




CAPTURE OF BALETE PASS

27th INFANTRY

RF= 1:50000



On 9 May, Pfc. JohnPatrick O'Leary, Platoon Scout, Item Co., was the first to reach the ruins of the "Rest House" in the center of Balete Pass. - Thus the operation from San Jose to Balete Pass, a distance of 33 miles of bitter, yard-by-yard fighting was ended, and the front door



Div. elements move thru Balete Pass to start a downhill fight - for the first time.

(Phil File) "I took seven men forward and as dark fell secured a prominent "sugar loaf" terrain feature which I reported would make a good OP for the next operation. It became the OP and was a popular spot with everybody who thought he had business there. It was a good box seat for the show to our northeast where Wolfhound riflemen were advancing across a hill and we could watch them digging the Japs out of their holes with the bayonet. It established the pattern for the next 60 days. Secure a little terrain feature and hang on tight



The 161, however, was still facing a determined foe west of Balete Pass.

while the flanks tried to move up. Sometimes the gain would be a 100 yards - sometimes nothing at all. The Japs would snipe at individual GIs with their 47 AT guns, which were high velocity towed guns similar to our 37 mm but a whole lot meaner. They also had a hidden field

to the Cagayan Valley was at last in American hands.

Able Co. then followed the Digdig River west of Hwy. 5 and contacted Item Co. This new supply route eliminated the long and tiresome route via Myoko. King Co. returned to the 3 Btn.

piece that we were especially anxious to find because every time it spoke - somebody died. One day I made a recon to an OP in the 161 area and, while we were battling the breeze, the man on the scope announced excitedly that he could see daylight thru the mountain he was watching. Then, while we watched, the hole darkened and the field piece we were hunting belched. The 161 had a 57 mm howitzer, mounted on a .50 cal. ground mount tripod, brought up and the men on the OP trained the gun on the hole and, the next time they saw movement, fired HE into the hole till smoke boiled out. Scratch one Nip cannon. One night I took Bill Austen's squad up on a little table topped hill and dug in. The next morning they found themselves pinned down by a sniper, on an adjacent mountain, who was good. The hilltop was about 100 ft. wide and right in the center was a white rock the size of a man's head. Once every hour, or so he would bounce one off that rock just to show us he was still in business.



In the fog, Infantry looked like ghosts passing thru the Div.s center on the attack.

"Rotation had started again and this time there was no hanky-panky. The men with the most points went home first. Replacements were coming up and turning into casualties at a disproportionate rate. I lost men I never even saw. They would be assigned while I was on patrol, be a casualty and evacked by the time I got back. We continued to struggle toward Santa Fe, a town at the head of the Cagayan Valley. The day we occupied Wolfhound Ridge, Gen. Dalton was killed - just fifty yards from my CP. The Jap sniper had crouched in the bushes by the trail and let an entire company walk by while he waited for someone that looked important (wearing a clean uniform!)."

(Ernie Lucas) "We had secured a knoll, south of the Pass, and from

310

"this point could look down Cagayan Valley. It was a beautiful sight, even at this time. We dug in for the night and only received a few mortar

rounds. Around 2400, we saw a Nip convoy coming down Hwy. 5 with it's lights on. I crawled over to the CP to get the old man to come have a look. The next day an arty observer came up and got into our hole with a phone. He zeroed the 10 in. guns on the area of the sighting. Each gun numbered 1,2 and 3 on his map was marked where each one was impacting. He told us he would be back at dark to spend the night. At good dark he was back and we had some good bull sessions. About 2400, again, the Nip trucks showed up. He grabbed the horn to get the battery alerted and, when the trucks got to his marked spots, he called down our greetings. We heard the shells whistling overhead, and in a few seconds, they hit the targets dead on. Every light in the convoy went out; but, it was too late - as he continued his fire orders. There were no more convoys after that.

"On 9 May, 1945, my squad and two scouts from Love Co. jumped off heading for the "Rest House" in Balete Pass. We hurried past deep holes with bamboo ladders in them. We wondered what they were for. We side stepped bomb duds - up to 500 pounders. We went by what was once enemy positions and came to a bluff overlooking the rest house. Lying on our bellies we checked it out with our glasses to have a good look at the infamous rest house... believe me it really looked restful. The game chickens were feeding while the roosters were crowing. We could see no damage on the east side of the buildings. No Japs - just chickens. We observed about 45 minutes then started back to the ridge. Didn't have to fire a shot. Later that same afternoon we made contact with Able Co. moving up from the south."

A concrete monument was erected at Balete Pass to commemorate those Tropic Lightning troops who had made the supreme sacrifice - and the Pass, in elaborate ceremonies, was later renamed Dalton Pass in honor of Gen. Jim "Dusty" Dalton, our beloved Asst. Div. CO.

Last Stage Ops

(Paul Glessner) "We were now going down hill toward Balete Pass and the town of Santa Fe, the entrance to the Cagayan Valley - which was our objective. One thing struck me odd - after a night raid, if several Japs were killed, we'd find the bodies together in a group. The Nips



ROUTE 5, winding south from Santa Fe.

were probably making sure they got out all the wounded and left only their dead.

"We were advancing to our next position, an area called Grassy Knol ("Grassy Saddle"?) and we met very stiff resistance. On top of it rain fell on us two, or three times while we were digging in

our perimeter defense. We were digging in on one slope of a hill while the Jap stronghold was on the reverse slope. They inflicted numerous casualties on our unit; however, our machine gun section (two machine guns and ammo carriers and a section leader - a section, at this time, was less than the normal two squads.) received no casualties. We were lucky that day (5 May ?), also.

"I can't recall whether it was L or K Co we were attached to; However, the next morning a combat patrol was sent out and met disaster - then withdrew. The other company was then sent out. Our two machine guns were set up to lay down a base of fire on the area occupied by the enemy. Then a patrol went out on each side and advanced on the Jap position

"undercover of our fire. We were in contact with the patrol leader by walkie-talkie, and when they reached a position within 20, or 30 feet of our crossfire we were notified to cease fire. They were now in a position when the Nips emerged, or looked over from their position, the enemy was at a distinct disadvantage, the majority of them were destroyed with a minimum of loss to this patrol. Overall, K and L Co.s suffered severe casualties in this op. Our machine gun section received none. After the area was cleared out we got careless and incurred casualties by Jap snipers. One of them was a platoon sgt. - believe his name was Moore.

"After the skirmish was over, I was guarding a trail to make sure no Japs approached our area. I heard someone coming thru the brush and when he appeared about 30 feet from me I almost shot him - thinking he was a Nip. He was a big man, six foot two, or so, and weighed over 200 pounds., I was sure relieved that I had not pulled the trigger on him after I found out it wasn't a Jap.

"Gen. Jim "Dusty" Dalton, our asst. Div. CO, who was at this time the youngest general in the Pacific Theater Ground Forces, was coming up the trail to inspect the Grassy Knoll area when he was killed by a Jap sniper a short distance from our position. To my recollection this was about 15 May."

