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UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONS

OF

THE 25th INFANTRY DIVISION

IN

THE CENTRAL SOLOMONS

NEW GEORGIA-ARUNDEL-VELLA LAVELLA

15 AUGUST 1943-12 OCTOBER 1943

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CHAPTER I

ACTIVITIES OF THE 25TH DIVISION FROM THE CLOSE OF THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN

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1. **MISSION.**--With the cessation of hostilities on Guadalcanal the division was assigned a defensive mission by the Commanding General, XIV Corps. The division was charged with repelling any attempted landings by the Japanese in the sector bounded on the east by the Motupona River and on the west by the east delta of the Lunga River. The beach positions were occupied by the 35th Infantry and the 161st Infantry Regiments, with the 161st Infantry on the right, or east part of the sector, and the 35th Infantry on the left, or west part of the sector. The 27th Infantry Regiment (less the 1st battalion which was held in Corps reserve) was assigned to furnish local security for island air and supply installations. The division artillery went into positions from which direct and general support could be given to the infantry regiments. Subsequently the 2nd battalion, 27th Infantry was moved to the Florida-Bulwer area where it manned beach defenses. On June 12th the 3rd battalion, 27th Infantry (less 2 rifle companies) was dispatched to Vinal where they furnished local security for Radar installations. With the departure of the 43rd Division for New Georgia, the 3rd battalion, 39th Infantry, and the 4th Field Artillery Battalion moved to Russell Island where it was charged with the mission of defending that base. Responsibility for beach defenses in the Guadalcanal sector passed to the Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division starting on July 21st with the departure of the 161st Coastal Team for New Georgia.

During the time the division was stationed on Guadalcanal it assisted in the development of the all important base. The Engineers were called upon to build bridges and roads and the Infantry Regiments and Artillery Battalions furnished many thousands of man hours of labor in building up supply dumps and unloading ships. The importance of this work, although it counted to draggery and caused a great deal of concern to the command, was illustrated by the subsequent successful campaigns waged in New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Bougainville, and Green Island with Guadalcanal as the operations base. Air operations against the principal Japanese base in the Southwest Pacific Area at Rabaul were also carried out from this base.

2. **TRAINING.**--There was no training activity undertaken during the month of February for the division was busy constructing and improving beach defenses. Early in March training was resumed with particular emphasis placed on methods to rectify the mistakes made in the Guadalcanal campaign. Additional instruction was given in amphibious

operations. New weapons were tested by the units as they became available, although none were issued for use during the New Georgia campaign.

Replacements were few until just prior to the departure of the 35th Infantry for Vella Lavella when the first of approximately 400 officers and men arrived. It was impossible to give these more than perfunctory training. However, they were carefully fitted into the companies of the regiment so that they might avail themselves of the experience of the older combat-wise troops.

3. LOSS OF PERSONNEL

a. During the period the division lost many of its high ranking officers. The war department, recognizing the comparatively large number of seasoned leaders, decided to enrich other units with these men. Brigadier General John R. Hodge, the assistant division commander was elevated to the rank of Major General and given command of the Aerial Division. Brigadier General Stanley Bethart was returned to the United States where he too was promoted to Major General and given command of the 65th Infantry Division. Colonel William McCallough, Commanding Officer of the 27th Infantry Regiment, was named a Brigadier General and assigned to the Aerial Division to give that division an all 25th command. Lt. Colonel Joseph K. Bush, A. C. of S., G-3, was promoted to Colonel and given command of the 125th Infantry Regiment of the Aerial Division. Colonel Robert McClure, Commanding Officer of the 35th Infantry Regiment, was named a Brigadier General on April 26, 1943, and made assistant Division Commander. In recognition of the outstanding job turned in by General McClure as Commanding Officer of troops in the Vella Lavella operation, the war department recalled him to the United States for re-assignment on September 9, 1943. He was given command of the 84th Infantry Division. Colonel William P. Blase, Chief of Staff, was promoted to Brigadier General on June 24, 1943, and became Commanding General, 25th Division Artillery.

b. The division had been in the Guadalcanal area for a period of eight and one-half months prior to being committed to New Georgia. Losses in personnel, both officer and enlisted, were heavy for the ravages of malaria and other diseases common in the tropics took their toll. The over all strength of the division as of June 15th was 573 officers and 12,123 enlisted men although the 90th for an infantry division at that time was 756 officers and 14,758 enlisted men. Losses in the infantry regiments were, of course, highest. The 161st Infantry was committed to battle with 110 officers and 2023 enlisted men. The 27th Infantry had 114 officers and 2274 enlisted men. The strength of the 35th Infantry on August 12, a few days before departing for Vella Lavella was 112 officers and 2335 enlisted men.

c. As the New Georgia Campaign progressed, the strength of the division became alarmingly depleted due to illness and battle casualties. Near the close of the campaign the 161st Infantry had 71 officers and 1575 enlisted men; the 27th Infantry had 84 officers and 1849 enlisted men; the 35th Infantry had 100 officers and 2459 enlisted men. The increased strength of the 35th Infantry was due to the arrival of about 400 officers and men during and after the move to Vella Lavella. There were many cases of rifle companies operating with 40-50 effectives.

4. PLAN FOR NEW GEORGIA CAMPAIGN. -- The original plan for the New Georgia campaign as promulgated by the Commander, Third Amphibious Force, called for the use of the 13th and 37th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st and 4th Marine Raider Battalions, in the combat operations. It was believed that these forces constituted sufficient troops to wrest the entire island group from the Japanese within a 90 day period. The 35th Division constituted the reserve. The Division was called upon to turn over much of its valued equipment to the two divisions about to go into action for the first time, particularly artillery pieces. This somewhat hampered the movement of the division into combat when it was decided that the reserve division was desperately needed to finish the campaign.

5. COMMANDERS AND STAFF. -- The commanders and staff at the start of the New Georgia campaign were:

Commanding General	Major Gen. J. Lawton Collins
Assistant Division Commander	Brig. Gen. Robert B. McClure
Artillery Commander	Brig. Gen. William F. Blase
Chief of Staff	Colonel William M. Cline, Jr.
A. C. of S., G-1	Lt. Col. Charles H. Mackoff
A. C. of S., G-2	Lt. Col. Robert L. Stevenson
A. C. of S., G-3	Lt. Col. C. Bradford Smith
A. C. of S., G-4	Lt. Col. Claude R. Jurney
Adjutant General	Lt. Col. Wilbur A. Sweeten
Signal Officer	Major Lawrence P. Forbes
Ordnance Officer	Major Gerald C. Cowan
Surgeon	Lt. Col. Raymond R. Dunham
Quartermaster	Lt. Col. Kress R. Williams
Finance	Lt. Col. Charles H. Miles
Headquarters Commandant	Major James C. Stue
Chaplain	Major Bruce T. Hensley
Chemical Officer	Lt. Col. Nelson McKelg
Staff Judge Advocate	Major Wilbur T. Baughn
Inspector General	Lt. Col. Fred W. Rice
Provost Marshal	Major John H. Smith
C. O., 27th Infantry	Colonel Douglas Sugg
C. O., 35th Infantry	Colonel Everett H. Brown
C. O., 161st Infantry	Colonel James L. Dalton II
C. O., 8th P. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. Stuart F. Crawford
C. O., 84th P. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. William H. Allen, Jr.
C. O., 89th P. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. John W. Ferris
C. O., 20th P. A. Bn.	Lt. Col. James J. Heriot
C. O., 43rd Engineer Bn.	Lt. Col. George F. Blase, Jr.
C. O., 25th Medical Bn.	Lt. Col. Willie B. Johnson

General McClure was ordered to the U. S. on 9 September 1943, Brigadier General C. L. Mallins replaced him, arriving at Arundel Island on 22 September 1943.

CHAPTER II PLANS AND OPERATIONS NEW GEORGIA

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SECTION I OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS OF THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION ON NEW GEORGIA

Lt. Col. C. B. Smith,
G-2 of S, G-3

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6. MOVE TO NEW GEORGIA

a. Orders from CINCENARP issued on 14 July 1943 alerted the combat team of the 25th Infantry Division for movement to the north. In the light of the division's tactical mission on Guadalcanal at this time, the 161st Infantry Regiment, 89th Field Artillery Battalion, Company "M", 65th Engineer Battalion (Combat), and Company "M", 25th Medical Battalion were selected. Preparations were made to move these units on 12 hours notice. Loading began on 19 July, and on 20 July, the combat team moved to Bougainville Island, New Georgia, and came under the command of the XIV Corps.

b. On 29 July the 27th Combat Team less the 8th Field Artillery Battalion was alerted for movement to the north. The following day it was decided that the division headquarters would accompany the 27th Combat Team. These units departed Buin Beach, Guadalcanal, the evening of 31 July and debarked at Seaville Island, New Georgia just before dawn on 1 August.

c. The following day the 27th Infantry and Division Headquarters moved to New Georgia. The 27th Infantry was assigned the mission of defending the Corps north flank and maintaining contact with the 2nd Battalion, 168th Infantry.

d. The South Pacific Scouts composed of Piliin and Solomon Islands natives was attached to the division on 3 August to assist in

patrolling activities to the north. This group was of great value, but the need for active facilities with New Georgia was timely felt. Information was often inadequate and of little military significance.

7. MISSION.

a. The Corps Commander directed the 25th Infantry Division to advance to the north; secure the Village of Ziate, Piro Plantation and Maroko Harbor, and clear the area of all Japanese.

b. The mission entailed an advance of ten miles through the jungle, locating and destruction of all enemy resistance, and a junction with the force at Enopai consisting of the 1st and 4th Marine Raider Battalions, the 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 146th Infantry. This combination of units became known as the Livermore Force.

8. ATTACK ON ZIETA.

a. Intelligence reports indicated that there were two native trails which ran north from the Wunda area - one to Bairoko and the other to Ziate. (See attached map). In addition, native and Marine patrols reported a cross trail which led from Mt. Bao to a point north of Ziate. Learning that there was a Japanese Garrison at Ziate, the division commander decided to hit it from two directions. At this time only the 27th Infantry was available for combat as tactical control of the 146th Infantry was not reverts to the division until 6 August. One battalion of the 27th Infantry was moved north along the Bairoko Trail on 2 August with the mission of moving to Mt. Bao and then turning to the west to flank the Ziate garrison; the other two battalions began moving north on Ziate. After an enemy strong point was reduced on the Bairoko Trail, the advance to the trail along this route proceeded unopposed except by the rugged nature of the terrain and the shortage of supply. However, the Japanese fought a strong delaying action on the Ziate Trail all the way to Ziate.

b. As the advance progressed it was established that a good portion of the information obtained at the beginning of the campaign was false. Mt. Tirokambila was not 1,000 yards north-west of Ziate, but rather approximately three miles east-north-east thereof. Further, Mt. Bao was one mile east of Mt. Tirokambila and there was no trail directly from Mt. Bao to Ziate. Consequently, a change of the basic plan of maneuver was indicated. It was no longer feasible to attack Ziate with a column from the east, so the battalion of the 27th Infantry on the Bairoko Trail was attached to the 146th Infantry.

c. The 3rd Battalion, 146th Infantry had been moved to Mt. Tirokambila and thence to Ziate Hill by the Livermore Force. This battalion was attached to the 27th Infantry and given the mission of preventing the withdrawal of the Japanese from Ziate to the north and northwest. While the main body of the 27th Infantry moved north along the trail to Ziate a force was sent around the west flank to block the trail between Ziate and Japanese held Piro Plantation. On the evening of 15 August, the 27th Infantry supported by four tanks from the 11th Marine Defense Battalion captured Ziate and eliminated a good portion of the remaining Japanese at the trail block west of Ziate. Pursuit of the remaining enemy was initiated and several prisoners were killed.

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9. ADVANCE TO BAIROKO HARBOR.

a. On 5 August the 146th Infantry Combat Team reverted to the control of the 25th Infantry Division and was committed 8 August on the Bairoko Trail with the mission of following the battalion of the 27th Infantry on that trail to Mt. Bao. From that point the 146th Infantry was ordered to proceed north, clear the area between Sunday Inlet and Bairoko Harbor and make contact with the Livermore Force.

b. On August 9th the advance on the Bairoko Trail had been carried to the Bairoko River and contact established with the Livermore Force, control of which passed to the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division. This force was given the mission of clearing the area east of Bairoko Harbor.

c. The 146th Infantry moved north from Mt. Tirokambila toward Bairoko Harbor and occupied the west bank of the harbor on 24 August without opposition. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, which was attached to the Livermore Force on August 10th, and the 3rd Battalion 145th Infantry, moved on Bairoko from the east and southeast and occupied the east bank of the harbor on 25 August without opposition. The Japanese had evacuated to Arundel and Kolombangara Islands, and all organized resistance on New Georgia was terminated on 25 August 1943.

10. ATTACK ON PIRO PLANTATION. -- After the fall of Ziate the 27th Infantry was given the mission of clearing the area between Piro Plantation and Sunday Inlet. Patrols were dispatched on 16 August to find a suitable route through the swamp to Piro Plantation. After exhaustive reconnaissance failed to disclose a high ground route, the 27th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) attacked across one and one half miles of swamp and secured the plantation area on 27 August, thus denying the use of Bathorn Sound to the enemy.

11. OPERATIONS ON ARUNDEL ISLAND.

a. During the period 25 August to 23 September elements of the XIV Corps were engaged in clearing Arundel Island and the small adjacent islands. Two battalions of the 27th Infantry were attached to the 43rd Division on 10 September 1943, and the remaining battalion on 15 September 1943 to relieve the units of that division on Arundel and Sogakura Islands.

b. On 24 September 1943, Arundel and Sogakura Islands were cleared, and control of the 27th Infantry reverted to the 25th Infantry Division. On the same date the responsibility of the division was extended to include Arundel Island and on 25 September 1943, "Mau Mau" Island.

12. OCCUPATION OF KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND. -- During the next several days the artillery battalions sent patrols on Kolombangara, many of which were clearly visible across Blackett Strait. By 6 October 1943, all patrols sent to Kolombangara had returned negative reports and it was evident that the Japanese had evacuated the island, and on that date one battalion of the 27th Infantry landed without resistance and set up a perimeter defense around Vila Airport. The last of the islands in the New Georgia Group had been occupied.

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SECTION II

G-2 PHASE

12. Col. R. L. Stevenson, G.S.C.

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13. PRIOR PLANNING. -- Prior to the invasion of the New Georgia group, several small patrols were sent by higher headquarters to reconnoiter landing areas, enemy dispositions and strengths. One of these patrols was led by Captain C. R. Kirby, 146th Infantry Regiment, and covered the small islands at the southern part of the group. The general plan of attack was made available to the division and a situation map was kept up to date. At this time, the use of the 25th Infantry Division was not included in the tactical plan.

14. MOVE TO NEW GEORGIA. -- As the action proceeded on New Georgia and it became evident that the division would be called upon, maps, aerial photos and all available objective data of the islands was assembled for study. A copy of the CHOSMAZ Photo Map, which had been designated as the official map was obtained for distribution. This map proved to be entirely inadequate and in many instances "incorrect." Although a good multicolored map with form lines was available it was not used on the official map.

15. RECONNAISSANCE.

a. Aerial Reconnaissance in New Georgia was not available until the latter part of the campaign. Due to the density of the jungle in this area, its chief value was in giving unit leaders a general conception of the area and orienting the various landmarks with each other, as ground installations and positions of our own units could seldom be made out. It also gave valuable information regarding high and low points which assisted the troops in avoiding swamp areas. In the early days of the campaign there was a great deal of uncertainty regarding the location of certain terrain features shown on the existing maps. The proper location and relationship of these terrain features was not determined until aerial reconnaissance had been obtained. While accurate means of determining the co-ordinates of a terrain feature are by obtaining altitudes or by survey, the latter is not always possible to run and the former is a slow process at the best, and difficult when the object in question is within enemy-held territory. Much controversy, needless argument, and time-consuming patrolling by native and unit patrols might have been avoided if aerial reconnaissance had been available earlier. Lessons learned from Guadalcanal showed that stereoscopic study of photos was of extreme importance to unit commanders. Due to lack of time, our units were not able to do this in the operations on New Georgia. However, in any future action, it is intended that this will be done. In this campaign, some difficulty

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was encountered in obtaining aerial photos promptly and in sufficient numbers.

b. Photo: Several days elapsed before any aerial coverage could be obtained and when coverage finally came by, in many instances the area desired was not covered. The instances were outstanding: (1) Request for coverage of the area from Baikro Harbor west to Sunday Inlet with 1/10,000 verticals was made for the 26th Infantry Regiment but was never obtained, a duplicate coverage of Pira-Plantation to Sunday Inlet area being received instead. (2) A request for coverage of the area from Baikro Harbor west to Baigai Inlet was made by Colonel Liveredge, Commanding Officer, Northern Landing Group. These pictures were to be dropped by plane to Colonel Liveredge, inasmuch as means of land communication were extremely difficult and slow. A roll of pictures addressed to Colonel Liveredge with instructions that they be dropped him on the morning of the 20th, arrived at Division Headquarters on the 22nd. On examination by G-2 they proved to be a coverage of Baigai Island, an area occupied by elements of the 43rd Division. The coverage requested by Colonel Liveredge was never received. It is felt that it would assist materially if a Liaison Officer from the combat unit could accompany the photographer in order to assist him in obtaining the desired pictures, it being very difficult for a photographer who has had no contact with the unit requesting the coverage to know what is actually desired.

c. Ground: The following types of patrols were utilized in the New Georgia area:

- (1) Native patrols led by N.E. or local Guineans.
- (2) Unit patrols led by intelligence or reconnaissance personnel.
- (3) A combination of Native and Unit patrols.
- (4) Combat patrols with reconnaissance missions.

In general it was found that the mixed patrols proved most effective and brought in the most reliable information. The Fiji Islanders proved more efficient than the Solomon Islanders when used with unit patrols. However, both groups did efficient work and proved that the efficiency of a patrol was greatly increased by having two or three native scouts along. Information brought in by the Fiji Scouts was sometimes disappointing due to the fact that these participants were not familiar with the area involved and thus members of the Combat Units and also because they did not clearly discern the nature of information desired. When the patrols returned, specific questions were asked and sometimes the information had not been obtained as the patrols had not paid attention to that specific point or phase. This emphasizes again the need of an "Intelligence Plan."

