. CO, Col. David Buchanan, was wounded by sniper fire and the EO, L/Col. Conway Christanson, assumed command of



The air strike was a grand sight from our side the line,

Self-propelled cannon, machine gun, and mortar fire were employed but the advance had gone to ground. Casualties were heavy and evacuation across the open rice fields was extremely hazardous.

(File) "Four American tanks came up to help with the push, but a few enemy arty rounds fell nearby and the tank co with drew his machines. Directed to fill a gap between Baker and Charley Co.s I entrusted my souvenir saber to one of the truck drivers. I got a case of rifle grenades and a launcher and spent the rest of the day chucking rifle grenades into Jap positions."

Able Co. (less one platoon in Btn. reserve) was ordered to envelop from the north, and after overcoming heavy resistance, one platoon reached the western edge of the town. This platoon made contact with the north flank of Baker Co., and B and C co.s attempted to advance. This was measured in yards and A Co., meeting an extension of the resistance, dispatched a platoon to recon for a route into Umingan via a nearby creek bed. This proved to be a good approach and using effective

~~SECRET~~

Auth: CG 25 Div

Init: *PAE*

Date: 21 Feb 45

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

F3)

HEADQUARTERS

Twenty-Seventh Infantry

Vic UMINGAN PI, 1 Feb 45

(NOTE: This order confirms verbal orders of the Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry, 1 Feb 45.)

1. a. 1st Bn:  
Hold present positions. At dawn, 2 Feb 45, probe enemy positions at various points. Make no general Atk. Be prepared to move right flank Fwd when 3d Bn 35th Inf makes contact and moves Fwd. During probing do not move in more than 100 Yds. No harassing fires during night 1-2 Feb. Send at least 1-Sq Co A to (B.2-14.0.)
- b. 3d Bn:  
Arty and mortar preparation on N part of NANCALABASAN at 0715. Follow preparation closely w/Inf Atk. When this point is secured fire Arty and mortars on SE part of barrio and follow closely w/2-Co's of Inf.  
RESTRAINING LINE: Extension of N Line (E to W) thru N of cemetery.
- c. Arty Preparation (8th and 90th FA Bns):  
Duration: 3 Min.  
Rate : 2 Rds per gun per Min.
- d. 2d Bn:  
Make reconnaissance for Atk in 500 Yd gap between 1st and 3d Bns. Be prepared to move to assembly area in vicinity of gap. No action until 3d Bn has seized 2d Obj.
- x. M7's and Tks Atchd Bns will be in Res.

*LINDEN*  
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

*Payne*  
PAYNE  
S-3

Dist: Special

~~SECRET~~

C-OM-ii

240

~~SECRET~~

- e. B/65 Engr: Construct road from BARAT to AMARONAN, and be prepared to assist adv of 1/27 and 3/27.
- x. (1) There will be no artillery or mortar firing during air strike.  
(2) At 1000 sharp, 1 Feb, front line markers will be displayed by all front line units down to squads and individual gun positions, and will be continuously displayed while advancing during air strike. Officers will check that nothing resembling markers are displayed in rear of actual front lines. Any color panels, white towels, or undershirts may be used. G.Co will display panels at 1000 so as to best designate area occupied.  
(3) In assembly areas and during advance from assembly areas and LD, maximum extension in deployment will be observed.
- 4. C/25 Med: (57.20-27.90)  
Fwd Ammo DP: (59.10-28.40)  
Other Supply Installations: No Change.
- 5. a. Bns will lay wire behind advance. SCR 300 and 694 radios in Regtl Net will open at 0745 for check.  
b. CP/27: (57.30-27.90)  
OP/27: To be reported.  
Units report locations oc CPs.

BUCHANAN  
Commanding

OFFICIAL: *[Signature]*  
PAYNE  
S-3

Dist: Special.

fire-and-movement, A Co. worked its way north around the enemy flank and into town.

An attempt was made to utilize the attached medium tanks; however, the boggy condition of the rice paddies restricted tank movement to the roads and they were covered by five AT guns of the enemy.

Meanwhile, 3 Btn. was attacking from the north and Item Co. moved out to secure a Btn. assembly area at Barat and to block the road from Buenavista. The Btn. closed on Barat and awaited the air strike. Afterwards, Love Co. crossed the DL and advanced south toward the barrio of Nancalabasan. Within 150 yds., small arms and mortar fire were received, and as the fire became more intense the company became pinned down. Arty was brought down on the enemy's mortars, near Abalos, and by 1500 L Co. resumed the attack. K Co. was positioned on Love Co.'s west flank and medium tanks were brought in on the east. Item Co. secured the supply route; but, at 1800, the push was stopped and the Btn. dug in for the night. During the night of 1-2 Feb., Philip F. Lindeman, of the 161 Rgt., assumed command of the Wolfhounds.

(Tony Crnko) "We approached and attacked Umingan's main defenses at 0930. We were supported by our heavy 81 mm mortars and the town was supposedly taken easily; but, we suffered heavy losses, in Mike Co. We had 1 Platoon attached to K Co. and 2 Platoon to L Co. We had KIA, Cpl. Kennedy and WIA were Ferrine, Hansom, and Porter. This was our first major battle."

(Les Thomas) "At Umingan there was no real cover and, what little there was, it was provided only by irrigation ditches. Col. Buchanan was hit and Col. Lindeman was assigned to the Rgt. the next day. Most of the shelling was over the Jap lines - so, they had to fight. Small parachute bombs helped us somewhat. This was the fight where the Jap infantry really tried to save their tanks."