(Les Thomas) "As we got closer to Balet Pass the going was rougher. Getting supplies to us was also rough. The engineers build the orads while getting sniped at. I was promoted to first sergeant while we were in the Kapintalan area. Capt.



One of our officers used to say, "The three F's of combat are fog, fatigue, and fear."

Fleming was hanging in there. The truth was that his big toes were half gone due to jungle rot. When we got to Wolfhound Ridge I guess

"that Capt. Kaulakis figured the ^{only} way was to go into the gorges and hope the Nips would only watch the ridges! The Cogon Grass was twelve feet high and we found many home made grenades here (sixteen penny nails wrapped around explosives.


"At last we were across Balete Pass! The next day Lieutenants Parker and Crowe were killed. The Japs were in caves defending the reverse slopes. A really bad day! It was raining all the time."

As part of the Tropic Lightning's drive on Santa Fe, the Wolfhounds were directed to attack to the northeast and seize the forward slopes of Shio Yama which dominated Santa Fe from the east. Here the Rgt. was to block hostile approaches from the Sawmill-Tayug-Tactac area on the southeast and Shio Yama on the northeast.



The balance of the 1 Btn. moved to join Able Co. on Wolfhound Ridge overlooking Balete Pass, having been assigned the west sector of the Regimental Zone of Ops. The 3 Btn. was assigned the east sector with the 2 Btn. protecting the Regiment's southeast flank. Patrols to the north determined that the enemy held Bolong Plateau (between Wolfhound Ridge and Santa Fe) and on 11 May, Charley Co. led the 1 Btn. attack, and a heavy machinegun platoon went into action on Wolfhound Ridge to interdict Hwy. 5. This platoon was successful in annihilating a number of small enemy groups.

Charley Co. secured the first ridge to the north and during the ensuing ten days all elements of the 1 Btn. gradually eliminated the enemy from the hills south of Shio Yama. Each hill was bitterly contested by an enemy firmly entrenched on high ground and supported by automatic weapons and mortar fire. Arty was employed as close as 100 yards in advance



Looking down on the battle of Santa Fe from Bailete Pass

of our front line troops, and the enemy suffered heavily in his suicidal defense of his positions.

Confronting the 3 Btn. was not only a fanatic enemy, but the terrain consisted of a series of cross-compartment ridges impossible for a road route. Item Co. swung to the west thru the 1 Btn. sector and then turned east. After an arty and M7 preparation, an attack seized this terrain. Co.s K and L relieved the 1 Btn., in order that the latter could continue north toward Santa Fe. A tank led attack succeeded in clearing the last enemy from the Rgtl. area of the Bolong Plateau.

From 14 thru 22 May, operating for the most part in heavily forested, rough terrain, the Wolfhounds fought to destroy fanatically resisting Jap groups blocking the western approaches to the Sawmill Valley. When this job was finished the 3 Btn. spread out over the valley's reaches, and the 1 Btn. swung north to clean out the valley to Route 5, tasks accomplished by 24 May. The 1 Btn. then wheeled east against Kanami Ridge which, ending at Rt. 5, 2½ miles north of Santa Fe, had become a Jap secondary route of access to both Bailete Ridge and the Old Spanish Trail. The Wolfhounds found considerable scattered resistance along the ridge, but by the end of May had secured sufficient terrain to assure the safety

Auth: CG 25 Div
Init:
Date: 12 May 45

RBR:

FIELD ORDER)
NUMBER 12)

HEADQUARTERS
Twenty-Seventh Infantry
S Kapintalan, 12 May 45

MAPS: PHOTOMAP, DIGDIG TO SANTA FE, 1:100,000.

- 1 a See current Int summaries.
- b 25th Inf Div reinf continues Opns to provide uninterrupted use of Hwy 5 from SAN JOSE to SANTA FE, coordinated Atk w/32d Div on SANTA FE, seizure of SANTA FE and high ground adjacent there-to, and to block hostile approaches to SANTA FE from E, N, and W.
- 2 27th Inf will Atk NNE, seize and secure high ground NE of SAWMILL area, seek and destroy enemy forces in Z of Action, and block hostile approaches to SANTA FE from the E.

D-Day: 13 May 1945

- 3 a 1st Bn (w/Co C 1st LGAF Atchd):
 - (1) Adv N in Z of Action, seize Bn 1st Obj, and initiate immediate Ren to Bn 2d Obj.
 - (2) Seize Bn 2d Obj.
 - (3) Destroy hostile forces in Z of Action.
 - (4) Prepare to Adv on Regtl Obj on order.
- b 3d Bn:
 - (1) Adv NE in Z of Action and seize Bn Obj.
 - (2) Destroy hostile forces in Z of Action.
 - (3) Prepare to Adv on Regtl Obj on order.
 - (4) Maintain security of Regtl right (E) Flank.
- c 2d Bn:
 - (1) Initially secure Regtl Right Rear.
 - (2) Prepare to follow either 1st or 3d Bns on order.
- d AT Co: (w/1st Bn LGAF less Co's C and D Atchd):
Initially provide security of Regtl CP.
- e Cn Co:
D/S of assault Bns, prepared to support either or both Bns w/ direct and/or indirect fire.
- x (1) Upon completion of Rd to WOLFHOOUND RIDGE, M4 Tks will be available for D/S.
- (2) Contact will be from right to left.
- (3) Base of Fire (105mm Assault Guns) initially from ridge-mass 1500 Yds SSW BALETE PASS.
- 4 a MSR: Hwy 5 to Vic BALETE PASS, thence E on WOLFHOOUND RIDGE to Vic (E.6-23.7,) thence in rear of both assault Bns.
- b Others, same.
- 5 a See current SOI and SSI, 25th Inf Div.
- b (1) Regtl CP: Initially (C.2-19.2)
- (2) Others : Report when established or displaced.

OFFICIAL: *[Signature]*

LINDEMAN
Commanding

of Santa Fe against counterattack from the east.

(Les Thomas) "At Santa Fe we had to cross open ground and I was hoping the 32 Div. would have a better shot than we would. Eleven Jap tanks got away from us here since we could not get close enough to them. In the Sawmill Valley Japs were all along the tree line and it was very slow going for



War Correspondents were received good-naturedly by the men on Bolong, because most people like to pose for a cameraman, or get their names in print.

us. Capt. Blackstock came to the company at this time - Capt. Francis Fleming had been CO until this time. I was rotated back to Manila about May 1945 and Wilburn then became Top Dog."

(Ernie Lucas) "We moved out to what we were told would be our last objective. With that hope, we wanted to get it over with. We moved north then east hitting some stiff resistance. When we fought our way to a hill we called Sugar Loaf in the Sawmill River Valley. This hill was well defended and while we kept probing for weak spots - we found none. We were 75 yards apart, straight across, but you had to go down a draw then start up Sugar Loaf. At night we could hear the Nips going down the backside (east) after water and could smell them cooking rice. The Lt. and I were standing and looking to our left and were getting ready to make a patrol to the east side when a shot rang out. The Lt. took a step backward and said 'I'm hit!' The Jap got him in the left shoulder, but it was a clean hit with no vital damage. He still even had feeling in his left hand. I wish I could remember his name. The patrol was postponed until the next day. In the mean time, they brought up another Lt. who had gone across with us and had served somewhere else in the 3 Btn., other than Item Co. All the time we were on New Cal he tried as hard as he could to get out of the front."