In most instances it was found best to limit reconnaissance patrols to five or six men, including three natives. This facilitated flexibility of movement and decreased the chance of detection. However, one instance showed that a patrol of ten men has definite advantages. A patrol of six men covering the area north of Zista, observed a group of ten Japanese only one of which was armed. Due to the size of the patrol and the fact that the patrol element had not been completed, it was not feasible to take a prisoner although one could have undoubtedly been obtained with ease. If there

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had been two or three more men in the patrol, a prisoner could have been taken and returned with the extra two or three men to headquarters.

16. THE INTERROGATIONS & DOCUMENT EXAMINATION.

a. Prisoners of War: Unfortunately no PWs were obtained by Units of the 25th Division during the campaign on New Georgia. However, several instances have been reported when prisoners might well have been obtained had a real effort been exerted to this end. In many situations, missing from past experiences, a prisoner would have provided the information which was desired and settled questions which were in the minds of all. As an example, there were numerous reports of Japanese troops in the vicinity of Baikro Harbor. If an attempt had been made to capture a number of one of these troops, it is felt that advance information of the evacuation of Japanese troops from the area could have been obtained and movements of our troops to occupy this evacuation facilitated. As it happened, it was not definitely established that the Japanese were evacuating until the last night of evacuation. The following day our troops marched into empty bivouac areas which had been vacated and completely stripped of equipment and intelligence information.

b. Captured documents: The volume of documents captured in areas occupied by units of the 25th Division on New Georgia was much less than that obtained on Guadalcanal. This was due to three factors: (1) Most of the bivouac areas occupied by our units were old bivouacs. (2) Most of the bivouac areas occupied by the Japanese were old bivouacs. (3) Most of the bivouac areas occupied by the Japanese were old bivouacs. The documents were left in the bivouac areas. These were turned in through the 37th and 43rd Division G-2's. (2) Bivouac areas, notably around Baikro, were thoroughly evacuated and most material of intelligence value taken away, the evacuation not being hampered by our offensive action. (3) Units encountered by the 25th Division were mostly troops brought into the area after the onset of hostilities, and inasmuch as they had been brought in as reinforcements, were traveling light and did not carry many personal documents or official records with them.

The effectiveness of an educational program was well illustrated by a comparison of the cooperation of the troops in preserving documents on Guadalcanal and on New Georgia. Documents captured gave valuable information regarding identification of units, routes by which they arrived on the scene of action and date of arrival. The most valuable documents found were maps giving detailed information regarding the defenses and terrain features of Kolombangara and Bougainville. These will undoubtedly prove of great value in future operations.

On Guadalcanal there was great destruction of documents and in most areas inspected vast numbers of mutilated documents could be found. During the rest period on Guadalcanal, an educational program was carried on by the Language section stressing the value of the documents and requesting the cooperation of the troops in preserving documents in the future. This program had the full cooperation of the unit commanders. All units were not reached by this educational program but on New Georgia very few instances of deliberate mutilation of documents was observed and the troops cooperated in their collection. It is felt that if unit commanders would give the matter of preserving prisoners the same support, similar results could be obtained.

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Not the least factor in the cooperation of the troops was the effort made by the language section to return to the finders, documents which proved of no intelligence value. In addition, an attempt was made to include a partial translation to enhance the value of the document as a souvenir.

17. JAP TACTICS.

a. Ground: The Japanese defended the high ground to a far greater extent than on Guadalcanal. Lines of fire for automatic weapons were generally narrow, and few instances were reported where traversing fire was encountered. Automatic weapon emplacements were well protected by individual riflemen and all trails and possible avenues of approach were covered. Their defensive positions were well camouflaged and strongly constructed with a direct hit by mortar or artillery fire necessary to insure neutralization. By excellent planning of a few men, a highly satisfactory delaying action was accomplished and when the strong-point was made untenable, too many escaped under cover of darkness. The Japanese heavy mortar fire was effective probably due to good observation and fire control or pre-arranged fire so plotted as to cover the most probable direction of our attack. When artillery was used, effective camouflage of the positions was made and fire withheld until our troops were nearly to the guns, when they opened up with direct fire. Indirect fire by Japanese was negligible and totally ineffective.

b. Air: Five bombers, when able to get through a fighter cover, were inaccurate in their bombing and did not attempt to strafe until after the release of the bombs. Night bombers apparently had no specific target area and kicked their bombs out anywhere after each seemingly aimless circling around outside the range of our AA.

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SECTION III

G-4 OPERATIONS

Lt. Col. Claude E. Jarny, G.S.C.

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18. INTRODUCTION.

a. Supply and evacuation in this campaign were characterized by insufficiency, uncertainty, tardiness and more than the normal amount of confusion. This statement is not made as a criticism of any individual or agency but as a plain statement of opinion based on experience. The problem was difficult and the facilities inadequate. The fact that the troops were supplied with fighting tools, were fed, clothed and cared for is a tribute to the energy and efforts of the service personnel involved.

b. The difficulties encountered are attributed to five principal factors each of which is discussed briefly in separate paragraphs.

19. LACK OF DIVISION SERVICE PERSONNEL.

a. The limited shipping available and the piecemeal commitment of the division resulted in the bulk of the service elements being left at Guadalcanal for some weeks after the last tactical unit entered action. Initially, then all supplies came from the 37th Division Camp at Isanah Beach and all casualties evacuated through the 37th Division Clearing Company. This placed an undue burden on those already overtaxed agencies.

b. Supply dumps, repair shops, a medical receiving station and later a small hospital were established as personnel to operate them were received from Guadalcanal. This personnel arrived in small groups and at varying times as shown in a later chapter. No installation over received its full complement, consequently, the combat units were required to perform functions normally undertaken by the service units.

c. The organization of the supply elements of the streamlined triangular division is based on a full complement of the single 7/2 vehicular equipment. Terrain difficulties encountered in jungle operations preclude full use of this transportation and force the use of a great deal of man power that can be obtained only from the combat elements. The division starts out then short-handed in its service units and ends up with this shortage passed on to the front line troops.

d. LACK OF SUPPORTING SERVICE UNITS: -- The XIV Corps had practically none of the Quartermaster, Ordnance, or Medical units normally

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assigned a Corps. The duties performed by such units had, of necessity, to be done by service troops of the divisions employed. Supplies brought in with the division were checked in Corps dumps, and personnel from the division were employed in the operation of these dumps. Division troops were used in moving supplies from the dumps at Sasaville to the New Georgia and Rendova. The assistant division G-4, Messinghamer at Lushetti, drawing his help from the G-4 section and the Quartermaster Company. The Ordnance Company furnished details to unload ammunition for Corps dumps at Sasaville, Kokonua and the other outlying islands and to move this ammunition to the Division Base on New Georgia. This widespread distribution of service elements of the division prevented unit distribution to the combat troops in action. They were forced to draw, load, and haul from beachhead BPs. In short, the division supply agencies devoted all their energies toward getting supplies to New Georgia Island, and were able to devote little time to pushing these supplies to the front line troops.

21. SHORTAGE OF TRANSPORTATION.

a. Water transportation shortages felt throughout the campaign were due to several factors. First, the lack of shipping space restricted the amount that could be brought from Guadalcanal. Second, part of the transportation was turned over to other units as directed by XIV Corps. Lastly, the delay in the arrival of the personnel of the Ordnance Company and a lack of spare parts kept many vehicles out of service and on the back line. Fortunately, the opportunities for use of wheeled transport were not great. In the New Georgia phase, the limited road net reduced the number of vehicles that could be employed; and following that period the scattering of the division on many islands called for water rather than vehicular transportation.

b. In this latter phase, with troops at Enogai, Betakoa, Pira, South Rendova, Lizard Island, Sogakomara, Kolombangara and Lushetti, the division had to depend almost entirely on boats for supply and evacuation. The shortage, especially of small boats, was acute. However, it had been deemed necessary at the start of the New Georgia operation to establish a thirty-boat pool to serve the four battalions of the Landing Force at Enogai. The division was unable to secure enough boats to maintain the minimum seventeen-boat pool requested to serve the entire division at the many points encountered. This shortage was shared by all other units and can be attributed to the general shortage throughout the theatre and a lack of spare parts to repair those boats that broke down. In an effort to improve the boat service for all units, all boats were on one command centralized in one pool under the immediate control of naval personnel. In theory, such centralization is the answer to a general transportation shortage. Actually the scheme did not work in this case. Too many hours were lost each day in the boats moving between the pool and the widely scattered points at which they started or finished their day's operations. It was impossible for all command to be thoroughly familiar with all the intricate water routes to the various points of call. As a result, on a number of occasions, a boat would be out of service for an entire day due to its becoming lost. The system was later decentralized and from the division point of view operated much more efficiently. Smaller pools were available to division units at Seavaco, Pira, South Rendova and Bomboe. Lost time was reduced and no loss of flexibility was apparent.

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out. Operations under the supervision of Lieutenant J. K. Morgan, U.S.M., the small number of boats available rendered excellent service. There is no doubt but that in operations on jungle covered islands the small boat is often a much more useful item than a truck. A comparison of the water and overland conditions between Lushetti and Betakoa can leave no doubt on that score. Where a unit is scattered on a number of small islands, the small boat is the only answer to the division supply problem. Since many more inland and jungle operations can be foreseen, a real effort should be made to acquire sufficient water transportation to efficiently serve the ground troops employed.

22. POOR ROADS. — Details on the difficulties of road construction and maintenance will be covered later. The efforts of the Division Engineers were well supported by personnel and equipment from the 24th and 73rd CB Battalions and the 132nd Engineers and by the extraordinary work of our own troops and the 18th Infantry. Still the road system was not satisfactory. The need for extensive hand carry and packtrails of supplies up to the end of the operations on New Georgia Island is evidence of this. The expectation is that similar conditions of climate, soil, and terrain will be met again and that the roads will be no better. The lessons are to stay close to the beaches, avoid routes over jungled mountains, and displace by water where possible.

23. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE COMMAND. — Units of the division were located at Guadalcanal, New Georgia Island (north, west, and south shores), outlying islands of the New Georgia Group (Aradeti, Sogakomara, Kolombangara, Sasaville) and at widely scattered points on Vella Lavella, all at the same time. No such widespread scattering of a division was contemplated when the division supply system was conceived. Most of the difficulties encountered and their origin is the existing dispersion. The important thing to remember, however, is that all hands were well clothed and equipped, and received the necessary medical attention. The system was strained but it did not break— thanks to a little imagination and lots of hard work and improvisation.

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SECTION II OPERATIONS TO BARRAGE HARBOR

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37. OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 7TH TO 10TH.

a. On 7 August a warning order for the movement of the Regiment to Mount Bao was given the Regimental Commander by the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division. Mission of the Regiment was to clear the Japanese from the area from Sunday Inlet to Enogai Inlet in conjunction with the Army-Marine force at Enogai Inlet commanded by Colonel Livermore.

b. On 8 August the 3rd Battalion moved out at 1130 and proceeded along the trail to Mount Bao following the 27th Infantry. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were alerted to move out at 0815, 9 August. The 3rd Battalion bivouacked in the rear of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry at 1400.

c. At 0815 on 9 August forward command posts of the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out on the Mount Bao Trail. At 1715 both battalions moved up to the rear of the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion followed the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and bivouacked near them at 1500, two miles south of Mount Bao. At 1300 that date the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry was attached to the 164th Infantry on order of the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

d. On 10 August the 3rd Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and proceeded to Mount Bao. Patrols from there contacted the 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry and 3rd Battalion, 146th Infantry. The 1st and 2nd Battalions remained in bivouac and secured the supply trail. At 1400 the forward Command Post moved to Mount Bao. The Antitank Company moved to the vicinity of the Coral Knob.

38. OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 11TH. — On 11 August, the 1st and 2nd Battalions carried routes to the 3rd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion reconnoitered the terrain north of Mount Bao and west to Mount Tiramabua. At 1300 this date, control of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry passed to Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Infantry Regiment at Enogai Inlet on order of Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division. The 161st

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The terrain limited wide flanking maneuvers, and only one battalion could be effectively employed at a time. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions alternated as leading elements.

e. An effort was made to locate on the ground, the route to Piru Plantation indicated on the map. However, extensive aerial and ground reconnaissance showed the entire area east of Piru to be a swamp. Accordingly, the two battalions marched through the swamp, and on August 23rd Piru Plantation was occupied by the 2nd Battalion, the 3rd Battalion following the same route. Beach defenses were installed along the Piru coast of Hathorn Sound, and daily patrols were sent to Sunday Inlet and into the swamp.

61. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED.

a. Wide envelopments in heavy jungle are impracticable because of extreme difficulty of control, location, and identification of units. Limited flanking movements are practicable for small units but require increased fire power. Units the size of a company may be sent around and to the rear of the enemy to establish trail blocks with the dual mission of cutting supply lines and ambushing withdrawing elements.

b. The use of two-man foxholes and a tight cordon defense again proved of paramount importance at night.

c. Intelligence information from other units should be verified before accepted.

d. Combat aircraft (TBF's and SBD's were used in the New Georgia Operation) are unsuited for reconnaissance because of the high speed and limited field of vision.

e. During the assault the light machine gun should be used in lieu of the heavy, holding the heavy machine guns in rear DP's to be brought up when needed for defense.

f. All grenades should be painted olive drab to blend with the uniform and terrain.

g. Whenever tactically possible, trained infantry-artillery combat teams should be held intact.

SECTION II
OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST BATTALION

August 4 - 27, 1943

Lt. Col. Joseph F. Ryneska, Infantry, Commanding

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62. MISSION. -- On August 4th, the Regimental Commander ordered the 1st Battalion to advance North along the Bairoko Trail, contact and relieve Company "I" at the trail block which had been established at that point. The battalion was to destroy the enemy there and continue on, locate and occupy Mt. Bao. From Mt. Bao the advance was to continue on the west trail until contact was made with other elements of the 27th Infantry and then with a coordinated attack capture the village of Zieta.

63. PRIOR PLANNING.

a. Before this action took place, events happened so fast that there was no chance for a good thorough reconnaissance. Company "I" had located the enemy 800 yards north of Point W and was pinned tightly to the ground. The enemy flanks were located and from the volume of fire, it was believed that the enemy had at least one reinforced machine gun company in position.

b. In order to secure and maintain a clear supply route to support troops moving to Mt. Bao this strong point had to be eliminated. Two plans were made for this mission. First, Companies "A" and "B" were to fix the enemy while Company "C" hit his right flank thus relieving

Commander ordered the battalion to bivouac at this point for the night, using a cordon defense. At 1120, a patrol from the Regimental Intelligence platoon led by Lt. Koontz, advanced up the north trail. The patrol found two Japs. One was killed and the other escaped through the jungle.

b. At 1300, mortar and 75mm guns fired a concentration on Jap pill-boxes of the remaining companies at the enemy strong point, which had been holding up the advance. No enemy fire was returned. One platoon from "B" Company was ordered to attack the right flank of enemy positions and to secure these positions. At 1530 the Rear Command Post and other units of the battalion moved out on the North Trail to join the leading elements of the battalion. The Engineers began demolition of the Jap pill-boxes. Hq, "B", "D", and Anti-Tank Companies reached the Rock at 1700 and joined the battalion. The distance covered by the battalion was 2500 yards. No contact was made with the enemy. A cordon defense was established, with "C" Company establishing its defense on the commanding ground with a security outpost on each trail.

68. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 8TH. -- At 0730, a "B" Company patrol moved out on the North Trail with the mission of finding the East-West Trail. The patrol traveled in a north and northwest course, crossing numerous ridges and small streams, through the dense jungle growth. The trail was generally fair, and followed the ridges. Several Jap bivouac areas were found, thoroughly scouted, and found to have been recently evacuated. At 1130 the patrol reached a high ridge, and was ordered to dig in for the night; the rest of the battalion to join "B" Company in the afternoon. At 0800 a "C" Company patrol was sent out on the West Trail. This patrol found two bivouac areas with well organized defense positions along the trail. These bivouac areas had been evacuated recently. At 1145, "A", "D", Hq and Anti-Tank Companies were ordered to move out and join "B" Company at their position. The battalion commander, operations officer and communication section were to remain in place and maintain communications with "B" Company and follow with "C" Company. Elements of the 161st Infantry had been ordered by the Division Commander to follow us on the north trail to Mt. Bao, with the mission of maintaining our supply route to the rear. Elements of the 161st Infantry contacted us at 1000 on this date. One battalion of the 161st Infantry followed our battalion on the trail to the north. No enemy was encountered this date.

69. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 9TH. -- At 0730 the battalion moved north along the Bairoko Trail. "B" Company, the leading element, reached a river thought to be the Bairoko River. The battalion halted at this point while the Battalion Commander and a six-man patrol moved 4500 yards north on the trail and contacted the Fourth Marine Raider Regiment under the command of Colonel Liversedge at the junction of the East-West, North-South Trails. The Battalion Commander received maps and information as to the local terrain. The Battalion Commander was also advised that the 145th Infantry had established a road block on the Bairoko Trail 3500 yards to the northeast. The patrol returned to the bivouac area at 1400. At 1730 a radio communication from the Commanding General to Colonel Dalton, Commanding Officer, 161st Infantry, directed that the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, be attached to the 161st Infantry, whose mission was to move to Bairoko Harbor and attack enemy positions in that area. The battalion bivouacked on the river for the night, sent out security patrols, and set up a cordon defense. One battalion of the 161st Infantry was tied on to the battalion to the south along the trail.

be built up for the next move to Hills 4 and 5.

75. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 15TH. -- A patrol from "A" Company left the battalion bivouac area at 1500 with the mission to move to Hill 5, bivouac for the night, and set an ambush the next day. On this patrol a detachment was to go to the left of the trail and make reconnaissance of Bairoko Inlet. At 1700 cargo planes dropped supplies to the battalion again. A patrol was sent out to the 161st Infantry to survey a possible jeep road between the two units. This patrol returned and found it would be possible to make the trail by following the ridge line 300 to 500 yards south of the trail.

76. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 16TH. -- "A" Company returned from its overnight patrol. Four Japs were encountered by the ambush; two were killed and the others fled into the jungle. The Japs were searched for military documents, but nothing was found. The patrol returned at 1300. The detachment patrol from "A" Company to Bairoko Inlet returned at 1430. It found the area very swampy and marshy and with the exception of one stray Jap saw little signs of enemy activity. The patrol reached the river and worked its way toward Bairoko but did not reach the Inlet.

77. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 17TH. -- Patrol activity continued around Hills 4 and 5 to secure the advance of the battalion. Anti-Tank Company was sent back on the trail to get all mortar ammunition and supplies possible for the pending move of the battalion.

78. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 18TH. -- At 1000 "B" Company, one platoon of machine guns, and one platoon of 81mm mortars moved out on the trail with a mission to occupy Hills 4 and 5. This move was to enable the battalion to get into position for the future push on Bairoko Harbor. The advance party arrived at 1230, and set up defensive positions on Hill 5 in a perimeter defense. The remainder of the battalion remained in its present position.

79. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 19TH. -- At 0800 "A" Company and "C" Company, two platoons of "D" Company, Battalion Hq Company, and the Marine Raider Hq moved out and carried supplies to the battalion on Hills 4 and 5. At 0815 a patrol from "B" Company followed the Bairoko Trail for 225 yards and moved into the bush paralleling the trail approximately 200 yards. The patrol contacted a Jap outpost and was fired on by light machine guns and concussion grenades. As the patrol attempted to envelope the enemy flank the Japs withdrew. They killed two Japs with no casualties to our patrol. The patrol returned by making a long circular trail through the jungle to avoid a possible ambush along the trail. The patrol returned at 1215. At 1230, the Marine Raider Headquarters and the remainder of the battalion arrived at Company "B's" position and went into position on Hills 4 and 5 with a security outpost 200 yards north at the coral rock. A carrying party from the Anti-Tank Company brought supplies up from the former bivouac area.

80. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 20TH. -- At 0815 a reconnaissance patrol from "A" Company was sent out with a mission to find a route from the Bairoko Trail to the Triri Trail. The patrol moved 300 yards northeast to what they thought to be Hills 14 and 15, but they did not find the Triri Trail. The patrol returned over the same route. At 0830 a combat patrol from "C" Company was sent to the northwest with the mission

the pressure on "A" and "B" Companies. Company "D" would be used to protect the battalion rear from any possible enemy enveloping movement. If this plan did not succeed it was planned to move Company "A" around the enemy's left flank and rear and to contact Company "C". From this point the enemy's rear could be hit with two companies abreast. The success of this plan depended on secrecy of movement. Friendly troops to the front would not be endangered by our own fire as there was a low ridge running east and west between the two companies in rear of the enemy and friendly troops to the front. Sound power communication was to be maintained by all units.

64. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 4TH. -- At 0830, with combat equipment, the battalion left for point W. (See attached Map). The battalion moved along the jeep trail to point W without encountering any enemy resistance. From point W advance elements of the battalion moved 500 yards north along the trail and made reconnaissance of the area and plans for relieving "I" Company which was held up at this point by strongly organized positions. At 1000 the battalion commander received verbal orders from the Regimental Commander to eliminate the enemy positions and continue north on the trail in the direction of Mt. Bao. "B" Company, the assault company, was ordered to advance to the right of the strong point and attack the enemy pill-boxes. The Anti-Tank Company with one 37mm gun and a platoon of machine guns from "D" Company laid down fire in support of the attack. Due to well camouflaged and entrenched machine gun positions protected by riflemen and snipers, the assault company failed to penetrate enemy positions. At 1400 the remainder of the battalion moved into position and set up a cordon defense.

65. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 5TH. -- A heavy concentration of 37mm and machine gun fire was directed at the enemy emplacements, in support of "C" Company which was enveloping the left flank. "C" Company met heavy knee-mortar, automatic rifle, and machine gun fire in its attack but pushed forward until it had made contact with "A" Company. "B" Company was ordered out of their flank position and brought back to the perimeter defense. Intermittent artillery was fired throughout the night to the north of "C" Company positions.

66. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 6TH. -- The Commanding General visited the Battalion Command Post at 1125 and issued orders for the battalion to push forward to Mt. Bao on the following day. Orders were issued for "A" and "C" Companies to by-pass the enemy strong point and continue on the original mission. Hq, "B", "D" and Anti-Tank Companies were to remain in place, and contain the enemy within their strong point. Hq Company remained on the trail to the south, "D" Company tied in with Hq extending northwest, "B" Company remained north of the strong point. "A" and "C" Companies were to tie in north of the strong point and move out the following morning along the North Trail, with "A" Company as the advance guard.

67. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 7TH.
 a. At 0700 "A" Company with "C" Company following started north on the trail. 500 yards up the trail the battalion passed through a strongly organized and entrenched enemy defensive position which had been abandoned. The battalion continued along the trail and the leading company found a large bivouac area, estimated to have been occupied by a battalion, which had recently been evacuated. From this point trails led to the west, and northwest. Security patrols were sent in every direction to search the area to the front and flanks. The Battalion

70. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 10TH. -- At 0900 one battalion of the 161st Infantry moved through the bivouac area along the North Trail and established a road block at the junction of the east-west, north-south trails. The battalion remained in position for the day. Supplies were brought in and issued to the troops in preparation for the move on the next day. The supply for the battalion was handled by carrying parties.

71. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 11TH. -- At 0700 the battalion moved out along the North Trail, and at 1230 moved through the road block of the 161st Infantry. "D" Company, with their heavy weapons, and the Anti-Tank Company bivouacked here for the night, with orders to resume march the next day. The rest of the battalion continued along the trail and reached the Marine Raider bivouac area known as "Kelly's Bar", at 1700 after an advance of approximately six miles. By radio a communication from the Commanding General; the 1st Battalion was attached to Colonel Liversedge's command. The trail covered by the 1st Battalion was very muddy, crossed numerous ridges and streams, and passed through very dense jungle growth. The supply route was from Enogai Inlet by native carrying parties; a distance of three miles.

72. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 12TH. -- The battalion changed the location of their bivouac area, moving into the area vacated by the 145th Infantry, which returned to Triri. At 1700 "D" Company and the Anti-Tank Company arrived at the battalion bivouac area. The battalion with all attached personnel was now present. The 1st and 4th Marine Raider Battalions were located at Enogai and patrolling west toward Bairoko. The mission of the battalion was to patrol north to Bairoko on the east side of the Bairoko River. A battalion of the 161st Infantry was to patrol the west side of the Bairoko River. At 1100 "C" Company sent a patrol consisting of 16 men on the North Trail; the patrol was to go out 1000 yards and return. The patrol returned at 1300 with a negative report.

73. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 13TH. -- A patrol of 35 men left the bivouac area to travel north along the Bairoko Trail with the mission of contacting and taking prisoners if possible. They moved up a well used trail which was in good condition and followed along ridge lines on the right and low swamp ground on the left. There were numerous small streams, with foot bridges made from poles. The patrol moved 3000 yards and came to two hills (later established as Hills #4 and #5), and continued 3000 yards farther where a Jap outpost was contacted. Six men were sent to flank the outpost and take them by surprise from their rear. The sentry discovered the movement and before it was completed fled into the jungle. At 1245 a four man patrol from the 161st Infantry contacted the 1st Battalion, and reported everything clear along the trail from their positions.

74. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 14TH. -- A patrol from "C" Company moved to Hills 4 and 5 and proceeded up the trail 500 yards where it contacted an enemy outpost. Again the Japs fled into the bush. The mission was to make contact. The patrol returned over the same route arriving in camp at 1400. At 1200, cargo planes dropped rations in the battalion bivouac area. The supply problem was very tough and the battalion was ordered to remain in place until adequate supplies could

81. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 21ST. -- At 0930 a security patrol from "A" Company was sent to the west to determine what was on the left flank. The patrol moved 200 yards west along the trail and came upon a bend in the Bairoko Trail, then traveled 250 yards at 220 degrees azimuth and came to the Bairoko River. The patrol circled south for 400 yards and returned to the bronze area at 1600. There was no contact with the enemy. The patrol traveled in low swampy jungle and found there had been no activity in that area.

[illegible][illegible]

84. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 24TH. -- At 0600 "B" Company left the bivouac in advance guard formation with "C" Company following to occupy Hill 9 in force. The Hill was occupied at 0730. At 1330 the battalion left the bivouac area to advance to Baifro Inlet. The battalion moved along the trail and contacted "B" Company which had left Hill 9. The battalion passed through three large bivouac areas which had recently been evacuated, and proceeded to Baifro Inlet. The battalion arrived at Baifro Inlet, and found that the Japs had evacuated the area. Security patrols were sent in all directions.

85. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 25TH. -- At 0700 the battalion commander with Colonel Livermore left the bivouac area to go to the mouth of Bairoko Harbor and contact the 145th Infantry which had moved to this position from Enogai the afternoon before. Here plans were made for defense of the area. Elements of the 161st Infantry were to defend the west side of the harbor, the 1st and 4th Marine Raider Battalions, Enogai, and the 1st Battalion, 145th Infantry, Triri and Enogai River Sector. Telephone communication with the 161st Infantry was completed. No contact was made with Japanese.

86. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 26TH. -- The battalion set up defensive positions at Enairoko Inlet, and the entire Jop Vivian area was searched for equipment that had been left behind. Security patrols were sent to the east and south.

87. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 27TH. -- The battalion was ordered to move to Enogai Inlet to relieve the Narine Raider Regiment. The battalion moved out at 0745, and arrived at Enogai at 1200. "A", "B", and "C" Companies took up defensive positions along the lagoon between Enogai and Kula Gulf. Anti-Tank and "D" Companies occupied defensive positions at Enogai. The 1st Battalion of the 145th Infantry was defending Shark Island, Enogai River and Triri. All units in the Enogai sector were under the command of Lt. Colonel Rywysko. The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, at this time was attached to the 161st Infantry.

Lt. Col. B. F. Evans, Infantry, Commanding

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88. MISSION. -- The mission of the 2nd Battalion was to pursue the retreating enemy to the North and clear the area between Pira Plantation and Sandy Inlet. This operation involved a sweep with no more than two miles across mountainous jungles and treacherous swamp with no accurate maps available, and during which all units had to supply themselves under the most extreme difficult conditions of terrain and weather.

89. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 2ND. -- On the morning of August 2nd the entire battalion moved to New Georgia Island in assault boats landing at Laiana Beach from which it marched to the vicinity of the Parachute Drop, where the battalion formed a perimeter defense in conjunction with the other two battalions of the regiment.

90. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 3RD AND 4TH. -- During August 3rd and 4th the 2nd Battalion sent out patrols in all directions twice daily, while remaining at the Parachute Drop in Regimental reserve. On August 4th Company "C" relieved Company "I" in the road blocks on Baxter Road. Company "C" relieved Company "I" in the road blocks on Baxter Road. Company "C" relieved Company "I" in the road blocks on Baxter Road.

5th. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 19th AND 20th. -- On the morning of August 19th, the battalion was relieved at the Parachute Drop by the 1st Battalion, 37th Division, and was ordered to move east to serve as a reserve on Barker Road to the vicinity of R-3-W in order to be readily available to assist either the 1st or 2nd Battalion. The battalion, less Company "F", moved east on Barker Road at 0900 by marching and arrived at the drop field of R-3-W about one hundred yards west of R-3-W by 1430. The 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of protecting the supply route of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The disposition of the 2nd Battalion was unchanged on August 19th. Lt. Colonel Evans assumed command of the 1st Battalion on August 20th.

92. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST TWELVE. -- On the morning of August 12th the battalion was informed of the following plan: The 1st Battalion with the Anti-Tank Company attached and with the West Infantry in reserve was to proceed North on the Yuma-Ziteta Trail to Ziteta Village. At this time Company "G" and Company "H" were released to rejoin the battalion, which then marched west on Butler Road to BJ-7, thence North to the top of the ridge area between Twin Hills which had been occupied the previous night by the 3rd Battalion. The battalion, less Company "G", remained in this area during the night. Company "G" was attached to the 3rd Battalion and continued North on the trail to the 3rd Battalion CP. During the afternoon of August 12th orders were received and plans made accordingly for the 2nd Battalion to pass through the 3rd Battalion on the following day and to continue the advance toward Ziteta.

93. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST THIRTEEN. -- On the morning of August 13th, Company "G" passed through the advance positions of Company "H" and was ordered to hold the advance line until the remainder of the battalion, then continuing North along the trail, arrived. Company "G" proceeded the battalion by 400 yards, and was followed by "H", "M", and "N" Companies. At about 1500 the leading scouts of Company "G" entered a deep ravine flanked on both sides by precipitous ridges paralleling the trail. At this point Company "G" came under intense fire. The company immediately deployed on either side of the trail and engaged the enemy in an intense fire fight. The Battalion Commander immediately initiated the following plan: Company "H" was to ascend the ridge to the left (west) of the trail and outflank the enemy resistance. A patrol from Company "G" was to locate the enemy left flank with the view of engaging Company "H" onto the enemy left flank with the view of engaging Company "H" around this flank. Company "H" reached the top of the ridge to the west, but upon reaching a point directly opposite the left flank of Company "G" was stopped by enemy fire. The patrol from Company "G" succeeded in eliciting what appeared to be the enemy's left flank and advanced about 150 yards before it came under cross-fire of machine guns from druses to the right and left. From the report of this patrol it was evident that the resistance was disposed in depth along a ridge to the right front of Company "G". At 1700 the attack was discontinued and an all-round defense prepared for the night.

94. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST THIRTEEN. -- The 2nd Battalion was to continue the attack and the following orders were given by the Battalion Commander: Company "H" was to withdraw from the left flank of the line to a position in rear of Company "G". At 0930 Company "H" and Company "I" were to launch a coordinated frontal attack with Company "J" on the left of the trail and Company "K" on the right. They were to pass through the line held by Company "G" and proceed North along the Ziteta Trail. This attack jumped off as scheduled, but after an advance of 150 yards Company "H" came under heavy enemy fire while advancing up the slope of a hill and were pinned down. Contact between units and control of units was very difficult due to the thickness of the jungle growth and roughness of the terrain. When the attack bogged down, the Battalion Commander ordered a wide envelopment of the enemy's right flank by the 2nd Battalion, less Company "H" which was attached to the 3rd Battalion. The plan was for the 2nd Battalion to bypass the resistance and reach the trail in the rear of the Japanese positions. At 1300 this enveloping maneuver was started with Company "I" in the lead followed



by Companies "G", "H", and "I" going several hundred yards Southwest; then followed a compass course across country parallel with the Ziteta Trail. At 1430, the leading elements of Company "H" surprised the outer defenses of a Japanese strong point near the top of a ridge perpendicular to their front. The leading platoon totally deployed and pushed forward to the top of the ridge when it encountered a line of pill-boxes and foxholes. In the ensuing fire fight two machine gun pill-boxes were destroyed and a considerable number of the enemy killed. Fire from other machine guns to the left and higher up the ridge prevented a complete break-through of the enemy line. Company "H" was committed to the left of Company "I", but was unable to reach the position on the high ground that was holding up Company "I". As it was nearly dark by this time Company "H" was withdrawn about thirty yards and the battalion formed a perimeter defense without digging in. Had the opposition been met earlier in the day there is little doubt but that the battalion would have successfully penetrated the enemy defenses and reduced this strong point. As it was, darkness was at hand before the situation could be developed thoroughly, and the Japanese still held the commanding ground, were well dug in, and had numerous supporting weapons including heavy and light machine guns which were employed in well constructed log pill-boxes. Throughout the night Company "H" reported hearing considerable chopping and digging from the enemy line. On the morning of August 14th the battalion was ordered to withdraw two or three hundred yards so that artillery fire could be placed on the enemy strongpoint. Throughout the remainder of the day the artillery adjusted and fired concentrations in the area occupied by the enemy.

95. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST THIRTEEN. -- At 0730 on August 13th, following a thirty minute artillery preparation, the battalion again pushed forward, swinging further to the left in an attempt to envelope the right flank of the resistance met on the previous day. Company "H" was leading, followed by "G", "I", and "K" Companies. After advancing about 300 yards the leading elements of Company "H" suddenly met a grenade barrage which was immediately followed by very heavy rifle and machine gun fire at extremely close range. No sooner had the fire fight begun than the Japanese launched a counterattack against the right flank of Company "H". The weapons platoon of Company "H" and all of Company "H" were immediately committed against this attack and succeeded in driving the enemy back. Company "H" was employed to protect the left flank of Company "H". Throughout the remainder of the morning and most of the afternoon the battalion made repeated attacks against the enemy resistance, and numerous casualties were inflicted on both sides. However, the Japanese were well dug-in and were employing numerous automatic weapons and were able to repulse the battalion's repeated attacks. When it became apparent that the objective could not be taken that day the battalion dug-in and surprisingly spent a relatively quiet night with the opposing front lines only a few yards apart. Around 0600 on the morning of August 14th the Japanese threw stones at our front line troops and considerable activity was audible in the rear of the Japanese line. Anticipating a counterattack our troops held their fire, but no attacks developed.

96. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST THIRTEEN. -- Just before dawn, the battalion commander was again ordered to withdraw so that artillery could be used as soon after daylight as possible. Making a special effort not to engage the enemy, the battalion accordingly withdrew about 600 yards. Throughout the morning the artillery laid down intense concentrations

on the entire area occupied by the enemy. Company "B" rejoined the battalion. In order to take full advantage of the effects of the artillery fire, a coordinated attack by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions was ordered. At noon the 3rd Battalion attacked parallel to and on the right side of the trail. The 2nd Battalion attacked along the high ground to the left of the trail and maintained contact with the 3rd Battalion. The artillery fire was not lifted until the safety of the 2nd Battalion was assured. Upon reaching the area advancing troops made such action necessary. Upon reaching the area advancing troops made such action necessary. Upon reaching the area advancing troops made such action necessary.

97. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 13TH AND 14TH. -- During August 13th and 14th, the 2nd Battalion, less Company "B" which was again attached to the 3rd Battalion, remained in reserve and furnished flank and rear protection for the 3rd Battalion. On the 13th a patrol consisting of a platoon of Company "B" located and placed a block across a trail to the North and West of the resistance being encountered on the West to the sea. This trail was apparently an important supply and evacuation route. During the night the platoon killed all members of a seven-man carrying party. On August 14th this platoon was relieved by another platoon from Company "B" led by Lt. Johnson. Shortly after midnight a party of Japanese assembled at 200 was established a bivouac a short distance from the block. At dawn of August 15th the enemy force broke camp and moved along the trail directly into the block. Taken completely by surprise the leading troops were literally "mowed down" by air machine guns. After the initial surprise the enemy launched vigorous attacks and completely encircled the platoons all around defense. One attack on completely encircled the platoons all around defense. One attack on completely encircled the platoons all around defense.

98. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 15TH. -- On the morning of August 15th the 2nd Battalion, preceded by light tanks, passed through the 3rd Battalion in an attack on the enemy defenses against which the 3rd Battalion had been fighting for the previous three days. No resistance was encountered and by noon the battalion reached Zieta. Patrols were sent out by both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to re-establish contact with the enemy, and to locate the 3rd Battalion. 14th Infantry supposedly somewhere in the vicinity of Zieta. The 3rd Battalion made contact with the enemy along the trail West of the block that Company "B" had occupied on August 13th and 14th. The 2nd Battalion contacted the 3rd Battalion, 14th Infantry, which had been located for some time in a hill overlooking Zieta Village and Zieta Trail.

99. OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 14TH TO AUGUST 21ST. -- On August 16th the 2nd Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 14th Infantry on Zieta Hill and continued patrolling

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to the North, East and West. At this time a reconnaissance patrol reported the presence of enemy at Pira Plantation but none at Sandy Islet. The Division Commander then directed that the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 27th Infantry, continue to the North and East, capture Pira Plantation, and thereby deny the enemy the use of Diamond Narrows for evacuation and supply. Diamond Narrows is a narrow channel of water at the southern part of Rapa Gulf which separates Anadai Island from New Georgia proper.

b. Air reconnaissance of this area had been made by the Division and Regimental Commanders, and there appeared to be a strip of high ground leading across the swamp which surrounded Pira Plantation. This proved to be a strip of exceptionally tall trees and not high ground. The 2nd Battalion following an azimuth course advanced 3000 yards Northwest of Zieta through swamp toward Pira Plantation in an attempt to locate this high ground but ran into a bog and were stopped. Patrols the size of a platoon were sent out on August 19th and 20th to the North, West, and Southwest to locate the high ground across the swamp but failed. On the afternoon of August 20th the Regimental Commander decided to abandon the search for the high ground and plans were made to blase a trail directly through the swamp to Pira Plantation using the same route followed by the reconnaissance patrol of August 10 - 12th. In accordance with this plan the 2nd Battalion bivouacked 2000 yards on August 21st and bivouacked just East of the mangrove swamp.

100. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 22ND. -- At 0700 the 2nd Battalion proceeded across the swamp following a trail blazed by the Regimental Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, Captain Kountz, and arrived 800 yards to the east of the plantation opposite Oukou Point in the afternoon of the same day. The crossing of this swamp deserves some special mention for a distance of from 1000 to 1500 yards was crossed in and from lines to waist deep with full combat equipment. In the afternoon the Battalion Commander and his Company Commanders made a personal reconnaissance in the rear of the plantation and preparations were made for securing the area the following morning.

101. OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 22ND TO SEPTEMBER 10TH. -- At 0700 the leading elements of the Battalion entered Pira and pushed on to Ithorn Sound. One company advanced to the North and two companies advanced South sweeping the entire plantation, but meeting no opposition. The rest of the enemy had evacuated the previous day (as evidenced by the report of an 80 and dead cattle left behind) leaving foot, equipment, and prepared defensive positions all of which were being the sea. Beach positions were prepared and occupied along the beach overlooking Rapa Gulf. This ended all active operations of the 2nd Battalion on New Georgia Island. The battalion continued to man beach defenses and patrol the area until September 10th but with the exception of frequent bombings by enemy planes, there was no other enemy activity encountered.

102. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

a. The operations were characterized by slow tortuous moves of short distances, over thick mountainous jungle trails and treacherous swamps, where the supply problem was always acute. The lack of accurate maps hampered the operation considerably, and to counter this, constant patrolling was necessary. The value of artillery was in the thickest of jungles was reduced, and although adjustment by sound alone lacks accuracy it is effective if used in sufficient quantity to cover the entire target area.

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b. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion is deserving of commendation for the excellent assistance they rendered the Regiment throughout the entire campaign. Even though operating under the most adverse conditions they always succeeded in laying down fire where we wanted it, and in any quantity desired.

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SECTION IV

OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD BATTALION

August 3 - September 10, 1943

Major Charles W. Davis, Infantry, Commanding

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103. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

a. The maps furnished the battalion for this operation were highly inaccurate. The distance to and location of Zieta Village, an intermediate objective, were not known; it was definitely known that the trail being followed would lead to Zieta Village; and finally the entire section of the map between Pain Hill and the supposed location of Zieta Village was blank, being covered by clouds at the time the aerial photos were made.

b. With this rather nebulous situation to cope with, and the fact that the location and strength of the enemy was unknown, it is apparent that little long-distance planning could be done. From the best available information an azimuth was selected which it was hoped would lead to Zieta Village, and this was followed in each advance. When contact with the enemy had been effected, a reconnaissance and estimate of the situation were made and the attack order issued. This procedure obtained throughout the campaign.

104. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 3RD. -- Company "B" moved by Baxter Road to R-4. From there a patrol was sent northwest along Bairoko Trail for a distance of approximately 500 yards. Upon returning the patrol reported encountering an enemy machine gun position and a bivouac area just as they were starting to turn back. Company "B" was ordered to move to the north along the same trail, establish a defensive position just short of the enemy location, and await further orders. In the meantime Company "B" had moved to and occupied the defensive position. Company "B" maintained its block on Baxter Road and Mr. Company and Company "B" remained at the Parakele Drop.

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[illegible]

115. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 14TH.
a. The attack was resumed at 0730 with Company "I"

4. This attack was in progress when it was learned that four Marine light tanks were on their way to the front lines, and plans for their immediate employment were made. At 1500 these tanks were ordered to move forward and were positioned in the rear of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, in the Zivota Trail, and passed through the attacking rifleman. One tank immediately became blinded because of a demolished windshield, and was ordered to stop. The other two tanks continued on the left side of the trail and the other two to the left of the trail. The rifleman followed closely straying roughly beyond the tanks on both sides. The tanks continued on their way until they were stopped by the enemy fire of the first of the attacking rifleman. The action of the tanks and the location of the two machine guns and pill-boxes was coordinated by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Infantry, and the tanks were ordered to move on slips of paper and passed them to the tank commanders through the pistol port. Several pill-boxes were destroyed during this action, yet the tanks were unable to move forward. The action of the tanks was forced to withdraw to replenish their ammunition. The intense fire of the hour prevented another action. Company "B", which had remained in the rear, was ordered to move forward and attack the enemy lines, and the companies dug in where they were, making a net advance for the day of approximately 50 yards. Casualties had again been fairly heavy, but the action of the tanks had raised the spirits and morale of the men immensely.

b. At 1300 Company "I" was ordered to move westward along a trail leading from Zieta with the mission of reconnoitering the trail and locating the block placed on this trail by Company "H" on the previous day. At about 500 yards from Zieta Company "I" located the block, then unoccupied, and continued to move westward along the trail. At 1500, when about 800 yards from Zieta, they encountered Jap sniper fire.

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around defense of Zieta Gordon. Orders were then received for Company "K" to reinforce Company "I", and accordingly they moved out along the same trail at 1200. Company "K" had just made contact with the rear of Company "I" when the sniper fire was re-started with the rear of Company "I". Major Davis directed that in attack be covered by Company "I" and "K" on the enemy resistance.

a. By 1545 Company "K" had been placed on the left of Company "I", and a line of fire consisting of four light machine guns had been established astride the trail. The plan of attack was to sweep the Japanese line with intense automatic fire while the riflemen infiltrated forward; for one platoon of Company "I" the riflemen infiltrated forward along the bank of the Zieta River, which was on to more westward along the bank of the Zieta River, which was on our right, with the mission of turning the Jap's left flank.

b. The attack was started as planned at 1600, and immediately heavy automatic and rifle fire was encountered. After thirty minutes of sharp fighting it was decided to dig in for the night on the ground gained and to resume the attack early the next morning. The platoon making the envelopment was withdrawn and a section defense was established. One Jap was killed by an outpost while our men were digging in. Artillery was called on to place harassing fire 400 yards to the west of our line throughout the night.

117. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 16TH.

a. At 0200 the attack was resumed by Companies "I" and "K" but no opposition was met. The advance was continued with both companies beating out the jungle on both sides of the trail. A large Jap bivouac was passed through with no sign of the enemy. At about 1000 the scouts reported that the end of the trail had been reached and a lagoon had been discovered. A Jap landing boat and several outrigger boats were discovered. This point, which was about 1000 yards from Zieta, had evidently been used as a supply point for Japanese troops at Zieta and along the Zieta Trail. Companies "K" and "I" established a block in the vicinity of the dock to deny the enemy further use of this area.

b. On August 16th and 16th, the battalion's less Companies "K" and "I" bivouacked in an all-around defense at Zieta Gordon. On the 17th of August, Company "K" relieved Company "I" at the block previously established at Dulu Channel; Company "K" returned to the battalion bivouac. On August 18th, Companies "K" and "I" were relieved by a detachment of the 18th Infantry; upon their return to Zieta Gordon the battalion was again consolidated, and spent the night of August 18th there.

118. OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 19TH. -- The battalion moved to Company "K" bivouac of the night before, a zone of some 1600 yards to the northwest, and remained there through the night of August 20th. While there a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon was sent to the west to attempt to locate a route to Pira; another patrol was sent northeast to locate Mt. Tirokamba and others were sent out for security purposes. The route to Pira was not discovered; the patrol to Mt. Tirokamba succeeded in reaching it without difficulty, and all other patrols reported negatively.

119. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 21ST. -- The battalion moved following the 2nd Battalion which had started across-country for Pira. The battalion bivouacked for the night in the area occupied the night before by the 2nd Battalion.

120. OPERATIONS ON AUGUST 22ND.

a. The battalion pushed westward at 0730, following the route of the 2nd Battalion, and had crossed the swamp between the trail and Pira by 1200. No enemy had been encountered. The occupation of Pira terminated the campaign on New Georgia Island.

b. The stay at Pira was devoted to the establishment of beach defenses and patrolling to include Sunday Island, and reorganization and rehabilitation of the battalion. The sector defended extended over a frontage of 3000 yards, with the causeway at Outer Point approximately in the center. This was effectively covered by Companies "I", "K", and "M", by strong points, from east to west respectively. Company "K", less one platoon, was held in reserve. The weapons platoon of Company "K" established a block at the extreme right flank, extending 150 yards inland from the beach. Security patrols were frequently sent out, and Sunday Island was patrolled three times, all with negative results. Several air raids were experienced nightly, with but two casualties suffered. The battalion butchered beaver four times while at Pira, and harbored beef was eaten by all hands.

c. Japs known to have been killed totaled 95.

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SECTION V

ARTILLERY SUPPORT, 89TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

Lt. Col. John W. Ferris, F.A., Commanding

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121. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

a. The battalion reverted to 25th Infantry Division control on 3 August and was placed in direct support of the 27th Infantry which had arrived in the area on 31 July. Positions were selected 500 yards north of Imbaki, New Georgia Island and the battalion displaced on four MT's on 5 August. Battery "B" rejoined the battalion.

b. The mission assigned the combat team was to attack toward Zieta Village, drive all resistance north, and to intercept and destroy all Japanese attempting to escape through our sector. One battalion of the 27th Infantry had been detached and was attacking on a trail paralleled to and 3000 yards to the right with the 161st Infantry. The battalion was given the mission of supporting the column attacking toward Zieta while the 104th Field Artillery Battalion would support the right column. The 136th Field Artillery Battalion furnished reinforcing fire to the 89th Field Artillery Battalion.

c. Fire and radio communication, liaison and observer parties and survey parties, accompanied the 27th Infantry when they jumped off at 0900, 5 August. Due to the complete lack of visibility beyond a few yards in the jungle all adjustment was made by sound. Landing elements were surveyed in by the battalion survey party. Fire could be dropped in front of landing elements at any time and adjusted closer by sound.

d. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion, supported by reinforcing fires of the 136th Field Artillery Battalion (Medium), fired daily in support of the attack from 6 August to 13 August when Zieta village was taken. The Japanese delaying force was dug in across the trail about every two or three hundred yards. The well constructed pill-boxes could only be reduced by heavy artillery and mortar concentrations followed by an immediate infantry assault.

e. The heaviest concentration was fired on the 12th when 2700 rounds were fired by the 89th Field Artillery Battalion and 850 rounds were fired by the 136th Field Artillery Battalion on an area 200 yards wide and 800 yards deep. The area had been extremely well prepared for defense but after this concentration the infantry attacked behind a rolling barrage and advanced 900 yards before a live Jap was found. The rolling barrage was not fired on a time schedule but was held on one point until the infantry pushed up to within fragment range of the impact area then lifted and moved forward by one hundred yard bounds.

f. Harassing fire was placed during the nights on points of evacuation along the coast of Ostonga Island and at Pira plantation.

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Native scouts and intelligence patrols sent information daily as to the exact points used for embarkation by the enemy.

g. On 15 August the battalion 8-2 moved with a patrol and the Japanese left flank and contacted the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry. The 18th Infantry had moved south from Bairoko with the mission of intercepting the Japanese forces at Ziate. This force and no artillery support and had been unable to take Ziate with small arms fire. Radio communication was established, registration was completed and plans made for an attack on the 15th.

14-15 August. b. The Japanese forces evacuated Zista during the night of 14-15 August. Evacuation commenced soon after a tank attack at 1800.

1. No firing was done during the period 16 August to 22 August. During this period the 27th Infantry were working their way across the swamps between Mt. Tinkrobani and Piru Plantation. When the infantry broke out of the swamp on 23 August a 400 yard concentration was fired on Piru Plantation in support of the attack from the east. This firing was done at maximum range. Once the plantation had been taken no further support could be given. The range to the plantation was 400 yards beyond the theoretical maximum range and it was possible due to the fact that the guns in the batteries have a positive velocity error that causes them to fire beyond their rated capability.

1. From 24 August to 9 September the Battalion received no missions as all opposition being encountered was beyond range. This period was devoted to preparing a battalio position on the top of Mt. Tirankambis to be used in support of the 1641 Infantry in an attack on Bairoko Harbor. The plan proved unfeasible due to difficulties in road construction encountered by the Division Engineer Battalion.

[illegible]

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and back to the base set in the battalion area. If all wire had gone out at once, which it never did, they would have been forced to have their messages relayed by the advance radio to the base radio as they generally could not reach the base radio with the SCR-284 due to irregular terrain and the high trees.

123. SURVEY.

5. When the battalion deployed to Lambetti, initial control was obtained from the CICOSPAC Map. A traverse was then run to the front lines of the 27th Infantry. As the infantry advanced, the survey followed at the tail of the small area fire. The traverse was computed as the party advanced. The survey party was usually at the head of the jeep team in the vicinity of the wire party lying the 110 trunk line between the front lines and the rear lines. The traverse was run at any time and the coordinates at the head of the jeep trail obtained. The head was usually within two hundred yards of the infantry front lines. From this accurately located point a paced traverse using a pocket compass was run to the forward observers and their exact location determined.

b. This method not only facilitated initial fire but was also valuable in locating the infantry front lines.

d. In operations where it is impossible to locate front lines on a map the best means of locating the leading elements is to run a traverse from the battalion area to the front. This traverse can follow the trail employed by the infantry units and advance as rapidly as they do. In the event that the attack is made on two trails some distance apart it is necessary to employ two survey sections.

d. A map made by the methods employed by the 2nd Aviation Engineers will furnish all the information needed for fire control if supplemented by current aerial photographs. This map was made from aerial photographs and was controlled by radial line methods. If the mapped area is covered by heavy trees and no definite details can be located by inspection, or by restitution from aerial photographs, then a traverse must be run.

124. METHODS EMPLOYED IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF FIRE.

a. Fire from the Zieta position was adjusted by forward observers with the 151st Infantry at Kairoko Harbor and with the 27th Infantry at Piru Plantation. Forward observer methods were employed. Additional points were registered upon by an aerial observer furnished by the battalion. An SBU was employed as an observation plane. It proved to be an unsatisfactory place for adjusting artillery fire. A plane to be satisfactory as an artillery observation plane must be capable of flying very slowly.

b. High angle fire was employed entirely during the attack toward Zietz Village. Low angle fire could not be employed near friendly troops without getting tree bursts over our own infantry. The high trees and rolling ground offered a mask that created a dead space on close targets.

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SECTION VI

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

Major C. J. Christensen, Infantry, Supply Officer
Major John A. Dole, Jr., Medical Corps, Regimental Surgeon

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125. PRELIMINARY PLANS.

a. The warning order for the move did not provide too much time for adequate preparation. Thirty-six hours for packing, drawing, and issuing of shortages, occasioned by the turning over of equipment to other units at the beginning of the New Georgia Campaign. Loading required continuous work during that period.

b. In addition to the combat equipment of the regiment, it carried 20 days "H" rations, 15 days "C" rations, 3 days "D" rations, 10 days "I" rations, gas and oil and maintenance supplies for 15 days, medical supplies for 15 days and 5 units of fire on the move from Guadalcanal.

c. By the 3rd of August the regiment and all its supplies were in bivouac at the Parachute Drop with Service Company and the Rear Echelon property remaining at Laiana Beach in bivouac there.

d. On the afternoon of August 3rd the Regimental Commander gave the field order as to the employment of the regiment from B-N-W. Locations for Regimental DP's were selected near B-N-W. The plans for supply were to establish a Regimental Dump at this point for water, ammunition and rations. From this point forward, supplies could be delivered for the most part by vehicle to the front lines. All supplies for the combat team had to be obtained from the 97th or 43rd Division installations at Laguna Beach. Casualties were delivered to the Clearing Company at Laguna Beach.

e. As the advance progressed with the mission of the 1st Battalion to proceed up the Munda-Batrako Trail (this battalion was later attached to the 161st Infantry for supplies) and the balance of the regiment to proceed up the Munda-Ziveta Trail, the supply installations remained as close behind the forward units as the roads would permit. As the advance continued, the supply problem became increasingly worse, due to the lengthening of the supply routes and increasingly poorer condition of the roads.

f. The Engineers would push a temporary road behind the assault units with the RD-4 and a more permanent road was prepared behind the advance by the use of the D-7. This worked well. Using 4-ton trucks, supplies could be moved as far forward as the road and tactical situation would permit. Battalion dumps were established at this point to feed, water, and replenish the ammunition of the attacking units.