(Ernie Lucas) "On, or about 31 Jan., we were on the outskirts of Umingan. Later that evening everyone was in their proper position and

"at dusk we laid down a show of force with our fire power and it was out of this world. The Japs knew we were there and our CO wanted them to know we were coming in. The next morning, Lt. Kaza sent Lucero and me out on our right flank to make contact with two 35 Rgt. men - out on their left flank. They wanted to be sure we (the 27th and 35th Rgts.) were in proper position. After going about a half mile, we spotted the two Americans coming out of some trees a quarter mile away. We signalled




Figure 61.—Model 97 (1937) special medium tank, with elongated turret to mount long-barreled 47-mm tank gun.

"each other and stopped and laid down behind a levee looking toward Umingan waiting to be signalled in. We relaxed and started talking and just then B-25's - 50 feet up - opened up with their fifties. We did not hear them until the moment they were on top of us and it really scared the poop out of us. We rolled on our backs and looked up and waved - feeling good at what they were doing to the Nips.

"We were then waved in and started the move to the left outskirts of the village. They set the Aid Station up and put the Assault Platoon nearby. We had no one call for us so we became litter bearers and bringing your buddies in is a mighty tough job. One of the casualties we brought in was Gen. Brown - he was dead when we put him on the stretcher. It was a long, sad day and the job wasn't finished yet.

"The next morning, Item Co. called for the Assault Platoon because they had found some Japs, well dug in, in a deep wooded draw, or ravine. Jim McClinch (better known as Jungle Jim) had crawled to the edge and got in a small shell hole trying to spot where they were. Everytime

he raised his head he drew their fire. He stuck his head up again and "Zing" down it went. Someone yelled 'Jim's been hit!' and another yelled "Where?" and then Jim called back in a clear voice 'In the head!' The bullet had hit him high on the forehead, zipping over his head cutting a gash from front to back. He plowed the ground like a mole and came out of his hole and back to the Aid Station. He made it O.K.

"Kaza looked over the terrain and suggested we throw a 35 lb. satchel



charge in before Timmo (3 pltn., I Co.) went in.

We did this by pushing ourselves up close on our backs and we pulled the lighter on our dual fuse and, while still on our backs, counted - one, two, three, and all four hands heaved into the draw.

but the collecting station did its best to ease them.

The thick brush must have caught the fuse and pulled it out of the caps. They finally got a M7 up close enough to fire three rounds and Timmo's men went firing into the position. The Nips fled out the other end and were all killed; but, I Co. lost Timmo, Pop Behner, and McCarley in about 30 seconds. With a little more mopping up Umingan was secure."

Information was received that on 2 Feb. 3/35 Inf. would attack Umingan from the south and that 2/35 would attack from the southeast. Therefore 1/27 Inf. was ordered to maintain pressure on the enemy to its front, contact 3/35 and coordinate an attack with them. Contact was made with 3/35, by Able Co., 27th, ;but, no resistance was eliminated confronting 1/27. The Wolfhounds relieved 3/35, and Col. Lindeman ordered 2/27 to advance from the northwest. By 1700, the 2 Btn. had entered the village and then received further orders to secure the west, north and southern sectors. the 1 Btn. was directed to attack



from the center toward the southwest and, after B and C Co.s bypassed the enemy to their east, the attack was launched at 1800. In the 3 Btn.

area an attack was made to the south and contact was made with 35 35 Inf. Night was approaching and, since none of the roads into Umingan were yet opened, supplies were loaded on two self-propelled guns which forced their way into the



but we could not fully appreciate its devastation until we entered the town after a bloody battle.


village. One of the mounts brought out wounded, on the return trip, while the other stayed in town to blast enemy resistance in the western sector.

(Phil File) "We finally secured the town; but, our losses were heavy and needless. The 2 Btn. had attacked from the north and their EO was killed at the bridge site I had inspected the night before. Perhaps my report had sounded rather improbable."



The Language Section can not be praised too highly, for the information it supplied through its expert interrogation of prisoners and its translation of captured enemy documents was invaluable. In the north sector

The morning of 3 Feb., the 1 Btn. continued reduction of the enemy in the western sector, and the removal of demolitions from the bridge on the San Leon Hwy. opened this route for traffic.



enemy pillboxes continued to impede the southern advance of the 3 Btn. Rifle grenades and mortars and bazookas were ineffective against these emplacements, so medium tanks were used to complete the reduction. Remaining enemy were mopped up and the town was organized for defense - 1 Btn. in the west sector and 3 Btn. in the north.

(Ernie Lucas) "We moved into the main part of Umingan where the new CP was, but I can't recall just how long we were there. A day or so later we were lying around when a young Filipino man walked up, snapped to attention, saluted, and said 'I am Pvt. Fabio T. Cabeguin and I would like to talk to your commanding officer.'. He sat down and waited after we told him Kaza would be back soon from a briefing. We talked to him and found he was a Filipino soldier, attached to the U.S.Arty on Bataan before the war and he was looking for an Arty outfit to join. He asked what unit we were and we explained our duties and he liked it. Kaza returned, talked with him and then took him to Btn. HQ. When they returned we had a new member in the Assault Platoon. Fabio spoke some Japanese plus several dialects of his own language. He had been a Jap prisoner for six months and had been to a Jap language school. He had been shot at while smuggling food and cigarettes to American prisoners in Manila and had a wife and small baby in Manila."

From Umingan the Wolfhounds were ordered to proceed to the poblacion of San Jose, located at the south end of the foothills of the Caraballo Mountains. At this time there were many small bands of enemy stragglers trying to recontact their



Passing through San Jose,

units en route to the Balete Pass-Santa Fe area from a general area in

\* This was the area where 25 died in area of 32 Bn (Kalya)