" The next day we started around to the backside of the hill and we made it okay. We spotted two of our buddies who had been killed a couple of days before and their bodies were only a few feet from the top. We tried to reach those bodies but drew fire every time we got close. This side of the hill had a gentle slope from it's base with an open space of about 50 yds. before the trees became thicker. We still couldn't see the river, but, we figured it wasn't too far away. We weren't able to get up there so we started back to our area. Halfway back the Nips had a trail block and their big mistake was throwing a couple grenades first which did little damage but alerted us and we opened up on them. The Lt. yelled for me to take my squad to the co, area and get help. We took the high ground between our position and Sugar Loaf, and went as fast as we could. We told the Old Man the Lt. wanted more help so he sent a couple squads back with us. My first scout was in the lead and, as we came to a large tree, a Jap stuck his rifle out against the scout's head and shot him. We killed the Nip immediately; but, it was too late. The scout's body started tumbling down the hill and our second scout made a jump holding to some vines and stopped the body. We pulled them up and the men we had left behind were coming up to us. We got back to the co, area where stretcher bearers took care of my scout's body.

"Let me tell you somting about this young scout. He wasn't able to into the U.S.Submarine Service so he joined the Canadian Sub Service, where he served with them in the North Atlantic. He was one who pushed a button which sank a Nazi U Boat. They picked up the survivours, - including the Sub Capt., ~~WHEN HE SHOT~~ and the Capt of the Canadian ship gave our scout an Iron Cross he took off the Sub Capt. When he showed it to us he said it was his good luck piece. He was discharged from the Canadian Navy for medical reasons and came back to the U.S. and joined the Inf. We asked him why - and he said he just wanted to fight.

"On our next try at the north flank of this hill another sgt. and I volunteered to try and see if we could draw fire. We started off and my buddy would climb 15 or 20 ft., stop, search the terrain and, if he

"spotted anything, he would wave for me to come up. I would pass him and repeat the process since we didn't want to miss anything. Suddenly he yelled 'Duck!'. He rolled to his left and started pushing himself down feet first when a shot rang out. I saw the gun barrel disappear. We slid down until we had some cover and he asked 'Ernie, did you see them?' I told him I saw nothing but a quick glance at the barrel. He said there were two of them. One was motioning him to come up, with his finger, and the other was ready to shoot him. We went on down the hill leaving them in their good position. That evening, at the CP, the Capt. told us he had orders in for a tank with a flame thrower. This made us very, very happy. The fire would force them to the bottom of their holes and then it was like shooting fish in a barrel. The tank got up about 1400, and - it didn't have a flame thrower. We tried to get the tank commander to fire 3 or 4 direct rounds into the hill but he said he was afraid the shrapnel might knock his tank out of commission. We then jumped off for a frontal assault and halfway up my BAR man started getting the shakes. I turned to Merchi, who had his squad to my right, and told him I was going to take over our BAR. There was a thorny bush on my left and, when I pushed it down to get around it - the lights went out. This was 23 May, and when I came to, it felt like my right arm was gone. I felt for it and realized it was still there. I told Merchi I had been hit and he yelled down to our Lt. that I'd been hit and the Lt. told us to get out of there - we were in a cross fire. I had to leave my rifle there since I had to hold my right arm tight with my left hand. When we got to the bottom of the hill the medics gave me a shot of morphine and then sent me to the CP. My buddies from Hqs. Co. came running up with a stretchertelling me to get on. I told them I didn't need one and they said 'That's your ass!' They carried me back to the aid station and the Doc, who was a Major, said, 'Well, Lucas, the law of averages caught up with you.' He had been with us from our first day in Item Co. The 25 cal. bullet entered the right front part of my neck, just missing the collar bone, and came out on a slight downward angle - missing my spine

"by a hair. The Doc said I was very lucky that it hadn't been a 31 cal. They loaded me in a jeep and we started back to Digdig. We made one stop at a medical check station and transferred into an ambulance and arrived at the Field Hospital around 2100. They put me on an X-Ray table for pictures and shot a couple in one position and then the technician said 'Ok, soldier, let's turn over this way.' My face turned toward him and he said 'My God! Ernie!' I looked up and surprise, - it was Rudolph. We had gone to elementary and Jr. Hi. school together in Houston. He had been the same one who X-Rayed me when I was inducted.

"One of my Wolfhound buddies came by to see me later on and said they got a flame thrower tank up there the next day, sprayed the hill, and walked up and killed 72 Japs - capturing one. He said that was the best fortified position he'd ever seen. Their hole was 18 ins. in diameter and went down to connecting tunnels. Pegs were driven into the sides, their rifles were lying topside so they could ease up on the pegs, take a look, fire a shot and then ease back down the hole. All the holes were well camouflaged.

"I was hit 23 May 1945, and went to the hospital at Digdig and after a few weeks they flew me back to a clearing station. From there I was taken to Lingayen, a Gen. Hospital on Leyte, and then to Frisco, 5 July, and then to McCloskey Hospital, Temple, Tx., where I was discharged 3 Nov. 1945.

"Writing this brought back a world of memories - and a bucket full of tears.

"P.S. The Tropic Lightning set a record for continuous front line fighting - 165 days."

King and Love Co.s combined to form a block astride the Sawmill Rd. and river. This denied the use of the Sawmill area to the Japs and cut off the enemy supply and evac route to the Tayug-Tactac area. This block, heavily reinforced with machine guns, accounted for nearly 50 enemy moving along the trail.

The westward slopes of the Shio Yama hill mass comprise a series of

~~SECRET~~
 Auth: CG 25 Div
 Init: *KBYE*
 Date: 26 May 45

RBR:

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER F13)

HEADQUARTERS
 Twenty-Seventh Infantry
 S Kapintalan, 26 May 45

MAPS: PHOTOMAP DIGDIG TO SANTA FE 1:10000.

- 1 a 25th Inf Div (Reinf) continues present missions and Atks W to open VILLA VERDE TRAIL E of IMUGAN.
 b 126th Inf seizes high ground E of IMUGAN.
- 2 27th Inf:
 - a Continues present missions.
 - b Prepares to support by fire 126th Inf Atk on order.
- 3 1st Bn:
 Continue Opns to hold Regtl Obj and patrol to E.
- 4 2d Bn (w/Co's B and C 1st LGAF Atchd):
 Continue security of Regtl Right Rear.
- 5 3d Bn:
 Maintain block on SAWMILL TRAIL and secure Regtl Right (E) flank in Z of Action.
- 6 Cn Co:
 - (1) D/S 1st Bn.
 - (2) Daily interdictory fire on KANAME YAMA.
- 7 8th FA Bn: D/S 27th Inf.
- 8 Prov Flat 775th Tk Bn: D/S 1st Bn.
- 9 1st and 3d Bns:
 - (1) Prepare to support by 81mm mortar fire 126th Inf Atk on order.
 - (2) Select positions and OP's to accomplish mission in Para 9 (1) by 0900, 27 May 45.
- 10 Cn Co:
 - (1) Prepare to support by fire 126th Inf Atk on order.
 - (2) Select positions and OP's to accomplish mission in Para 10 (1) by 0900, 27 May 45.