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These dumps were cleared each afternoon upon the completion of the days operation. This system of supply was used until the regiment was ordered to cross the swamp between New Georgia and George Island (Piru Plantation).

g. When the regiment occupied Piru Plantation the supply of the regiment overlaid was impossible. Nor was it possible to use boats until the waters adjacent were in our hands. Two parachute drops were made, dropping ammunition and rations on the 23rd and 24th of August.

h. On the 25th of August the first supply boat made its way to Piru Plantation with rations and medical supplies, and removed patients and casualties that it had been impossible to evacuate before. From this time on the supply was wholly dependent upon water transportation. Part of the supply section remained at the 25th Division Beach at Laketti Beach and most requirements were requested as the volume of supplies required. The Collecting Company also remained at Laketti Beach to receive casualties and patients returned on the supply boats.

126. **TRANSPORT OF SUPPLIES.** -- All possible means of hauling supplies were used in this operation. One quarter ton trucks and hand-carrying parties of the individual battalions, Cannon Company, Anti-Tank Company, and Band were used to supply front line units. The movement of the supplies from the beach was made by 2 ton trucks. 2 1/2 ton trucks were prohibited from using the roads and could only be used on beach roads that had been surfaced. Air drops were used and proved helpful but an inadequate number of parachutes required that some of the supplies be dropped with anything to break the fall. Particular care should have been exercised to see that the medical supplies were dropped in a parachute. All the medical supplies were lost with the result that some of the wounded and sick suffered. Water transportation was used after the waters near Piru were safe to operate in. LCM's, LCVP's, and LC's were used depending upon the type and quantity of equipment and supplies requiring transportation.

127. **WATER SUPPLY.** -- Normally water was obtained from a source reasonably close by. Difficulties experienced were usually in the lack of transportation and condition of the roads over which water had to be hauled. The conditions under which the troops were fighting in the thick jungles out of the direct sun had a direct bearing on the amount of water consumed which helped us in this line of supply. Water cans were pooled in a Regimental Dump, units drawing as many cans as were required.

128. **FOOD SUPPLY.** -- Food supply during this campaign was adequate. 100 rations were issued on the basis of 2 1/2 rations daily. This was all the men desired. "M", "K" and "V" rations were issued as a variety. Coffee, hotcakes or some form of pastry was prepared in a small battalion kitchen that traveled with the supply installations. Over a period of time, "V" rations were the most desired; "M", "K" and "V" rations were fine to give variety but not as a steady diet.

129. **TRANSPORTATION.** -- Transportation allowed was 12 - 1 ton, 5 - 2 ton, 6 - 2 1/2 ton, one - 2 1/2 ton wrecker, and 2 radio cars. All except 2 - 1 ton and the radio cars remained under Regimental control and were used as the situation required. The condition of the roads due to

constant rain made the use of vehicles nearly impossible. The 1 ton performed excellently and when the roads were restricted only to their use they could continue to get through. The 2 ton performed well in that it could traverse roads impassable to the 1 ton, but difficulty was experienced by this vehicle in that the drive shafts universal or transmission were constantly breaking (spare parts were extremely limited). Two or three of the five 2 ton were all that were in operation at any one time. The cause for this, it is considered, was due to the heavy type soil. The vehicle would normally have traction, but in trying to push through the heavy roads something would have to give, and the parts listed above gave way.

130. **EVACUATION.**

a. First echelon evacuation was accomplished by the battalion aid sections plus assistance from line troops. Litter hauls were over difficult terrain and frequently harassed by enemy fire. From the aid station casualties were evacuated by litter bearers from Collecting Company "C", 25th Medical Battalion to an advanced collecting point at the road terminus. From here they were removed to the collecting station by means of 1 ton trucks with improvised litter racks.

b. Due to the difficult terrain and slowness in evacuation from the aid station no attempt was made to evacuate a patient unless he could be removed in daylight. This frequently necessitated keeping casualties at the Battalion Aid Station overnight regardless of the seriousness of the wound.

CHAPTER IV - PART II

OPERATIONS OF THE 27TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

ARMED AND KILCHANGARA

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SECTION I

OUTLINE OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Colonel Douglas Sage, Infantry, Commanding

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131. **SITUATION.** -- Prior to September 10th, the 43rd Division had landed patrols on Kumbel Island. Slight enemy resistance was encountered, and after this resistance had been overcome, the island was announced "clear of the enemy". A few days later, however, strong enemy positions were encountered on Bamboo Peninsula just south of Sapekara Island. The 159th Infantry held a block running north from East Bamboo. The 27th Infantry Commander was informed that a battalion of the 172nd Infantry also held a block running from the east end of Bamboo Lagoon north across Bamboo Peninsula to Sapekara Lagoon.

132. **ATTACK ORDERS.** -- The 27th Infantry was attached to the 43rd Division. The Regimental Commander was assigned commander of all units on North Arundel and given orders to contain and destroy the enemy on Sapekara and Bamboo Peninsula. (See attached Map). The estimated number of enemy was 200.

133. **RECONNAISSANCE AND TERRAIN APPRECIATION.**

a. The narrow finger of Bamboo Peninsula prevented wide flanking movements. The Regimental Commander prepared a simple, swift striking plan. The 2nd Battalion, two companies abreast, would attack directly east, the impetus of the attack dislodging the enemy and driving him into the block held by the 172nd Infantry.

b. By the time the 172nd Infantry's block would have been met by the enemy the 2nd Battalion would have been between the enemy and Stopping Stone Island, thus preventing the enemy on Sapekara and Bamboo Peninsula from joining. The 1st Battalion was assigned the mission of clearing Sapekara once the 2nd Battalion had passed Stopping Stone Island.

c. The 1st Battalion remained at Rendel Inlet.

d. The Regimental Reconnaissance Platoon was ordered to outpost island 1 - 30 as protection of the regiment's flank.

134. **PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.** -- The 2nd Battalion and Regimental Headquarters moved by LVT to Butling Point on September 10th and bivouacked for the night and the following day moved by small landing craft to Bomboe. The 1st Battalion followed the same procedure on day later.

135. **DETAILED OPERATIONS.**
a. The attack of the 2nd Battalion was launched at 0730 September 12th. The resistance was disposed of.

b. On September 13th, the 3rd Battalion moved into position in the rear of the 2nd Battalion and crossed mangrove-covered stepping stones to Segakuran. The abutting islands west of Segakuran were occupied and outposted by especially trained assault swimmers from the Regimental Reconnaissance Platoon and the 3rd Battalion.

c. Not finding the block at the east of Bomboe Lagoon where expected, the 2nd Battalion located the unit by patrol. The number of the enemy was much greater than 200, so the battalion of the 172nd Infantry had to bypass it to join the 2nd Battalion.

d. It was evident that the enemy was much stronger than anticipated, and the Regimental Commander requested that the 1st Battalion be released to him. Accordingly, the 1st Battalion, arriving at East Bomboe, was attached to and went into position with the 2nd Battalion.

e. Meanwhile the 3rd Battalion engaged strong enemy forces on Segakuran. These forces were constantly reinforced and supported at night by barges from Kolombangara. Infantry and artillery weapons were effectively employed against the barges. However, naval craft would have been much desired.

f. The seemingly impossible task of landing tanks on Bomboe Peninsula was accomplished, and in a co-ordinated attack of the 1st and 2nd Battalions the enemy resistance was disorganized.

g. When Segakuran Island had been cleared by the 3rd Battalion the entire command made a co-ordinated attack to the east, and elements of the 43rd Division were contacted on September 21st.

h. The 27th Infantry was released to the control of the 25th Division on September 21st and set up defenses on the north coast of Rendel.

i. On October 6th, the 1st Battalion landed at Bird Cove on Kolombangara at 0800. Until October 12th, when relieved by a Puma Infantry Battalion, the battalion employed numerous combat and reconnaissance patrols which mopped-up enemy that were left when Kolombangara was evacuated.

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27TH INFANTRY ENROUTE TO KOLOMBANGARA FROM ARUNDEL.




27TH INFANTRY PATROL PRESSING THRU JUNGLE UNDERGROWTH ON KOLOMBANGARA.



TROOPS LANDING AT VILA PLANTATION FOUND THE AREA HAD BEEN EVACUATED.



WRECKAGE OF TWIN ENGINE MITSUBISHI BOMBER FOUND BY PATROL NEAR VILA AIRFIELD.



SECTION II

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND BATTALION 17 IN

September 10 - 21, 1943

Lt. Col. B. F. Evans, Infantry, Commanding

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136. **PRIOR PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE.** -- At 0900 September 10th, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to prepare to move with combat equipment immediately. The Battalion Commander was ordered to make for an air reconnaissance of North Rendel. Following the reconnaissance, the Battalion Commander met the battalion, which in the meantime had moved by LVT to Butling Point, at 1730. On September 11th, the Battalion Commander, his staff, and company commanders proceeded to East Bomboe, reconnoitered the area, and formulated the plan of attack for the following morning. During the day the battalion proceeded by small personnel craft from Butling Point to the landing point at East Bomboe, North Rendel Island.

137. **TERRAIN AND PLAN OF ATTACK.**

a. The ground over which the battalion was to attack was a narrow peninsula approximately 400 yards wide. About 200 yards in the center of the peninsula the terrain was flat, dry, and the jungle not extremely dense. From this flat area, the ground sloped off through mangrove swamp to the sea on both sides.

b. The battalion was assigned the mission of attacking to the East up the peninsula to make contact with units of the 172nd Infantry, and destroy or drive into the sea the Japanese forces estimated to be approximately two hundred men defending the north end of Rendel Island. The plan of attack was to have two companies abreast, one in reserve, followed by Heavy Weapons Company and Headquarters Company. Preliminary artillery and mortar concentrations could not be used prior to the jump-off due to lack of accurate information of the location of the battalion of the 172nd Infantry.

138. **OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 12TH.** -- At 0730 the attack moved off as scheduled, two companies abreast, "B" Company on the right, "C"

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[illegible][illegible]

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141. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 19TH. -- The lines having been strengthened by the employment of units of the 172nd Infantry, Company "F" was released from attachment to the 2nd Battalion. The Japanese positions were shelled by artillery, 4.2" and 81mm mortars almost continuously. The battalion received an order to attack before noon. The attack was launched at 1150, but was unsuccessful, the Japanese counterattacking in force and mauling in driving a small salient in "F" Company's lines. The reconnaissance platoon, 43rd Division, reinforced "F" Company, drove the enemy back and regained our original positions.

1422. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 16TH. -- The Jap positions were again heavily shelled by artillery and mortar fire. There was intermittent sniping and rifle fire by opposing forces all during the day. At 1300 the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry with Anti-Air Company attached, arrived as reinforcements, and went into position behind the lines of the right flank units preparatory to an attack at 0730 September 17th. At 1630 six light tanks entered the defense perimeter during a rain which fortunately covered the noise of their armor, and gave us the advantage in the tank battle. The tanks were used to break the tank column and reconnoiter the area and formulated the plan of attack for the following morning.

143. PLAN OF ATTACK FOR SEPTEMBER 17TH -- The tanks were to spearhead this attack. They were to advance in waves of three or four. The second three tanks protected the first three tanks by firing by rounds on an azimuth of 60 degrees. They were to be followed closely by Company "C" and Company "B", 27th Infantry, with Company "C" on the left and Company "B" on the right. They were to pass through the lines of Company "D" and Company "E" and advance to the front of the line. They were to be supported by the mortar platoons of Company "H" and Company "I" were to be attached to the assault companies. Company "A" and Anti-Tank Company were to be in echelon and were to be in echelon to the right rear to protect the right flank.

144. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 17TH. - The attack jumped off as scheduled. Tanks passed through the lines of the 2nd Battalion CP at 0800 engaged the Reds in the territory between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions firing 76's and heavy machine guns. At about 0900 the tanks were firing 76's and heavy machine guns from a point blank range with their fire being controlled and directed by radio from the 2nd Battalion CP. The battalion, in turn, had telephone communication with the Company Commanders in the front lines, who had located many of the enemy machine gun positions. At first the tanks drew heavy fire from small arms weapons, but this fire decreased steadily as the tanks reached one position after another. At 0930 the tanks were forced to withdraw to refuel and obtain more ammunition. At 1100 the tanks again passed through the lines of Company "B" and Company "H" and were followed by Company "G". By 1200 the tanks had destroyed most of the last two companies. The assault companies advanced until they hit the sea, then regrouped and

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pushed on to the east in pursuit of the enemy. They succeeded in advancing approximately three hundred and fifty yards before the enemy mounting heavy resistance at a second well-organized position. It was late afternoon before this resistance was met and it became necessary to dig in and prepare defenses for the night because the attacks could be surprise and inflicted heavy casualties, knocking out at least 12 machine guns and killing about 75 Japanese in addition to other problems in numerous shallow, heavily mined areas.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

lines, but no casualties were reported.

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was heard to the east of our position during the night.

148. OPERATIONS (ON SEPTEMBER 20TH). Two patrols were sent out at 0800 while the remainder of the Battalion held their position. A combat patrol consisting of one officer and thirty men was sent to the southeast along the trail down which the Japs had retreated to locate the main body of the enemy. The patrol was sent out at 0900. The patrol travelled approximately 2200 yards before running into a Jap block. The strength of the Jap block was estimated as fifty men with at least five automatic weapons. After a brief fire fight in which the patrol lost one man, the Japs retreated. The patrol then continued on to the next Jap position. The second patrol consisting of one officer and twelve men was sent 500 yards to the south to reconnoiter a trail running in the same direction. The trail was found to be a well worn trail to runny Jap graves. It had not been used for at least a week, and no fresh sign of Jap activity was noted. The Battalion was not permitted to advance until the 3rd Battalion at Sagakurao had reached a position

1494. PLAN OF ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 21ST - A coordinated attack by the 1st and 2nd Battalions was ordered with Companies "A" and "B" of the 1st Battalion, and Companies "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I", "J", "K", "L", "M", "N", "O", "P", "Q", "R", "S", "T", "U", "V", "W", "X", "Y", "Z", "AA", "AB", "AC", "AD", "AE", "AF", "AG", "AH", "AI", "AJ", "AK", "AL", "AM", "AN", "AO", "AP", "AQ", "AR", "AS", "AT", "AU", "AV", "AW", "AX", "AY", "AZ", "BA", "BB", "BC", "BD", "BE", "BF", "BG", "BH", "BI", "BJ", "BK", "BL", "BM", "BN", "BO", "BP", "BQ", "BR", "BS", "BT", "BU", "BV", "BW", "BX", "BY", "BZ", "CA", "CB", "CC", "CD", "CE", "CF", "CG", "CH", "CI", "CJ", "CK", "CL", "CM", "CN", "CO", "CP", "CQ", "CR", "CS", "CT", "CU", "CV", "CW", "CX", "CY", "CZ", "DA", "DB", "DC", "DD", "DE", "DF", "DG", "DH", "DI", "DJ", "DK", "DL", "DM", "DN", "DO", "DP", "DQ", "DR", "DS", "DT", "DU", "DV", "DW", "DX", "DY", "DZ", "EA", "EB", "EC", "ED", "EE", "EF", "EG", "EH", "EI", "EJ", "EK", "EL", "EM", "EN", "EO", "EP", "EQ", "ER", "ES", "ET", "EU", "EV", "EW", "EX", "EY", "EZ", "FA", "FB", "FC", "FD", "FE", "FF", "FG", "FH", "FI", "FJ", "FK", "FL", "FM", "FN", "FO", "FP", "FQ", "FR", "FS", "FT", "FU", "FV", "FW", "FX", "FY", "FZ", "GA", "GB", "GC", "GD", "GE", "GF", "GG", "GH", "GI", "GJ", "GK", "GL", "GM", "GN", "GO", "GP", "GQ", "GR", "GS", "GT", "GU", "GV", "GW", "GX", "GY", "GZ", "HA", "HB", "HC", "HD", "HE", "HF", "HG", "HH", "HI", "HJ", "HK", "HL", "HM", "HN", "HO", "HP", "HQ", "HR", "HS", "HT", "HU", "HV", "HW", "HX", "HY", "HZ", "IA", "IB", "IC", "ID", "IE", "IF", "IG", "IH", "II", "IJ", "IK", "IL", "IM", "IN", "IO", "IP", "IQ", "IR", "IS", "IT", "IU", "IV", "IW", "IX", "IY", "IZ", "JA", "JB", "JC", "JD", "JE", "JF", "JG", "JH", "JI", "JJ", "JK", "JL", "JM", "JN", "JO", "JP", "JQ", "JR", "JS", "JT", "JU", "JV", "JW", "JX", "JY", "JZ", "KA", "KB", "KC", "KD", "KE", "KF", "KG", "KH", "KI", "KJ", "KK", "KL", "KM", "KN", "KO", "KP", "KQ", "KR", "KS", "KT", "KU", "KV", "KW", "KX", "KY", "KZ", "LA", "LB", "LC", "LD", "LE", "LF", "LG", "LH", "LI", "LJ", "LK", "LL", "LM", "LN", "LO", "LP", "LQ", "LR", "LS", "LT", "LU", "LV", "LW", "LX", "LY", "LZ", "MA", "MB", "MC", "MD", "ME", "MF", "MG", "MH", "MI", "MJ", "MK", "ML", "MN", "MO", "MP", "MQ", "MR", "MS", "MT", "MU", "MV", "MW", "MX", "MY", "MZ", "NA", "NB", "NC", "ND", "NE", "NF", "NG", "NH", "NI", "NJ", "NK", "NL", "NM", "NO", "NP", "NQ", "NR", "NS", "NT", "NU", "NV", "NW", "NX", "NY", "NZ", "OA", "OB", "OC", "OD", "OE", "OF", "OG", "OH", "OI", "OJ", "OK", "OL", "OM", "ON", "OO", "OP", "OQ", "OR", "OS", "OT", "OU", "OV", "OW", "OX", "OY", "OZ", "PA", "PB", "PC", "PD", "PE", "PF", "PG", "PH", "PI", "PJ", "PK", "PL", "PM", "PN", "PO", "PP", "PQ", "PR", "PS", "PT", "PU", "PV", "PW", "PX", "PY", "PZ", "QA", "QB", "QC", "QD", "QE", "QF", "QG", "QH", "QI", "QJ", "QK", "QL", "QM", "QN", "QO", "QP", "QQ", "QR", "QS", "QT", "QU", "QV", "QW", "QX", "QY", "QZ", "RA", "RB", "RC", "RD", "RE", "RF", "RG", "RH", "RI", "RJ", "RK", "RL", "RM", "RN", "RO", "RP", "RQ", "RR", "RS", "RT", "RU", "RV", "RW", "RX", "RY", "RZ", "SA", "SB", "SC", "SD", "SE", "SF", "SG", "SH", "SI", "SJ", "SK", "SL", "SM", "SN", "SO", "SP", "SQ", "SR", "SS", "ST", "SU", "SV", "SW", "SX", "SY", "SZ", "TA", "TB", "TC", "TD", "TE", "TF", "TG", "TH", "TI", "TJ", "TK", "TL", "TM", "TN", "TO", "TP", "TQ", "TR", "TS", "TT", "TU", "TV", "TW", "TX", "TY", "TZ", "UA", "UB", "UC", "UD", "UE", "UF", "UG", "UH", "UI", "UJ", "UK", "UL", "UM", "UN", "UO", "UP", "UQ", "UR", "US", "UT", "UU", "UV", "UW", "UX", "UY", "UZ", "VA", "VB", "VC", "VD", "VE", "VF", "VG", "VH", "VI", "VJ", "VK", "VL", "VM", "VN", "VO", "VP", "VQ", "VR", "VS", "VT", "VU", "VV", "VW", "VX", "VY", "VZ", "WA", "WB", "WC", "WD", "WE", "WF", "WG", "WH", "WI", "WJ", "WK", "WL", "WM", "WN", "WO", "WP", "WQ", "WR", "WS", "WT", "WU", "WV", "WW", "WX", "WY", "WZ", "XA", "XB", "XC", "XD", "XE", "XF", "XG", "XH", "XI", "XJ", "XK", "XL", "XM", "XN", "XO", "XP", "XQ", "XR", "XS", "XT", "XU", "XV", "XW", "XX", "XY", "XZ", "YA", "YB", "YC", "YD", "YE", "YF", "YG", "YH", "YI", "YJ", "YK", "YL", "YM", "YN", "YO", "YP", "YQ", "YR", "YS", "YT", "YU", "YV", "YW", "YX", "YZ", "ZA", "ZB", "ZC", "ZD", "ZE", "ZF", "ZG", "ZH", "ZI", "ZJ", "ZK", "ZL", "ZM", "ZN", "ZO", "ZP", "ZQ", "ZR", "ZS", "ZT", "ZU", "ZV", "ZW", "ZX", "ZY", "ZZ".

150. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 21ST. -- The attack commenced as planned. No opposition was met and by 1100 Companies "A" and "B" had advanced 1600 yards. At this point they were halted to allow the 3rd Battalion time to come abreast on the peninsula. At 1300 the advance was resumed and by 1345 the advance companies had passed the position of the Jue block of the previous day. At 1400 the advance was again halted, while patrols were sent to the east and northeast to detect units of the 172nd Infantry, and 169th Infantry. By 1600 contact had been established with the 169th, 172nd Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, on the eastern shore of the island.

Infantry, thus reducing the last organized resistance on Arundel Island.

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SECTION III OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD BATTALION

September 10-21, 1943

Major Charles W. Davis, Infantry, Commanding

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151. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

a. Two of Grand Island were issued to the Battalion at the time the warning order was received on September 10, 1943, while the Battalion was at First Platoon. Little was known of the situation existing on Grand Island, and part of what was known was later found to be false. Combat equipment only was taken from First, and the Battalion had completed its move and consolidated on Bomboe Peninsula by 0900 on September 13th.

b. An examination of the maps (which were excellent) disclosed a small "Stepping Stone" Island, lying approximately midway between Segokurua and Bomboe Peninsula. This appeared to offer the best route of approach to the objective, although at the same time it seemed the most likely point which the enemy would guard.

c. A careful reconnaissance of this route was immediately made by the Battalion commander, his staff and the company commanders. This was done by going to various points along the shore from which Segokurua and Stepping Stone could be observed. It was apparent that the channel between the Peninsula and Stepping Stone would have to be waded, and if the maps were accurate, wading would also have to be resorted to in order to reach Segokurua from Stepping Stone.

d. The narrowness of the island prevented maneuvering, and the large number of enemy, who were well dug in and who were employing many automatic weapons, made frontal attacks futile and costly. It was planned, therefore, to make the greatest possible use of mortar and artillery, and this was done successfully.

152. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 11TH. -- The 10th arrived at Stepping Point on Grand Island at 1315. Troops and equipment were unloaded immediately, and tentative bivouac areas were assigned to units. Upon

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learning that a limited number of small assault boats were available to the Battalion, the shuffling of troops to Bomboe Peninsula was started at 1600, and by 1700 Companies "I", "K", and half of Company "J" had been moved to a point on the Bomboe Peninsula approximately 2400 yards east of Bomboe Village. An all-around defense was set up by these units, with the remainder of the Battalion bivouacking at Basting Point.

153. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 12TH.

a. Early on the morning of September 12th, snuffing operations were resumed, and the Battalion had consolidated on Bomboe Peninsula by 0900.

b. Twelve men were furnished to Regiment to be used in conjunction with several men from Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon in reconnoitering and seizing the chain of small islands extending west of Segokurua Island.

c. At 1430 Company "I" was ordered to place a block on the Jap trail extending north-west across Bomboe Peninsula. This was accomplished before daylight, with blocks emplaced on both ends of the trail.

154. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 13TH.

The Battalion moved early, following the route taken by Company "I" the day before, and reached Company "I's" block at approximately 1000. The Battalion remained in this area until 1100, at which time it received orders to continue eastward to the vicinity of Stepping Stone Island, a small body of land lying between Bomboe Peninsula and Segokurua Island, and situated opposite the center of the latter. This move was completed at about noon and an immediate reconnaissance of Stepping Stone Island was made from the edge of the peninsula. The Battalion had been given the mission of seizing Segokurua Island, and Stepping Stone Island appeared to offer the best route of approach.

b. At this time Company "I" was ordered attached to the 2nd Battalion which was in contact with the Japs approximately 1000 yards to the east, and left the Battalion at 1330.

c. Orders for the attack of Segokurua were then issued. Company "I", with a section of machine guns from Company "K" attached, was to wade the narrow channel separating the peninsula from Stepping Stone Island, cross the island, and again by wading was to cross over onto Segokurua. They were to drive across Segokurua to the northern side and establish a block across and on the southern side of the island, opposite Stepping Stone, to cover the subsequent crossing of the Battalion. Company "K", with a section of machine guns from Company "I" attached, was to follow Company "I", and depending on the opposition met by Company "I" was likewise to drive across to the northern shore, going to the left or west of Company "I". Company "K" was to prepare flame mortar positions on the peninsula with the mission of placing fire on any part of the island. The remaining section of Company "K's" machine guns and of the Battalion were to remain on the peninsula in the vicinity of Headquarters Company were to remain on the peninsula in the vicinity of the mortar positions pending developments of the attack.

d. Company "K" immediately started clearing firing positions. It was necessary to cut a number of large trees in addition to the dense

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INFANTRYMEN READY TO BEGIN THE CROSSING FROM ARUNDEL TO STEPPING STONE ISLAND.



INFANTRYMEN CROSSING FROM STEPPING STONE ISLAND AFTER SCOUTS HAVE REPORTED THE WAY CLEAR.



81MM MORTAR SECTION FIRING IN SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY ADVANCING ON ARUNDEL ISLAND.



INFANTRYMEN ADVANCE ON ARUNDEL ISLAND.



undergrowth before any firing could be done, and work on this continued until late in the day.

g. At about this time it was learned that Company "P", 62nd Chemical Battalion, had been attached to the Regiment. They likewise started clearing mortar positions close to those being prepared for the 81's.

f. Company Commanders issued their orders and the attack by Company "P" jumped off at 1500. The advance proceeded very slowly, as the channel to Shopping Stone proved to be almost neck-deep and rather swift. The leading scouts felt their way cautiously onto and across Shopping Stone, which was found to be almost entirely mangrove swamp, with the remainder of the company following their route and arriving at 1530. A brief halt was made by the scouts while they scanned the jungle-lined shore of Sogakurana, and again they moved forward. The channel to Sogakurana was not as deep as the other had been, and the scouts reached the island without opposition. The advance was pushed steadily and the northern shore was reached at 1550. Company "P" followed closely behind and going slightly west of Company "P" also reached the north edge of the island. No opposition was met by either unit in this advance.

g. Companies "I" and "K" immediately consolidated in a cordon defense, forming a small square with Company "I" facing to the east and south and Company "K" to the west, the northern flank resting on the beach which was covered by machine gun fire only. Company "I" also placed a small block on the southern edge of the island opposite Shopping Stone.

h. Shortly before dark, while the men were digging in, two Japs approached from the east and were fired on by an outpost of Company "I". Results of this fire was not observed. At about 2000 two Japs were again seen coming into Company "I's" positions; both of these were killed. No other activity occurred on this flank during the night.

i. At about 2130 a machine gunner of Company "K", whose gun covered an east-west trail running along the center of the island, observed a column of Japs approaching along the trail from the west. Visibility was good, as the moon was within a day of being full. He held his fire until the leading Jap was within a few feet of his position and then opened up. The first five in the column were killed, with the others scattering to the west. The remainder of the night on this flank was quiet.

j. CP's which had been established on the northern flank of both companies noted extensive barge activity throughout the night in Blackett Shallows, which lay between Sogakurana and Kolombanara Islands to the north. This body of water was only 1200 yards wide at its narrowest point, and because of the bright moonlight boats could be seen immediately after they left Kolombanara. Most of this traffic proceeded toward Devil's Island and then cut northward along the eastern shore of Kolombanara. The barges were in column, and often five or six were visible at one time. Some barges were noted moving westward from the vicinity of the mouth of the Vila River. Several times during the night a Jap float plane was observed landing and taking off near the southern shore of Kolombanara.

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k. Artillery fire was requested from the 169th F. A. Battalion, which was in support of the 27th Infantry, to be placed on these targets. The artillery, however, would not fire as they did not wish to expose their gun positions to a Jap observation plane which was reported in the vicinity.

155. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 14TH.

a. Shortly after daylight on this day Japs were observed infiltrating from the west toward Company "K's" line, and a brief fire fight ensued. Fire was received from several Jap light machine guns, and grenades were thrown toward our line. This fire fight was still in progress at 0800 when the remaining section of machine guns from Company "K", the battalion aid station, and the communication section of Headquarters Company arrived at Sogakurana.

b. In order to prevent the Japs from cutting the line of communications between the perimeter defense on the north and the block covering Shopping Stone on the south, the section of machine guns of Company "K" was placed in this gap. This line was lightly held, but additional troops were not available. Intermittent fighting took place throughout the day on the entire western line. The eastern flank was quiet. At 0900 a patrol from Company "I" moved 300 yards to the east and returned. No enemy was encountered.

c. At 1330, in order to feel out the enemy strength to the west, a platoon of Company "I" consisting of an officer and four men was sent along the southern slope of a small ridge running east-west near the middle of the island. About 200 yards west of our lines and between the above mentioned ridge and the southern edge of the island a large Jap bivouac was encountered. The platoon succeeded in surprising the Japs in this bivouac, killed five of them and withdrew safely to our lines, the enemy following them as they pulled back.

d. The small numbered islands forming a chain to the west of Sogakurana had by this time been secured, with an CP in position on one from which observation was possible of the western end and northeastern shore of Sogakurana. It was known from captured maps that a Jap barge landing was located on the northern shore of Sogakurana near the western end. Accordingly, the 81st mortar of Company "K" and the attached 4.2" mortar registered on the western end of the island and eastward along the northern shore for about 500 yards. (See attached map). Arrangements with both mortar units were made so that these barge concentrations could be put down on very short notice in the event the Japs used this barge landing or any other part of the northwestern shore for reinforcing or evacuating. These registrations were completed on the afternoon of September 14th. During the afternoon a forward observer from the 169th F. A. Battalion (195 Squadron) came to Sogakurana and adjusted fire on the western part of the island.

e. At about 1800 the sporadic fighting which had been taking place throughout the day on the western flank suddenly increased in intensity as the Japs attempted to work their way into Company "K's" line. This attack continued until just before dark, when the enemy ceased his activity. The use of our hand grenades and light machine guns prevented the Japs from breaking the line,

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although the denseness of the jungle growth permitted them to approach very close to our positions. Company "K's" line was reinforced for the night by five men from Company "I"; all available Headquarters Company personnel, consisting of wiremen and intelligence men, were also placed in the line.

f. Barge activity in Blackett Shallows started soon after dark, following the same routes as on the previous night. At about 2100 three Jap bombers or transports were led to the Vila air strip on Kolombanara by a float plane, which then immediately flew toward First Plantation on New Georgia Island. Anti-aircraft firing was heard at this time from the vicinity of First. The float plane later landed off Kolombanara. The bombers referred to above were soon taking off at 2200. Artillery fire was again requested from the 169th F. A. Battalion, but none was received as a Jap observation plane was reported to be in the vicinity.

g. At about 2115, CP's reported that several small landing boats were soon approaching the northwestern corner of Sogakurana. The barge concentrations were immediately held down. CP's were unable to determine whether or not these craft were loaded; they later saw several of them pulling away from Sogakurana. Barge activity in Blackett Shallows continued throughout the night.

156. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 15TH.

a. A few minutes after daylight the Japs attacked along the entire west line. Their main effort was made along the high ground near the center of the island, which was opposite Company "K's" left platoon. The lack of a good field of fire was keenly felt, as the enemy was able to work his way unseen to within grenade distance of our positions. In addition heavy automatic fire was laid down on our line, and considerable sniper fire was received.

b. No reserve was available as all men were already in the cordon. Contact was made with the Company "K" mortar positions on the peninsula, and men who could be spared from the mortars plus Headquarters Company men who had been carrying supplies were sent to reinforce the battalion. A request was also made to Regiment that Company "I" be returned as soon as possible.

c. The Japs continued to exert pressure along the entire line, in some cases approaching almost to the edge of Company "K's" foxholes before being shot. Grenades were again used to good advantage in holding off the enemy. The light machine guns covering the ridge to the west prevented the Japs from breaking the line in that sector.

d. Upon the arrival of reinforcements from the peninsula they were put in the line extending the left flank of Company "K". Company "I" in the morning, started digging positions in the rear of Company "K", clearing fields of fire at the same time. Progress was slow, as considerable fire was sweeping the area, but by 1150 a new line had been made and occupied by Company "I". Company "K" was ordered to withdraw behind the new defensive line.

e. The withdrawal by Company "K" was skillfully executed, and upon its completion Company "K" took over the line to the east formerly occupied by Company "I". This eastern line had been outposted by Headquarters Company men while "K" Company was digging in on the new line.

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k. Artillery fire was requested from the 169th F. A. Battalion, which was in support of the 27th Infantry, to be placed on these targets. The artillery, however, would not fire as they did not wish to expose their gun positions to a Jap observation plane which was reported in the vicinity.

155. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 14TH.

j. Shortly after daylight on this day Japs were observed infiltrating from the west towards Company "M's" line, and a brisk fire fight ensued. Fire was received from several Jap light machine guns, and grenades were thrown towards our line. This fire fight was still in progress at 0800 when the remaining section of machine guns from Company "M's" the battalion aid station, and the communications section of Headquarters Company arrived on Sogekarua.

k. In order to prevent the Japs from cutting the line of communications between the perimeter defenses on the north and the block covering Stepping Stone on the south, the section of machine guns of Company "M" was placed in this gap. This line was lightly held, but additional troops were not available. Intense fighting took place throughout the day on the entire western line. The western flank was quiet. At 0900 a patrol from Company "M" moved 300 yards to the east and returned. No enemy was encountered.

l. At 1330, in order to reel out the enemy strength to the west, a platoon of Company "M" consisting of a small ridge fourteen men was sent along the southern slope of the western flank and east-west near the middle of the island. About 200 yards west of our line and between the above mentioned ridge and the southern edge of the island a large Jap bivouac was encountered. The platoon succeeded in surprising the Japs in this bivouac, killed five of them and withdrew safely to our line, the enemy following them as they pulled away.

m. The small numbered islands forming a chain to the west of Sogekarua had by this time been secured, with an 82 in position on one from which observation was possible of the western shore of Sogekarua. It was known from captured maps that a Jap large landing was located on the northern shore of Sogekarua near the western end. Accordingly, the platoon of "M" Company and the attached 82nd mortar registered on the western end of the island and eastward along the northern shore for about 500 yards. (See attached map). Arrangements with both mortar units were made so that these large concentrations could be put down on very short notice in the event the Japs used this large landing or any other part of the northern shore for reinforcements or evacuating. These registrations were completed on the afternoon of September 14th. During the afternoon a forward observer from the 169th F. A. Battalion (55 Schneider) came to Sogekarua and the 169th F. A. Battalion (55 Schneider) came to Sogekarua and adjusted fire on the western part of the island.

n. At about 1800 the sporadic fighting which had been taking place throughout the day on the western flank suddenly increased in intensity as the Japs attempted to work their way into Company "M's" line. This attack continued until just before dark, when the enemy ceased his activity. The use of our hand grenades and light machine guns had prevented the Japs from breaking the line, and light machine guns had prevented the Japs from breaking the line, and light machine guns had prevented the Japs from breaking the line.

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o. At about noon a platoon of the 169th Infantry arrived, having been attached to the battalion, and Company "M" arrived at approximately the same time. The weapons platoon of Company "M" and a platoon of the 169th were placed in the line to the left of Company "M's" new positions, extending southward across the island to the block opposite Stepping Stone. Company "M" (last weapons platoon) formed a similar line to the east, connecting the right flank of Company "M's" old position with the block on the south and facing eastward.

p. Company "M" had taken up the fire fight as men from Company "M" worked their way back through the lines, as the Japs continued to exert pressure all along the line. They continued to work their way forward, and placed automatic fire and sniper fire on our positions.

q. Before Company "M" had been withdrawn, steps were taken to place 82mm mortar fire on the Japs in front of the western line. Using one mortar only with 82 (100) adjustment was started 300 yards to the west of our line, and to the north of the ridge in the center of the island. Upon the completion of Company "M's" withdrawal this fire was walked in towards Company "M's" a few hundred yards west of our line. Ten rounds for effect were quickly dropped. Adjustment was continued until a round was dropped fifty yards from our positions. This round produced immediate reactions from the Japs, causing them to entrench and about, so fire for effect was ordered. Further adjustment brought the fire to within thirty-five yards of our line, and again fire for effect was laid down. The impact area was moved north to the shore and then south to the ridge with concentrations of ten rounds dropped on areas in which the enemy was active.

r. Whereabout this close-in mortar fire Company "M" laid down rifle and machine gun fire along the entire line, opening up as soon as the rounds were completed and stopping when another concentration was on the way. This volume of fire served to restrict movement among the Japs, and prevented them from pulling out of the impact area.

s. As soon as the area north of the ridge had been covered, another mortar was adjusted in front of our line to the south of the ridge. The same procedure was followed, with the fire again being walked in close to our line, and the area from the ridge to the south-ern shore was covered in the same manner. Intense fighting was continued with both mortars, single rounds being followed up with concentrations whenever they came forward, a noise among the Japs, until after 1700.

t. Another platoon of the 169th Infantry had arrived at about 1630, and it was placed in position in the eastern line.

u. Earlier in the day, an outpost from Company "M" and the 169th's platoon had been sent 400 yards to the east. They remained in position during the day, and were withdrawn at 1600. No enemy activity had been observed by them.

v. Harassing fire to be employed during the night by the 81's was set up, with eight rounds per hour to be dropped close by.