LINDEMAN
 Commanding

OFFICIAL:

LOMENZO
 S-3

Dist: Special.

~~SECRET~~

C-OM-xi

south to west fingers fanning onto the north-south ridge line. The 1 Btn. employed covering fires to support enveloping movements to the grassy ridge lines. From here strong combat patrols sought enemy dispositions. These groups of enemy were destroyed by close support of mortars followed by fire and movement ops. There were many fluid enemy groups thru the Shio area, and it was only with aggressive combat patrols that Shio Yama was finally cleared.

(Paul Glessner) "After securing the Balet Pass area, we moved to another position, high ground, about a mile and a half from Santa Fe. Here, again, we met stiff resistance from the retreating Nips trying to get out of the hills to their stronghold in the Cagayan Valley. I believe the Jap Gen. in command was Gen. Yamashita. I believe he was once called the "Bloody Butcher of Bataan".

"This was the first we were given a chance to write home, since Mar., and we were allowed one V-Mail letter. This was the latter part of May. It had been about 50 days since we had last written home.

"During our stay here we were almost bombed by our own planes and a couple nights later arty was called in on a TOT barrage. The FO's said there were sixteen 105 howitzers, eight 155's, four 240's, and two eight inch Long Toms. The guns were timed so that all projectiles reached the target at the same time and, when that many rounds go over simultaneously it sounds like a freight train. They were attempting to soften up an area around Santa Fe, and when our advance unit reached Santa Fe they were met by units from another division.

"We were then relieved and went to Camp Patrick, a short distance from Tarlac. I think this was the first week in June. When we reached Camp Patrick we thought we were going to get a long rest; however, after two days we boarded trucks and went to an area I think was called the Old Spanish Trail. We were in this area for twenty days, or more and were in almost constant contact with the enemy. Also, during this time there were intense thunder storms. One night a lightning storm came up and our hole got struck. Altho no one was hit, I was on guard duty, it

7 sure scared the hell out of us. We were going up the Spanish Trail to *see* make contact with a unit from the Cagayan Valley and to secure the area. Our unit was attached to I, K, and L Co.s and there were many casualties during this op."

(Tony Crnko) "After we left Balete Pass we moved toward Santa Fe with the 81's in support of the Btn. in attack. On 29 May Hagen and Madey were wounded in a Jap ambush. Three weeks earlier Cpl. Taylor had been KIA and the next day his orders came thru to go home on rotation."


(Glessner) "Many of the boys by this time had what they called battle fatigue and this included officers. I remember seeing several of them just

sit down and cry when something happened to their boys.



"Some of the officers I remember in 3 Btn. were Capt. Ballard, Lt. Anderson, Lt. Brown, Lt. Burns and Lt. Karwaki."

"One afternoon a short round from a 4.2 mortar of ours hit a tree about ten feet from my fox hole. It hit in the crotch of the tree and exploded with several people getting shrapnel from that burst. It was either Burns or Anderson had to be evacked because of that burst. Our machine gun squad acted as litter bearers to carry many wounded from the area to the forward aid station."

After moving to a training area near Tarlac, the 27th was directed to move to the Spanish Trail-Cauco area, the east route to Aritao. The 3 Btn. was assigned to the initial op in the area, while 1 Btn. moved in reserve to the Digdig area and the 2 Btn. went into reserve in the Shio Yama-Sawmill area northeast of Santa Fe to continue blocking approaches *from the west. On 15 June, after Div. Recon had* released its road block



Camp Patrick



Martin Hunsberger at Baleta Pass

~~S E C R E T~~
 Auth: CG 25 Div
 Init: *RJR*
 Date: 30 May 45

RBR:

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

F14)

H E A D Q U A R T E R S
 Twenty-Seventh Infantry
 S Kapintalan, 30 May 45

MAPS: PHOTOMAP DIGDIG TO SANTA FE 1:10000.

- 1 37th Div passes thru 25th Div and continues Atk to N to seize ARITA0.
- 2 25th Div (Reinf):
 - a Continues current mission.
 - b Relieves elements 136th Inf at DINGALEN BAY.
 - c Releases 148 RCT (-140th FA Bn) to control CG 37th Div.
- 3 27th Inf: Continues current missions.
- 4 1st Bn: Continue Opns to hold Regtl Obj and patrol to E.
- 5 2d Bn (Co's B and C 1st LGAF detached):
 Revert to Div Res Vic DIGDIG on order.
- 6 3d Bn:
 - a Clear enemy in Z.
 - b Secure Engr supply route to 1st Bn.
 - c Patrol E and N in Z to present location Co L.
- 7 Cn Co: 1-Plat D/D 1st Bn.
- 8 AT Co: Secure Regtl CP.
- 9 8th FA Bn: D/S 27th Inf.
- 10 Plat Co C 98th Cml Bn: Initially D/S 1st Bn.
- 11 Prov Plat Co C.775th Tk Bn: Detached per FO 22, 25th Div.
- 12 1st LGAF: Detached to Atchd 161st Inf on or about 31 May 45.

LINDEMAN
 Commanding

OFFICIAL:

LOMENZO
 S-3

Dist: Special.

~~S E C R E T~~

C-OM-xii

~~SECRET~~

Auth: CG 25 Div

Init:

Date: 11 Jun 45

RBR:

FIELD ORDER)

NUMBER 13)

HEADQUARTERS
Twenty-Seventh Infantry
S Kapintalan, 11 Jun 45

MAPS: PHOTOMAP N CARRANGLAN TO S DUPAX 1:100,000; LUZON 1:500,000.

- 1 a See Int annex.
- b (1) 25th Inf Div Rein secures Hwy 5 from SAN JOSE to ARITAO.
(2) 35th Inf Atks S on SPANISH TRAIL to secure MARANG R FORK.
- 2 27th Inf less 2d Bn will pass thru 25th Recon Trp (Mec) and Atk N to clear enemy from SPANISH TRAIL and CAUCO VALLEY and secure SPANISH TRAIL PASS.
- 3 a 1st Bn:
 - (1) Initiate immediate Recon of SPANISH TRAIL-CAUCO area.
 - (2) Be prepared to move to SPANISH TRAIL-CAUCO area on 24-Hr notice.
- b 2d Bn:
 - (1) Continue present missions.
 - (2) Remain in present positions NE of SANTA FE as Div Res.
- c 3d Bn:
 - (1) 12 Jun 45:
 - a Bn less Co's I and K close on and relieve elements 25th Recon Trp (Mec) 130,000 Yds N CARRANGLAN.
 - b Close Co's I and K from TALLAC on remainder of Bn. If impossible to complete move 12 Jun, close 13 Jun.
 - (2) 13 Jun 45: Following preparation by 90th FA Bn:
 - a Initiate Recon from Fwd positions N to determine if the enemy block remains on SPANISH TRAIL.
 - b Reconnoiter 100,000-150,000 Yds N in CAUCO R VALLEY.
 - c Reconnoiter 80,000-100,000 Yds to the W.
- d Cn Co:
 - (1) Attached initially to 3d Bn.
- e 8th FA Bn:
 - (1) Initially D/S from positions Vic PUTLAN.
 - (2) Be prepared to move to SPANISH TRAIL-CAUCO area on order.
- f Plat Co C 98th Cml Bn (4.2" Mort):
Initially Attached 3d Bn.
- x AT Co, Co C 25th Med Bn, 30th Ptbl Surg Hosp:
Move to Vic CARRANGLAN R:
AT Co: 13 Jun. Co C 25th Med Bn: 13 Jun.
30th Ptbl Surg Hosp: 14 Jun.
- 4 a Sv Co:
 - (1) Initially remain present position.
 - (2) Be prepared to move Vic CARRANGLAN on order.
- b Other Adm details, no change.
- 5 a Current SOI and SSI 25th Inf Div.
- b (1) Regt CP: Initially Vic CARRANGLAN R.
(2) Others: Rpt when established.

OFFICIAL:

LORENZO
S-3LINDEMAN
Commanding~~SECRET~~

C-xviii

at J - Spanish and Cauco Trails three days earlier, Love Co. moved to the high ground west of Spanish Trail and a patrol engaged an enemy strong point 1000 yards north of the block. Item Co. passed thru L and attacked this position, gaining the 15000 yards. A patrol from 161, to the west, contacted L Co. thus forming an east-west line of the two sister Rgt.s.

Cauco Valley patrols reported encountering small groups of enemy, and on 20 June, Charley Co. moved from Digdig into this area with the mission of operating under 3 Btn. control with aggressive patrolling to the north. A combat patrol, from C Co., moved out on 21 June to secure a dominant ridge 3500 yards south of Cauco Pass. This ridge was a portion of the terrain east of the valley, and an advance of 1800 yards was made without contact, - the balance of the co. followed at a 1000 yard distance. On 22 June, C Co. encountered enemy on a hill 1100 yards south of its objective and, after calling down mortar and arty to precede the attack, the hill was taken the next afternoon. On 24 June, the 1 Btn. patrolled this sector and it was discovered the Btn. objective was occupied by an enemy force with a 75 mm gun., one of two which had been firing on both Btms. since the entry into the ZA. Charley Co. moved the last 1100 yards to its objective, 25 June, and successfully seized the hill mass. Among fifteen enemy killed, by C Co., was a Jap field officer, Mjr. Suzuki, and his dispatch case contained a complete plan for the enemy withdrawl to the east. The route was along a trail north of Susug Pass - some ten miles east of the Spanish Trail area. Medium arty was placed on this route, during the prescribed withdrawl night, and patrols were sent to seek and destroy as many Japs as possible before they could escape. An Able Co. patrol encountered a number of the enemy 1800 yards east of Maton Pass; however, well placed arty caused an enemy withdrawl. Patrols from both Btms. continued their action and made contact with those from the Cacti Rgt. The enemy had withdrawn all his forces he could, east toward Biruk, and this cleared the Spanish Trail-Cauco area.



Hunting knife
from the Igorot
tribe on the island
of LUZON in the
PHILIPPINES 1945

(Bob Zoller) "After completing basic training, at Camp Rahn, Ia., I shipped out of Camp Stoneman early in 1945 and, after stopping at Hollandia, N.G., we were put ashore, by landing craft, at Manila and went to a Repl. Depot being built south of town. Manila was still a real mess, ^{and} but the Japs were still being cleaned out just down the road from our camp at a saw mill. Like most other occasions over there, we experienced one of the guards, on the perimeter, shooting a carabao (auto-carbine, full clip) one night and the Army having to replace it after the Filipino farmer raised Billy hell with the Old Man. We got out of camp occasionally and a couple of the troops went into this barrio to see the varmint. They got roused out, about mid-evening, by the alarm of 'Japs coming!' (The Nips would walk under these huts, on poles, and stick their long bayonets up thru the floor.). These two bailed out and ran for the nearest paddy, into which they dived, to hide. They had their suntans on and when they got back I think we suffered more from their stink than they did. They were really a mess - from head to toe and we hung a tag on them.




Fresh Meat

"We shipped north, by open gondola, to the area of the 25 Inf. Div. ops. Mop up ops were going on yet, in June, and we used to run into these Igorots who were also hunting Japs. They were very small natives and had the wickedest looking barbed arrows I ever saw. They would brag about the Jap heads they'd taken. Charley Co., Wolfhounds, could brag about the Jap Major we got, tho."

In its assault the 1 Btn., Wolfhounds, captured a series of Jap Field Orders which made it apparent that the Nip CO was aware of his bad situation. Knowing that he was hemmed in from the north, south, and west and that his chances of escape northeast were blocked in the Dupax-Malasin area. he decided to withdraw to the east rather than be exter-

inated. This occurred on the night of 23 June along the trail north of the Suzuga Pass. Arty poured onto the flight path and any Japs that got away were thoroughly beaten.

The Balete Pass action had exhausted the principal strength of the



Balete Pass was renamed Dalton Pass by the Philippine Congress in honor of General Dalton, who died there. A monument was erected on the site.

enemy, and a number of his troops were caught in the Kaname-Minami mountain area where they had been stopped en route to reinforcing the Pass. The enemy's position had become untenable, and he had decided to evacuate to the east. During

the Spanish Trail-Cauco action numerous small groups were contacted on their way eastward, and arty and mortar fire worked in conjunction with aggressive patrol action to destroy many of those groups. These subsequent mop-up ops continued until 30 June which was to mark the end of 165 days of offensive combat by the Tropic Lightning. By the last day of June, the battle weary Wolfhounds moved to their training camp of Camp Patrick, near Tarlac.

(Glessner) "About the first day of July, a patrol from either the 32, or 37 Div. made contact with us and took over our positions. We were then taken back to Camp Patrick and set up our tents for a long rest and training period. Camp Patrick was on a




Our arty, 8th FAB, was still the best.

"series of barren slopes near Tarlac which was an R and R haven.

"I had put in 80 days of combat and my weight had dropped from 170 pounds to below 140. After about four weeks we started training for the invasion of Japan. We were out on a problem when the first A-Bomb was dropped and, after the second one was dropped, the Japs surrendered unconditionally! That night we celebrated and there were an awful lot of hung over Wolfhounds the next day."

(Zoller) "As far as I was concerned, the high point of my time in the



Church at Tarlac

Phillipines was 13 Aug. 1945, when we got word of the Jap surrender.

I don't think we had any feelings about the A-Bomb (which we didn't know what it was) since it ended the war and (tho it may have opened Pandora's box) it surely saved my life and probably millions of others. The Tropic Lightning was scheduled to invade (Operation Olympic) Kyushu. By way of celebrating we shot up all our ammo."


(Phil File) "At the end of 165 days of combat we were relieved and

went back to Central Luzon where we started extensive training for the invasion of Japan. In 1 Btn., HHQ. Co., there were still 19 men who had landed on the Canal together. Every man was competent to handle promotions, but they




L. Phil File with actg. sply. sgt.
late July '45

"had been frozen to leave vacancies for replacements coming from the States. It was a sore point and I had Pfc.s and Cpl.s leading Staff and Techs. around. One of the saddest things we saw, at Camp Patrick, were the many misplaced children who came around to clean the food scraps from the garbage cans. Eventually the Filipino Police gathered them up and moved them someplace else.



"The S4 was salvaging ammo from the hills and making a dump right on the edge of the Rgtl. area. As Murphy's Law would have it, a fire broke out in the dump and we had to evac - post haste. The 1 Btn. surgeon was in his sack and insisted he wasn't about to move, but others prevailed and finally he got up. No sooner had he gotten outside than a piece of 105 shell came thru the tent and center of the cot the good Doc had just vacated.

Three of the "19" cutting up:
Corette, Pinky Clift and Schroeder



Red Cross Club at Tarlac

"We heard stories of a new bomb being dropped on Japan. We were all on tent-erhooks about the possible ending of the war. One morning I was awakened by a runner with orders reassigning me to a Repl Depo for processing back to the States. I was flown to the Depot and put on a ship before I had confirmation that the war was over. I celebrated the capitulation of the Nips on shipboard and, after spending three months in a Stateside hospital, I was allowed to re-up for limited duty. My "Big War"

"was over - or so I thought."

(Tony Crnko) "On 29 June, we moved out of the jungles and established Camp Patrick not far from Tarlac - about 60 miles north of Manila. On 18 July, I made Cpl. and on 15 Aug. the war was over. On 21 Aug., I was promoted to S/Sgt."

Reprise

(Enemy viewpoint)

The landing at Lingayen Gulf, on 9 Jan. 1945, occurred before Yamashita had completed the withdrawal of troops and equipment to their planned defensive areas. Accordingly, he decided to protect the withdrawal northward from Manila along Hwy. 5 and a secondary route east of it as long as possible. The actual withdrawal along these routes was seriously impeded by air attacks and the speed of the Allied advance. When asked why he did not choose to defend on the Agno River, General Yamashita said his army had lack the proper mobility because of their fuel shortage, and that he did not have enough troops. The air force service troops were then ordered to stem the US advance in the central plain at Clark field in order to gain time. Gen. Yamashita maintained that if this had succeeded, and had his troops held out for two more weeks, the US troops would have found Manila completely evacuated. He realized that Manila could not be defended, and had planned to abandon it as soon as he had managed to remove all the supplies massed there. "Had this been accomplished, all troops would have been withdrawn. The rapid US advance, however, nullified these plans. Yamashita complained --

--He indicated that communication with forces west of Stotsenberg and Bamban terminated in mid-Jan.

"Had Balete Pass remained in Jap hands until the end of June, Gen. Yamashita planned on bringing the 103 Div. down into Orioung Pass and withdrawing the 105 Div. to the river crossing on Hwy. 4 just northwest of Bagabag. The, as the US forces approached Bagabag, he would have launched a counterattack with the remnants of the 2 Armored Div. hitting

However, the swift advance of the Americans broke thru before he was set, and thus began the closing phases of the Luzon Campaign.

Strangely enough the Jap commanders said they had not taken a single U.S. prisoner on Luzon other than one pilot taken and then released near the end of the campaign. The generals indicated they did not believe Americans really killed Jap prisoners but said they had to make their troops believe it. They searched bodies for documents and sent individuals and patrols out to secure info; however, they complained that the documents received were often merely "love letters" Yamashita marvelled at the completeness in detail of Sixth Army's awareness of his military situation throughout the campaign.

The maps used by the Japs on Luzon were US scale 1:200,000 maps. The commanders indicated that, particularly with reference to the Balete Pass area, these were so inaccurate as to be hardly a "sporting proposition" and almost a preconceived deception.

Yamashita had a wholesome respect for the 6 Army. He asked which sections were present and, when told, he said - be it sincerely or diplomatically - that the Army's intelligence and tac ops had been remarkably effective. He also praised US troops for the rapidity with which they repaired their transport, and he was impressed by the speed with which the US moved a division from one place to another.

Military Intelligence

(Counter Intelligence Activities)

Prior to embarkation, the 201 CIC was augmented by attachment of the 450 Area team for the op. In addition, 13 Filipino enlisted men and 1 officer from the 2 Filipino Btn. were assigned, thus making a total of 40 personnel available for the operation at Hq I Corps.


The total team was not assembled until about two weeks before embarkation. A brief but intensive training was deemed essential, since more than 60% had never been in combat landing and only about 30% had more than three months of CIC experience.

aircraft used was the L-5 and each payload was 125 lbs. Over a period of 18 days a total of 137,386 lbs. were dropped. At the end of this period units were again accessible by way of Hwy. 5.



Each white cross and each Star of David, at Santa Barbara, marked the grave of a man whose most fervent desire had been to return home.
"The real heroes had been the buddies we had left out there in the islands."

In taking stock, the Tropic Lightning found it had suffered more combat deaths than any other U.S. Div. fighting on Luzon - 1134. Further, there were 3271 WIA and one man listed as MIA. After the Japs surrendered, instead of Olympic, it was Operation Blacklist (A plan for the occupation in case of enemy collapse) that was initiated. The Tropic Lightning, after three extra weeks aboard ship, due to the typhoon off Okinawa, marched ashore near Wakayama on 2 Oct. 1945.



So it was with mixed emotions that we left them there and headed for the transports and Japan.

(Tony Crnko) "On 21 Sept., we departed from Camp Patrick, boarded a cattle car for San Miguel and San Fabian, on the Lingayan Gulf (the scene of our landing - so long ago) and boarded the USS Pickens to sail for Japan."

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

Capt Fred P. Lohr

SILVER STAR

Colonel	Philip F. Lindeman	(OLC)
Lt Col	Robert L. Stevenson	
Major	Cecil H. Bayless	(P)
Major	William R. Cole	
Capt	Edward J. Berry	
Capt	Edwin C. Cook	
Capt	Henry S. Hirst	
Capt	Edward S. Kaulakis	
Capt	Paul Miltnerberger	
Capt	John W. Scannell	(OLC)
Capt	Kenneth E. Yates	
1st Lt	Mark H. Brown	
1st Lt	Herbert C. Gentry	
1st Lt	Robert W. Leonard	(OLC)
1st Lt	Ira J. Nelson	
2nd Lt	George K. Grant	
2nd Lt	Cecil R. Lamb	
1st Sgt	Leo O. Maheux	
T/Sgt	Gerald B. Ward	
S/Sgt	Victor A. Bieganowski	(P)
S/Sgt	Maurice Hain	
S/Sgt	J.C. Hollingsworth	
S/Sgt	Farley N. Huddleston	
S/Sgt	James J. Kemp	
S/Sgt	William Nettles	
S/Sgt	Lewis Nioovich	
S/Sgt	Joseph W. Petrovich	
S/Sgt	Luther Rhoden	
S/Sgt	Albert L. Timmin, Jr.	
Sgt	Glenn A. Cherry	
Sgt	John M. Ganovsky	
Sgt	Lester O. Johnson	
Sgt	Elbert V. Lee	
Sgt	Harold L. Stafford	
T/4	Francis W. Dalton	
T/5	Orville Cox	(OLC)
T/5	John A. Jones	(P)
T/5	Donald M. McPherson	
FFC	Earl M. Ballard	(P)
FFC	Vance R. Brown	
FFC	Charles L. Clark	
FFC	Gerald Dipano	
FFC	Edward A. Harzewski	(P)

PFC	James Hogan, Jr.	
PFC	John A. Kouhout	
PFC	Donald L. McDonald	
PFC	Billy R. McKee	(P)
PFC	Robert Mark	
PFC	Robert W. Ryan	
PFC	Michael A. Santulli	
PFC	Alfred T. Shrout	(P)
PFC	Vestal Smith	
PFC	George L. Southard	
PFC	Charles Stone	
PFC	Albert L. Vega	
PFC	Theodore Wilczeski	
Pvt	Charles V. Scott	(P)

AIR MEDAL

Colonel	Philip F. Lindeman	
Lt Col	Louis S. Ahlen	
Lt Col	Kenneth C. Robertson	
Lt Col	Eben F. Swift	
Major	William H. Cole	
Major	Jack A. Briscoe	
Major	Joseph J. Koontz	
Major	Joe L. Payne	
Capt	James R. Porter	
1st Lt	Ernest J. Liggett, Jr	
S/Sgt	Amos O. Keever, Jr	
S/Sgt	John F. Lengel	
T/5	Henry W. Gaines	
PFC	Alfred L. Cournoyer	
PFC	Rudolph J. Gronowicz	
PFC	William E. Pope	
PFC	Milton Savage	
PFC	Weldon Stubbs	

BRONZE STAR

Lt Col	Benjamin F. Evans, Jr	
Major	Jack A. Briscoe	(OLC)
Major	John A. Dole	
Major	Walter N. Guletsky	
Major	Peter T. Lomenzo	
Capt	Jerome J. Christians	
Capt	Merrill C. Futch	
Capt	Arthur G. Johnson	
Capt	Harry Linker	(OLC)
Capt	David J. Rattapel	
1st Lt	James J. Enright	
1st Lt	Leon Freier	
1st Lt	William F. Haines	
1st Lt	Gordon H. Kingston	
1st Lt	Louis J. Mack	

2nd Lt	Jordon L. Epperson
2nd Lt	Dennis J. Vogel
2nd Lt	James J. Welsh
T/Sgt	Glen W. Vote
S/Sgt	Rufus V. Cox
S/Sgt	Edward L. Snyder
S/Sgt	Dayton L. Spangler
T/3	Lawrence W. Childers
T/3	Harry M. Kleinschmidt
T/3	Kenneth M. Uni
Sgt	Norbert F. Henry
Sgt	Louis J. Maniscarco
Sgt	John A. Robinson
Sgt	Tony B. Schneider
Sgt	Achlee C. Rogers
T/4	Euclid W. Bishop
T/4	James L. Chandler
T/4	Santos Dicho
Cpl	Walter F. Gramza
Cpl	Charles Coons, Jr.
PFC	Benjamin Aubin
PFC	Everett E. Bruner
PFC	Earnest V. Daniels
PFC	Whitney W. Hall
PFC	Vince A. Matich
PFC	Homer Stooksbury
PFC	Julius Tucker
PFC	Charles W. Ussrey

M/SGT ROBERT H. SHOLD

(P)


ROSTER OF OFFICERS

	Colonel	David H Buchanan	O 17 746	(WIA) (E)
	Colonel	Philip F Lindeman	O 272 444	
	Lt-Col	Robert L Stevenson	O 343 589	
	Lt-Col	Conway J Christianson	O 377 257	
	Lt-Col	Alan M Strock	O 23 099	
	Lt-Col	Eben F Swift	O 23 258	
	Lt-Col	Kenneth C Robertson	O 241 453	
	Lt-Col	Louis S Ahlen	O 362 057	(WIA)
	Lt-Col	Joe L Payne	O 413 263	
	Major	Walter N Guletsky	O 21 309	(WIA)
	Major	Cecil H Bayless	O 384 649	(KIA)
	Major	John A Dole jr	O 369 424	
	Major	Jack A Briscoe	O 413 152	
	Major	William R Cole	O 387 282	
	Major	Harry Linker	O 404 210	
	Major	Joseph J Koontz	O 1 283 448	
	Major	Richard H Ferriter	O 1 283 397	
	Major	Peter T Lomenzo	O 1 283 277	
	Major	Edward S Kaulakis	O 452 114	
	Major	James R Porter	O 402 794	
	Captain	Jerome J Christians	O 310 427	
MD	Captain	Robert R Onorato	O 406 213	
	Captain	James M Browning	O 397 939	
	Captain	William J West	O 432 313	
	Captain	Robert O Holcombe	O 390 551	
	Captain	Roy H Weipert	O 303 346	
	Captain	Clarence B Irwin jr	O 416 022	
Chpl	Captain	John W Scannell	O 386 942	(WIA) (E)
	Captain	George T Morris	O 315 827	
	Captain	David Kleiner	O 419 246	(WIA) (E)
	Captain	Paul C Miltenberger	O 436 236	
	Captain	Henry S Hirst	O 419 882	
	Captain	John R Paulikonis	O 1 285 991	
	Captain	Jacob C MacKorell	O 305 637	
	Captain	Stanley H Shaw	O 376 448	
	Captain	Charles J Brenneman	O 1 283 370	(WIA) (E)
	Captain	Edward J Berry	O 1 283 011	(WIA) (E)
	Captain	Charles S Burton	O 514 336	
	Captain	William J Stroh	O 376 614	
	Captain	Rudolph L Baehr jr	O 1 283 350	
	Captain	Harry Quain	O 513 879	
	Captain	Richard F Gaffney	O 398 746	
	Captain	David J Rottapel	O 470 322	
	Captain	Frank F Boyle	O 35 326	(WIA) (E)
	Captain	Merrill C Futch	O 342 788	
	Captain	Woodrow Waleika	O 423 267	
	Captain	William H Little	O 424 868	
	Captain	John S Flowe	O 394 430	
	Captain	Marvin V Gumma	O 412 286	
	Captain	Charles R Blaine	O 530 836	
	Captain	Fred P Lohr	O 330 964	

Captain	Arthur G Johnson jr	0 425 784	
Captain	Francis W Fleming	0 1 289 568	
Captain	Richard C Hirt (Red)	0 1 287 714	(WIA) (E)
Captain	Edwin C Cook	0 1 283 215	(WIA) (E)
Captain	Walter R Johnson	0 376 775	(WIA) (E)
Captain	Wesley Curtis	0 35 792	
Captain	Robert W Leonard	0 1 283 451	
Captain	Taylor S Samuel	0 326 506	
Captain	Curtis F Williams	0 1 284 800	(WIA) (E)
Captain	Kenneth E Yates	0 372 738	
Captain	Ralph B Reeves jr	0 430 667	
Captain	William H Strassner	0 375 998	
Captain	Henry M Baldwin jr	0 493 385	
Captain	Edwin M Shattuck	0 1 299 484	
Captain	Steven P Benash	0 1 298 018	
Captain	James J Enright	0 1 298 845	(WIA)
Captain	Ernest J Liggett jr	0 391 015	
1st Lt	Richard F Stone	0 276 411	
1st Lt	Davis G Lunsford jr	0 365 142	
1st Lt	William H Anderson jr	0 1 283 188	
1st Lt	Leonard R Hill	0 362 890	
1st Lt	Herbert C Gentry	0 405 390	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Baylus Cade jr	0 413 605	
1st Lt	Harry D Archer	0 416 188	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Kenneth L Black	0 354 084	
1st Lt	Richard B Luther	0 1 284 897	
1st Lt	Louis M Dennison	0 1 283 220	
1st Lt	James S Miles	0 442 892	
1st Lt	Charles E Reynolds	0 1 288 445	
1st Lt	Joseph J Schutz	0 1 285 646	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Virgil N Cordero jr	0 465 340	
1st Lt	Jack W Upham	0 463 452	
1st Lt	Thomas T Hay	0 394 442	
1st Lt	Percy B Bennott	0 389 690	(KIA)
1st Lt	Leon Freier	0 1 304 197	
1st Lt	James E McInackin	0 1 301 909	(WIA)
1st Lt	Chandler Bergen	0 1 289 537	
1st Lt	Ernest R Stooltzing	0 2 049 113	
1st Lt	Elmer Nordell	0 1 301 867	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Aryid H Bolin	0 1 011 409	(WIA)
1st Lt	William T Olson	0 2 042 839	
1st Lt	Harold W Funke	0 1 307 005	
1st Lt	Barton A Gleason	0 1 299 875	
1st Lt	Louis S Ballard jr	0 1 304 661	
1st Lt	John R Dalton	0 1 308 060	
1st Lt	Harold V Gingrich	0 26 076	
1st Lt	Julius C Jacobs	0 1 304 736	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Stanley A Williams	0 1 315 748	
1st Lt	Valentine F Carloy	0 1 297 159	
1st Lt	Herbert W Itzen	0 1 296 216	
1st Lt	Thomas Heineman	0 542 674	(WIA)
1st Lt	Charles M George	0 1 316 716	(WIA) (E)
1st Lt	Francis H Serafini	0 1 825 192	
1st Lt	William O Whitaker	0 1 288 832	
1st Lt	Gordon H Kingston	0 2 047 024	

1st Lt Ira J Nelson O 1 300 515 (WIA)
 1st Lt William E Harper O 449 952
 1st Lt Earl G Parker O 442 229 (KIA)
 1st Lt John F Cronin O 926 209
 1st Lt Warren R Nelson O 930 672
 1st Lt Louis J Mack O 1 289 291
 1st Lt Cornelius M Harman II O 1 323 127 (WIA)
 1st Lt William F Haines O 1 301 295
 1st Lt George E Kaza O 1 312 489 (DOW)
 1st Lt Joe C King O 1 312 643
 1st Lt Horace Crowe O 1 320 219 (KIA)
 1st Lt Cecil R Lamb O 1 315 589 (WIA) (E)
 1st Lt Richard C Young O 1 305 691
 1st Lt Jordan L Epperson O 2 048 903
 1st Lt Dennis J Vogel O 1 298 958
 1st Lt Paul J A Bauer O 1 322 760 (WIA)
 1st Lt Paul M Bailey O 524 563
 1st Lt Clifford M Cartwright O 1 323 537
 1st Lt Lee G Fiala O 1 305 906
 1st Lt Alexander P Kergol O 1 302 674
 1st Lt Chester Behrns O 1 316 712
 1st Lt Horace W Briscoe O 1 323 908 (WIA)
 1st Lt Walden L Gade O 1 305 198 (WIA)
 1st Lt Robert T Green O 1 307 402
 1st Lt Edward R Harrison O 1 305 922
 1st Lt Bernard M Rounds O 1 320 651 (WIA)
 1st Lt Mark H Brown O 1 323 529
 1st Lt Enos R Stewart O 1 313 663
 1st Lt Walter W Bass O 1 323 514
 1st Lt Charles W Allbritton O 2 043 180
 1st Lt Jim E McIntyre O 2 043 176
 1st Lt Lewis V Labenske jr O 1 312 643
 1st Lt Herbert F Ballard O 1 316 313
 1st Lt Harmon A Boyd O 1 315 902
 1st Lt George K Grant O 1 315 927
 1st Lt Edward V Haywood O 1 318 543
 1st Lt William G Brooks O 1 323 787
 1st Lt Warren E Anderson O 1 323 896
 1st Lt Irwin C Carter O 1 325 200
 1st Lt Bernard Big O 1 324 132
 1st Lt Henry H Brown O 1 316 861
 1st Lt Melvin R Birch O 2 007 670
 1st Lt Ray F Beckham O 557 833
 1st Lt William P Curran(chubby) O 2 043 177 (WIA)(dscd.)
 1st Lt Charles A King O 1 331 519 (WIA)
 1st Lt Warren W Latshaw O 1 331 403 (WIA)
 1st Lt Thomas A Haggerty O 2 007 722
 1st Lt Claude E Sims O 2 026 856 (WIA)
 1st Lt Paul H Kollort O 1 327 748 (WIA)
 1st Lt Howard B Gagain O 1 324 016 (WIA)
 1st Lt Paul H Peemuceller O 2 047 776
 1st Lt Harry A Hirsh O 1 316 313 (WIA)
 2d Lt Horace C Singletary O 1 294 735 (WIA)
 2d Lt Robert A Treat O 1 307 885
 2d Lt Thomas J Edwards jr O 1 310 823 (KIA)

25th Infantry Division Association



The culmination of the 25th's Luzon campaign was waged on both sides of Highway 5 driving north toward Balete Pass. In the weeks following the Japanese defeat, the 25th Division erected a monument at the top of Balete Pass. The ceremony to dedicate the monument is seen here. The pass was renamed "Dalton Pass" in honor of BG James Dalton, Asst. Div. CG who was killed just prior to the victory. This monument stands to this day and the Filipinos still call the passage "Dalton Pass."