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w. Although the thickness of the jungle growth permitted them to approach very close to our positions, Company "M's" line was reinforced for the night by five men from Company "M's" all available Headquarters Company personnel, consisting of wireman and intelligence men, were also placed in the line.

x. Large activity in Blackett Sprits started soon after dark, following the same routes as on the previous night. At about 2100 three Jap bombers or transports were led to the Vila air strip on Kolombangara by a flock plane, which then immediately flew towards Piru Plantation on New Georgia Island. Anti-aircraft firing was heard at this time from the vicinity of Piru. The flock plane later landed off Kolombangara. The bombers referred to above were seen taking off at 2400. Artillery fire was again requested from the 169th F. A. Battalion, but none was received as a Jap observation plane was reported to be in the vicinity.

y. At about 2115, OPI reported that several small landing balsa were seen approaching the northwestern corner of Sogekarua. The large concentrations were immediately laid down. OPI was unable to determine whether or not these craft were loaded; they later saw several of them pulling away from Sogekarua. Large activity in Blackett Strait continued throughout the night.

156. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 15TH.

z. A few minutes after daylight the Japs started along the entire west line. Their main effort was made along the high ground near the center of the island, which was opposite Company "M's" left platoon. The lack of a good field of fire was heavily felt, as the enemy was able to work his way unopposed to within grenade distance of our positions. In addition heavy automatic fire was laid down on our line, and considerable sniper fire was received.

aa. No reserve was available as all men were already in the action. Contact was made with the Company "M" mortar positions on the peninsula, and men who could be spared from the mortar plus Headquarters Company men who had been carrying supplies were sent to reinforce the battalion. A request was also made to Regiment that Company "M" be returned as soon as possible.

bb. The Japs continued to exert pressure along the entire line, in some cases approaching almost to the edge of Company "M's" foxholes before being shot. Grenades were again used to good advantage in holding off the enemy. The light machine guns covering the ridge to the west prevented the Japs from breaking the line in that sector.

cc. Upon the arrival of reinforcements from the peninsula they were put in the line extending the left flank of Company "M". Company "M" in the meantime, started digging positions in the rear of Company "M", clearing fields of fire at the same time. Progress was slow, as considerable fire was sweeping the area, but by 1150 a new line had been made and occupied by Company "M". Company "M" was ordered to withdraw behind the new defensive line.

dd. The withdrawal by Company "M" was skillfully executed, and upon its arrival Company "M" took over the line to the east formerly occupied by Company "M". This eastern line had been outposted by Headquarters Company men while "M" Company was digging in on the new line.

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ee. All enemy activity to the west had ceased after the mortar firing, and both flanks were quiet throughout the night.

ff. Barges were again active during the night, following the same pattern as on the two previous nights. At about 2100 six Jap barges succeeded in landing on the northwestern shore of Sogekarua. OPI was slow in reporting this, and as a result the barges remained there for about 400 minutes before being concentrated by the 82's and 81's were called for. Later in the night barges were again reported by OPI, and the concentrations were again laid down.

157. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 16TH.

gg. Early in the morning an outpost was again put out to the east. Plans were made for an attack to the west to be launched at 0930; this hour was selected so that units would be able to obtain water before jumping off. The plan of attack was: Company "M", on the right, was to drive to the west, with its zone of action extending from the beach to and including the high ground near the middle of the island; Company "M", in the center, was to drive to the west maintaining contact on the right with Company "M" and on the left with a platoon of the 169th Infantry; Company "M's" zone of action was approximately 150 yards in width. A platoon of the 169th on the left was to drive to the west, maintaining contact on the right with Company "M", and to extend to the southern shore on the left. It was to extend the line slightly to the left rear, with the mission of protecting the rear of Company "M".

hh. After a mortar preparation which started very close in to our lines and then walked westward about 200 yards the attack was started. It progressed steadily until it had passed through the area of Jap activity of the day before, and then came under hostile fire. This fire increased in intensity as the platoon attempted to work forward, and at a point approximately 200 yards from the line of departure the entire line was pinned to the ground. The undergrowth was very dense; many logs and large rocks made observation difficult. An attempt to move forward was met with fire. In addition to using snipers and grenades, the Japs had in action north of the ridge three heavy and at least two light machine guns, and about the same number of machine guns were in action south of the high ground.

ii. It was decided to pull back slightly and place mortar fire on the Jap line. The withdrawal was made, and it was learned that two wounded men from Company "M" had been unable to pull back because of enemy fire. The mortar fire was held off while efforts were made to extricate these men, but each attempt was met with intense automatic fire. It was finally decided to dig in and hold the ground gained, and after the line had been strengthened defensive positions were prepared about 150 yards west of the old line. The flank on the northern shore which had been opened by Company "M's" advance was covered by Headquarters Company men, and adjustments were made by the 169th's platoon to the left of Company "M" and the Company "M" block on the south to close that flank.

jj. All attempts at rescuing Company "M's" two men having failed, mortar fire was adjusted on the Jap line, and considerable fire for effect was laid down. The 82mm mortar also registered further to the west on Sogekarua, using 82 (medium).

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f. Harassing fires by both the 4:2's and the 81's for the night were set up, covering the area from close-in to our lines to the western end of the island. The 81's were to use HE (light) for the close-in concentrations, and HE (medium) for the more distant.

f. Harassing fires by both the 4:2's and the 81's for the night were set up, covering the area from close-in to our lines to the western end of the island. The 81's were to use HE (light) for the close-in concentrations, and HE (medium) for the more distant.

[illegible]

159 OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 17TH

b. Registration of 105's by an artillery liaison officer from the 155th F. A. Battalion, which had gone into position at Ruston Point on September 13th, was started in the afternoon, and was nearly completed just before dark. The registration covered the western half of the island from 150 yards in front of our lines to the edge of the island. Another 37mm gun was obtained and emplaced on the eastern shore.

b. Registration of 105's by an artillery liaison officer from the 155th P. A. Battalion, which had gone into position at Ruston Point on September 13th, was started in the afternoon, and was nearly completed just before dark. The registration covered the western half of the island from 150 yards in front of our lines to the edge of the island. Another 37mm gun was obtained and emplaced on the eastern shore.

c. The outpost to the east had again been sent out early in the morning, and reported no sign of enemy activity.

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159. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 14TH.

159. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 14TH.

b. After the Anti-Tank Company had started its advance, orders were received that in the event no opposition was met, it was to continue across to the western end of the Peninsula and replace a block there. This information was conveyed to the Anti-Tank Company before the end of Sagakurama had been reached. No opposition was met, and the channel between Sagakurama and the peninsula was reached at 1/00.

b. After the Anti-Tank Company had started its advance, orders were received that in the event no opposition was met, it was to continue across to the western end of the Peninsula and replace a block there. This information was conveyed to the Anti-Tank Company before the end of Sagakurama had been reached. No opposition was met, and the channel between Sagakurama and the peninsula was reached at 1/00.

d. Two small patrols were then sent out to the east. The patrol on the right, or south, encountered a swamp about 100 yards to the front, and returned with negative information. The patrol on the left had advanced about the same distance when a single Jap was seen. He disappeared before any firing could be done, and the patrol returned with this information.

d. Two small patrols were then sent out to the east. The patrol on the right, or south, encountered a swamp about 100 yards to the front, and returned with negative information. The patrol on the left had advanced about the same distance when a single Jap was seen. He disappeared before any firing could be done, and the patrol returned with this information.

f. The position rapidly becoming untenable, and upon the recommendation of the company commander at 1600, the Anti-Tank Company was ordered to withdraw to the eastern end of Sangkarasa. A small force was withdrawn initially, and covered the subsequent withdrawal of the remainder of the company.

f. The position rapidly becoming untenable, and upon the recommendation of the company commander at 1600, the Anti-Tank Company was ordered to withdraw to the eastern end of Sangkarasa. A small force was withdrawn initially, and covered the subsequent withdrawal of the remainder of the company.

G. At the same time that orders for withdrawal were given a request was made of the 2nd Battalion, then occupying positions on

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h. Also at the same time that the withdrawal was ordered Company ~~XXX~~ and the platoon of the 169th Infantry which had been in position on the eastern flank were ordered to proceed to the eastern end of Sagakuraga and there consolidate with the Anti-Tank Company in a common defense.

h. Also at the same time that the withdrawal was ordered Company ~~XXX~~ and the platoon of the 169th Infantry which had been in position on the eastern flank were ordered to proceed to the eastern end of Sagakuraga and there consolidate with the Anti-Tank Company in a common defense.

i. The Anti-Tank Company completed the withdrawal at about 1645, and upon the arrival of Company "K" and the platoon of the 169th Infantry shortly thereafter an all-around defense covering the channel was prepared.

and including the northeast corner of the road.

ii Casualties sustained by the Anti-Tank Company were two killed and nine wounded. Losses would have been more severe had not the company been put out in an efficient manner.

8. At about noon the battalion was informed that Companies "A" and "K" of the 27th Infantry would be attacked by 1400, and that the upon their arrival at Sokengeram at approximately 1400, and that the would be used in an attack to the west to be launched the following morning. This order was changed before the arrival of Companies "A" and "K", and the attack was ordered to take place as soon as possible upon their arrival.

1. The plan of attack was as follows: At "H" hour minus 15 minutes the 105's were to begin a preparation, starting 150 yards in front of our line and walking westward to the end of the island at "H" hour minus 10 minutes the 81's and 4.2's were to lay down mortar fire covering from 50 yards in front of our line to the end of the island; at "H" hour Companies "A" and "B" were to attack Company "A" on the right, with boundary between companies, the left

3. Upon the arrival of both companies, which was completed at 1515, the hour was set at 1545, and the companies went into position behind our line opposite their zones of action. The attack jumped off as scheduled, and proceeded about 75 yards before meeting any resistance. The entire line then came under Jap machine gun fire, and was unable to advance further.

2. In an attempt to neutralize the heavy automatic fire being received, machine guns were set up as a base or fire by the platoon that due to the dense undergrowth and limited visibility of the company, proved ineffective. Any movement from the attack would produce heavy fire, and it became apparent that were therefore ordered to stay no further than that day. Both companies on the eastern flank withdrew. Company "A" was placed on the line on the eastern flank, formerly occupied by Company "B" and the platoon of the 101st Airborne and the weapons platoon of Company "B" were placed on the beach to the north. The remainder of Company "B" occupied positions within our

At about 1700 Regiment directed that the 4.2's be
on the western end of the peninsula; and also register on a Jap

g. Harassing fires on Sogekarasa by the mortars were set up as on previous nights. Jap barges followed the same pattern as on other nights, and several barge concentrations were called for during the night following any indication that the boats were landing on the northwestern shore.

g. Harassing fire on the western end of the peninsula was carried out throughout the night by 4.2" mortars. The barrage concentration on the peninsula was also laid down on two occasions during the night barges having been heard in the vicinity of the landing previously registered on.

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160: OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 1941:
a. An attack to the west was again directed. The orders were the same as on the afternoon before, with the exception that the artillery and mortar preparations were intensified.

b. The attack jumped off at 0830, and proceeded much the same as on the previous day. The same resistance was met, consisting of many Jap machine guns, both light and heavier. Sniper fire was not as heavy as had been received before, but any forward movement was met with a hail of automatic fire.

c. Fire and movement was attempted, with the entire line opening up while a squad or platoon endeavored to work their way forward. This met with limited success, and a few yards were gained. Anti-Tank grenades were also employed, and good results were experienced from the few grenades that were not duds. Several machine gun emplacements were knocked out by this method.

d. All attempts at breaking the enemy resistance having failed at about 1900 two flame throwers were carried forward and used. Close approach to a pill-box with these flame throwers was difficult because of mutually supporting enemy weapons and were not effective. At about 1630 the attacking companies were withdrawn to our lines.

e. Intermittent firing by mortars was arranged for both Sasakarasu and the peninsula for the night, and plans were made for an attack to be made the following day.

f. At about 2000 barges were heard on the western end of Sasekuro, and the barge concentrations were laid down. Shortly thereafter GPI reported seeing red flares or tracers being fired from the western part of the island.

g. At 2100 one of the outposts along the beach saw a small Jap landing boat approximately 25 yards off shore approaching his position. He could see one Jap in the boat, but because of the darkness was unable to determine if he were alone. The outpost opened fire with his carbine, and the boatman cried out in Japanese. The entire beach

line, including the 37mm with cannister, opened fire, and the boat was

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quickly sunk. Another boat or barge farther out was also sighted and fired on with unobserved results.

b. At about 2215, a 4.2" concentration was placed on the western end of the peninsula, and the barrage concentration on the peninsula was fired at the same time. This was repeated 30 minutes later, and each shooting and screaming was heard from the impact areas. While the firing was being done, "Pistol Pete" opened up from Kolomo- bangero and shelled the mortar positions. As the 4.2's were in exposed positions and as their muzzle flash was considerable, they were ordered to cease firing and the 105's were requested to take up the firing on the peninsula.

1. For the next three hours "Fistul Pete" gave the area between the mortar positions and eastern end of Sogekarasa a thorough shelling. Fortunately most of the rounds were long, and fell in rear of the units. One man was killed and four wounded on the eastern end of Sogekarasa.

1. Barges were heard in the vicinity of the Jap landing on Sogekarasa throughout the night, and on each occasion the barbs conce-
trations were fired. It was apparent that the enemy was using "Pistol
Pete" as a diversion, but whether he was again reinforcing Sogekarasa
conjecturing could not be ascertained.

k. At the height of the shelling from Kolombangara all communication lines went out, and the battalion was out of contact for several hours. The line from Regiment was finally repaired; the other lines were out until daylight.

161. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 20TH

161. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 20TH.
 a. At 0900 the attack to the west was again launched. Orders for the attack were the same as on the two previous days. A close-in mortar preparation was fired, and the western half of the island was subjected to harassing mortar fire only; artillery fire was held on call.

subjected to increasing mortar fire during the day. The advance got under way slowly, as leading elements felt the advance terrain to their front. The line of Jap resistance on previous days was reached and passed without opposition. On reaching the point where the advance continued steadily to the west. On reaching the point of the island where the southern sector abruptly - to the northeast, Company "A" took up the attack with Company "B" following. The rate of advance was increased as the undergrowth became lighter. All mortar

c. At 1405 the western end of Sorokarosa was reached, and contact was made with the CP on Island 1. One Jap was killed near the end of the island, and one was taken prisoner.

2. Orders were received from Regiment to outpost the western extremity, and to withdraw the remainder of Company "A" and "B" to the center of the island. A rifle platoon from Company "A" with a section of machine guns attached was formed on a strong point near the end of the island, and the withdrawal was accomplished by 1600. Upon the arrival of Company "A", 16th Infantry, at about 1700, this outpost was relieved and the defense of the western part of Sangharua was taken over by them.

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g. Orders were received at this time that the defense of Sagokarassu would be taken over by units of the 169th the following morning, and that the 3rd Battalion with attached units would cross the channel to the western end of the peninsula and attack to the southeast. The battalion was given the mission of making contact with a unit of the 43rd Division holding a block across the peninsula at a point approximately 2400 yards southeast of the western tip.

f. Harassing concentrations covering the area from the western end of the peninsula 600 yards east were set up by both the 4.2" mortars and the light artillery, and were fired throughout the night. Following one of these concentrations screaming was heard. The same concentration was repeated immediately.

g. "Pistol Peto" commenced firing from Kolombangara at about 2200, with most of his shelling directed at the eastern tip of Sagerasma. As on the previous night most of these rounds were long, and several landed across the channel on the peninsula. During this firing the same signalling was observed on the peninsula as had been seen on Sagerasma the night before.

b. The plan of attack for the following morning was issued: Following a twenty-minute artillery and 4.2 mortar preparation on the western end of the peninsula, the Anti-Tank Company followed by Company "K" was to cross the channel and establish a block across the peninsula at a point 200 yards inland. The platoon of the 169th Infantry was to remain in position, and was to establish a base of fire with their automatic weapons covering the crossing by the Anti-Tank Company.

162. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 21ST

162. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 21ST.
a. The artillery and mortar preparations were completed at 0800 September 21st, and a patrol from the Anti-Tank Company quickly crossed the channel and seized the peninsula. When this reconnaissance disclosed no enemy activity the remainder of the Anti-Tank Company crossed over, followed by Company "K", and the block was put in according to plan, with the Anti-Tank Company on the left.

b. At 0800 the remainder of the battalion and Companies "A" and "B" left the center of Songkharu and moved to the eastern end of the island. Companies "I" and "M" crossed over to the peninsula at one end of the island in position in front of the block and it was planned to push them through. Anti-Tank Company and Company "K" have them continue the attack. Because of the very heavy jungle growth and the swampy ground on the right it was decided to move the block forward 200 yards, which would give Companies "I" and "M" more room for deploying.

c. At 0945 Companies "I" and "L" were in position and at 1000 they passed through the block and resumed the advance. The remainder of the battalion followed in column. Progress at first was slow, but became more rapid as the undergrowth thinned out.

d. The advance continued at a steady rate, and at 1430 the leading elements made contact with the 43rd Division block. One Jap was killed and one taken prisoner by Company "A" during this advance.

c. Orders were received that the northern shore of the peninsula from the western end to the block would be defended by the battalion.

This was accomplished by placing companies at intervals of 400 yards, each company establishing a cordon defense which included as much of the shore as the size of the company would permit. Units received water and sandwiches later in the evening; these were carried by boat via the lagoon south of the peninsula. Nothing of consequence happened during the night.

163. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 22ND

163. OPERATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 22ND. -- The defense of the peninsula was taken over by the 1st Battalion. Companies "A" and "B" reverted to the 1st Battalion. The 3rd Battalion with the Anti-Tank Company attached moved by marching via Stepping Stone Island to a bivouac area on Bombo Peninsula. Thus the active part of the campaign came to a close.

164. SUMMARY. -- It is believed that the wedge driven across the island by Companies "I" and "K" on the afternoon of September 13th cut off a small Jap outpost which had been sent out to the eastern end of the island, and that they were returning to the Jap garrison on the western point of the island when they encountered Company "I" again. It is also believed that the Japs were successful in sending a boat to the northeastern shore of the island on the night from September 13th through the 18th, bringing in reinforcements and taking off wounded men; and that they finally evacuated the island on the night of September 19th.

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SECTION IV

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

Major C. J. Christianson, Infantry, Supply Officer
Major John A. Dole, Jr., Medical Corps, Regimental Surgeon

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165. PRELIMINARY PLANS

209. Final In the operation of the 27th Infantry on Arundel Island, we were attached to the 43rd Division for supply. The 43rd Division delivered all of our supplies to a beach dump at East Bomboe. The supplies came to Buetting Point and were trans-shipped to East Bomboe by Higgins boats. They had representatives of their 52nd office at both points and were able to handle the supplies. This system worked quite well. It was necessary to anticipate the needs of the 2nd Marine in advance in order to get supply requests acted upon due to the fact that supply installations were so far from Arundel and communication was limited.

b. To assist us in our supply the Navy was to maintain a fifteen Higgins boat pool for our use. Six to eight boats are the most we had available at any one time, due to boat casualties caused by operation of the boats in too shallow water.

c. Due to lack of roads, our plan of supply was to use engineer assault boats with outboard motors and to deliver supplies to the units advancing up the Bomboe Peninsula using the lagoon water route paralleling the advance. This scheme proved satisfactory, and an incredible amount of supplies were moved. Even after roads were built and vehicles brought in to augment our original supply route, we continued to use this route.

d. In addition to our supplies we were also responsible for the supply of the battalion, 172nd Infantry, one battalion, 169th Infantry, Reconnaissance Troop, 43rd Division, 2 Tank Platoons and a Chemical Mortar Platoon with the large amount of ammunition they required.

e. In this operation every effort was made to evacuate the bodies of the dead. Dead were returned on supply boats and delivered to the Graves Registration Service thus avoiding the unpleasant task of picking them up from the battlefield afterwards.

166. TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES

g. In this operation supply was wholly dependent on water transportation. Many serious moments were experienced due to the lack of sufficient boats and the large amount of ammunition and supplies requiring handling. The Higgins boats were used exclusively to move supplies from Bunting Point to East Bamboo. From East Bamboo forward supplies had to be trans-shipped into small engineer assault boats. Initially two out-boards were all that were available for hauling the supplies. Others obtained raised our total to five. These boats were operating constantly

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from dawn till dark. Inability to obtain a glucose not soluble in salt water caused these sectors to break down, and no spare parts were available. Close supervision, limiting their use to tasks absolutely essential, was required to assure the availability of the boats. Had it not been for these boats and motors our supply problem would have been critical. On the return trip the boats would bring out wounded and sick men. The collecting company which was located at East Bamboo, it was a very satisfactory arrangement, much easier for the patients than to have to traverse this distance on an ambulance jeep.

b. Vehicles were used after a bull dozer could be brought in. This took considerable pressure off the engineer boats. Two parallel roads were constructed, one for light transportation and one for heavier transportation.

c. Carrying parties from the battalions, Road and Cannon Company were used. It was necessary to carry to front line units who were forward of the roads and water route and across the peninsula and water to Sapekruan Island.

167. **WATER SUPPLY.** -- Perhaps the most critical one single item of supply in the initial phases of this operation was water. No water was found on Bombo Peninsula for a week. A water distillation unit was operating at Butling Point but could not begin to furnish the amount of water required. Water was found at a spring on Wau Wau Island 8 miles by water from East Bamboo. Using two gasoline boats carrying a 250 gallon water trailer and any available empty 5 gallon water cans, they could, with good fortune, make two trips a day. With all the additional units (who did not have water cans) only a minimal amount of water could be obtained. Fortunately a source of water was taken in our advance. Thereafter, water ceased to be a serious problem.

168. **FOOD SUPPLY.** -- "C" ration on the basis of 2 2/3 rations per day was the main item of the ration. Hot coffee, hot cakes, pastry, sweetmeats, fruits, and fruit pieces were used to augment the ration; prepared daily by the battalion kitchen at East Bamboo. A great amount of spoilage was experienced in the "C" ration. The supply section had to sort over each box and replace spoilage. This had to be done to save the extra burden upon the carrying parties having to carry the additional weight of spoiled cans. This sorting worked a hardship on an already overtaxed supply section.

169. **EVACUATION.** -- First echelon evacuation was accomplished by battalion aid sections plus the assistance of line troops. Collecting company "C", 23rd Medical Battalion, was bivouacked at East Bamboo Village. Casualties from the aid stations were removed by litter bearers from the collecting company to points along Bombo Peninsula where they were loaded on an engineer assault boat and taken to the collecting company. This greatly facilitated the removal of casualties, otherwise it would have been necessary to carry the patients by foot to the collecting company. Patients were evacuated from the collecting company to the clearing company on New Georgia by means of returning supply boats.

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sufficient springs, wells and streams were found to handle all fresh water needs. Front line troops filled canteens and water cans from water sources at hand, chlorinating with Halazone tablets. Both on New Georgia and Arundel water units were established where the greatest majority of troops could be supplied. On the small adjoining islands where no fresh water could be located, salt water distillation units were set up, which will take care of fresh water needs. Vella Lavella was well supplied with water and the two units available were able to cure for the majority of troops. Units located too great a distance from a water point depended on Halazone tablets for chlorination.

c. On New Georgia and Arundel Islands the road building equipment was found to be inadequate. The two D-7 bulldozers performed creditably but were not sufficient in number. On Arundel only one D-7 was available. The D-4 and B-4 bulldozers were found to be too light and in this type of terrain have only road maintenance value. The Delcon power grader and dump trucks could be used only in the rear areas on New Georgia and Arundel due to heavy rains. No bridging or stream crossing equipment was used on New Georgia. On Arundel only the M1 manual boats and outboard motors were used and equipment was found to be sufficient as far as the engineers were concerned. The two D-7 bulldozers performed the heavy construction work while the D-4 took care of much of the road maintenance and miscellaneous jobs. Other heavy road building equipment was not available to the company.

228. LESSONS LEARNED.

a. These operations clearly demonstrated the necessity of heavy bulldozers. The Engineer Combat Battalion should have six caterpillar D-7's or equivalent. It is desirable that there be two D-7 dozers behind each Infantry Regiment in blow. One to pioneer the road, the other to follow up widening and improving the roadway and at the same time being available if the leading dozer should break down.

b. The minimum good is given to the infantry and a maximum of protection to the equipment is afforded when the equipment is worked immediately behind the front line as the advance progresses. It is imperative that the equipment be guarded with an alert, armed patrol that moves with the equipment.

c. It was found that more attention should be given to surveying both with plane table and transit. Often, the front line units operating in dense jungle do not know where they are on the map or the aerial photo. An Engineer survey party supporting the artillery survey, can help considerably in this, at least tying in the regimental command posts and possibly the battalions.

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SECTION II

OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISION SIGNAL COMPANY

1st Col. Lawrence G. Forbes

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229. **INTRODUCTION.** -- Communication on Guadalcanal, following the termination of active combat, followed standard patterns and presented few difficulties. Radio was rarely used except in training, since units were bivouacked near enough to each other to make motor messenger the fastest means of communication when wire lines were broken. Plans were drawn up for alternate positions in the event of attack, but little wire was laid to these positions. Extensive reclamation of wire from battle areas was carried out to supply the wire needed during the rest of our stay on the island. A sizable percentage of the division communication personnel was on the operating Corps and Island communication facilities and constructing semi-permanent pole lines.

230. NEW GEORGIA PHASE.

a. On New Georgia Island the axis of signal communication, as might be expected, were the roads and trails used by the troops in their advance. Communication to XIV Corps was maintained through the 27th Division CP which had underwater cable circuits to Corps Headquarters on Rendova Island. The division circuits to the 37th Division were diverted to provide direct communication to the Corps CP when it moved to New Georgia Island.

b. Circuits to the 27th Infantry initially ran from BJ-W north along Bairoko Trail. Changes in the division plan shifted the axis to run west from BJ-W by road to Twin Hills and thence north along Ziate Trail. This was the axis along which the Division CP, 27th Infantry CP, and the 161st Infantry CP all displaced. Wire lines laid along Bairoko Trail continued in use to serve security elements in the vicinity of B. Bay.

c. Elements of the 161st Infantry moving from the Ziate Trail to Bairoko via Mt. Tirikou laid W-130 wire which was zealously guarded as the principal communication link from the Regimental CP to the battalions in the Bairoko-Engel area. Conversations to Bairoko were relayed by the switchboard operator at Mt. Tirikou. Conversations to Engel were further relayed by the Bairoko switchboard.

d. Lines to the 27th Infantry when it moved to Piru were laid cross-country through the swamp, the wire being brought in by carrying parties. These circuits were erratic, since the lines were extremely tenuous and were frequently "stranded out" in the swamp. Fortunately supplies to Piru by water, leaving the wire route undisturbed.

e. Radio was used extensively during this phase of the operation.

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tion. Regimental CP's and some battalion CP's carried the SCR-284, which operated with a fair degree of reliability. Communication with the 3rd Battalion, 145th Infantry, was entirely by radio while this battalion was moving down from the Mogeni area. The conditions under which this battalion had to operate and the lack of prearrangements made coordination with it extremely difficult.

231. AIRTEL PHASE.

a. At the time that the 27th Infantry on northern Arundel reversed to division control, its only communication with higher headquarters was by two direct SCR-193 radio channels which handled a tremendous amount of traffic daily with the 43rd Division CP near Mogeni. Much of this traffic consisted of reports written by the large number of liaison officers and observers present in the regimental area. The Division CP was located on southern Arundel, the 161st Infantry CP was at Pira in the area formerly occupied by the 27th Infantry. Two battalions of the 161st Infantry held the Bairoko-Rogoni area and the north shore.

b. Communication from the division CP to the 161st Infantry occasioned little trouble. Field wire circuitry laid two miles across southern Arundel joined spiral-four cable laid underwater 1 1/2 miles across the channel to Pira. The 161st Infantry had long lines laid along the shore to its battalions in the Bairoko-Rogoni area. Messages to Rogoni had to be relayed by the Bairoko operator. SCR-193's at Pira and Bairoko provided excellent supplementary service.

c. An 18 mile wire line from Division CP to the 27th Infantry CP at Bomba Village was laid in four days along the eastern shore and in lagoons. Wire and wire crews tramped by 12P and were ferried ashore in rubber boats. This line operated 95% of the time. The rest of the time it was either broken by road building equipment or shorted-out in the water or along the shore. Dependence on water transportation made the simplest repairs an all-day job.

d. Communication with the 1st Battalion which moved to Kolobogara was initially by radio, later by rubber covered cable laid across Blakett Strait. This cable was still in operation when the battalion was relieved by Fiji scouts.

232. ARTILLERY COMMUNICATIONS. -- Artillery wire lines suffered in the same way as other lines but to a greater extent since there were more of them. The 89th Field Artillery Battalion laid wire from below Delta Hills to both Bairoko and Pira. Division Artillery initially laid lines to both Delta and Mt. Hiraemba. None of these lines could have been successfully installed had not communication personnel been supplemented by large carrying parties which carried W-110 cross-country. These lines were often used when other parallel lines went out of service and at times carried the entire burden of traffic from Pira and Bairoko back to division. An SCR-193-284 net linked the various CP's.

233. SUMMARY.

a. Signal communication was hampered by the same difficulties as supply:

- (1) Extended distances, often crowding the transmission range of field signal equipment.
- (2) Lack of roads and the inability to take vehicles

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27TH SIGNAL CO. OPERATOR MAINTAINING RADIO COMMUNICATION WITH TROOPS AT THE FRONT.



COMMUNICATION WIRES INSTALLED THROUGH DENSE JUNGLE ON BAIROKO



SIGNAL CORPS REPAIRMAN AT WORK.



RADIO CAR BEHIND THE LINES RELAYING MESSAGES FROM ADVANCED POSTS AT THE FRONT.



cross-country, which prevented Infantry Battalions from carrying switchboards and high-powered radio sets.

- (3) Depletion of personnel by their use on other islands.
- (4) Insufficient vehicular and water transportation.

(5) Lack of supplies, especially wire W-150 and radio batteries. Drawing signal supplies from dumps on another island was a three-day affair. The scarcity of essential items in the New Georgia area prevented the division from building up a reserve to anticipate the needs of its unit.

b. Rubber-covered telephone cable increased the range of our telephones and was the only suitable wire for underwater lines. As before, the sound-power telephone furnished almost all the communication from battalions to companies and platoons.

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c. Ammunition: Ammunition details were organized from mechanics and repairmen of the company to establish ammunition DP's. In addition to the dump previously mentioned an officer and five men established a DP on Arundel Island 17 September 1943, and one officer and ten men established and maintained a dump at Firu Plantation.

244. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
a. As a result of the operations on New Georgic, the following were submitted as recommendations:

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Lt. Col. Raymond H. Bunshaw, MC

Parastaphis

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The elements of the 25th Medical Battalion were injected into the New Georgia campaign in a piecemeal manner. On July 20th, 1943, Company "A", Collecting, departed from Guadalcanal with its combat team, the 161st. On arrival, the entire combat team was attached to the 37th Division. On July 31st, Company "C", Collecting, left Guadalcanal as part of the 27th Combat Team. At this time, the 161st Combat Team reverted to division control. On August 6th, 1st Platoon, Clearing Company "B" was moved from Guadalcanal to New Georgia. The battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment accompanied the platoon of the Clearing Company.

c. On September 11th the 27th Combat Team with Company "C",
~~5th~~ moved to Arundel Island.

[illegible]

litter hauls became increasingly more difficult until in the final stage of the operations at First Plantation and south of Mt. Tirokumbia it was necessary to hold wounded and sick at Battalion Aid Stations and Collecting Stations because of a five mile swamp belt which separated these installations from the Clearing Station. Evacuation was finally accomplished by boat. The Clearing Station kept pace with the division by utilizing the plectron and leap-frogging forward. Four and limited roads, difficult terrain and climatic conditions frequently taxed the collecting facilities beyond their capabilities. When the five mile swamp belt was encountered as the division progressed towards First Plantation and Bairoko Harbor, a request was submitted to XIV Corps for another Collecting Company. This was not available.

b. On Arundel Island, patients were evacuated by litter and jeep haul from the Battalion Aid Stations to the Collecting Station located in the vicinity of Bombo Village and thence by boat to the Division Clearing Station then located at Laiana Beach, a distance of about 15 miles.

c. On Vella Lavella Island, because of the lack of other hospitalization facilities, Collecting Company "B" was forced to hold patients in the Collecting Station. Evacuation from the island was by LST's which arrived at intervals of from six to ten days. With the arrival of the Clearing Station the Collecting Company was at least partially relieved of this load. Evacuations from Vella Lavella were made to Guadalcanal, after October 1st by sea transport.

247. CARE OF WOUNDED AND SICK.

1. Statistics compiled for the period 21st July - 27th September, 1943, are as follows:

	New Georgia	Vella Lavella	Total
Killed in action	118	22	140
Accidentally killed	3	0	3
Wounded in action	507	72	579
Neuro-psychiatric	125	22	147
Other Diseases	1424	562	2026
Evacuated	2096	666	2782
Returned to duty	893	286	1179

2. Of the neuro-psychiatric patients 16 were officers, 216 were NCO's, 48 Technicians and 746 privates. 54% of all evacuees were neuro-psychiatric. A few patients who might be included in this classification were listed as "evacuated". All these patients were treated with sedation, clean clothes, food and rest. Many were transferred from the Clearing Station to the "Division Rest Camp" located on Seaville Island where after a few days they were returned to duty. The camp on New Georgia provided an example of the serious possibilities of psychoneurosis among the front line troops. Within a period of less than 48 hours on August 10th and 11th, 35 cases of psychoneurosis occurred in two infantry companies. When this fact was reported to the Commanding General, a change of command in the companies and increased vigilance by the Battalion Surgeon promptly rectified the situation.

3. Of the wounded on New Georgia and Arundel Islands, 356

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INFANTRY CASUALTY RECEIVES FIRST AID AT THE FRONT.



MEDICS ENROUTE TO AID STATION WITH INFANTRY CASUALTY.



CASUALTY BEING TREATED AT A BATTALION AID STATION PRIOR TO EVACUATION.



25TH INFANTRY DIVISION CLEARING STATION AT LAIANA BEACH.



were of the upper extremity, 31% in the lower extremity, 1.5% were chest wounds, 15% were head wounds, 9% neck wounds and 8.5% back wounds. No abdominal wounds were encountered. All wounds were debrided and dressed using sulfanilamide. All fractures and extensive soft part wounds were placed in plaster prior to evacuation.

248. MALARIA. -- For the two months period prior to the New Georgia Vella Lavella operations, the division had been on 0.4 grams of atabrine weekly as a prophylaxis. As the division moved into combat the dosage of atabrine for all troops was increased to 0.6 grams a week. The malarial rate for the month of May 1943, was 1867 cases per thousand per annum and in June of the same year, 1240 cases per thousand per annum. Statistics as recorded on New Georgia during the combat period indicated a malarial rate of 935 cases per thousand per annum. Even when allowances are made for unreported and undetected cases during the period it would appear that the division was able to accomplish its mission without any appreciable rise in the incidence of malaria. No adult Anopheles mosquitoes were detected on New Georgia, Arundel or Vella Lavella Islands.

249. REST CAMP. -- A division rest camp was established on Seaville Island. The establishment of a rest camp was valuable in that it prevented the total loss of a number of men who would otherwise have been evacuated to a rear area. Operating under a staff consisting of a Camp Commander, a Surgeon, aid men and cooks, several hundred men suffering from fatigue or convalescing from minor ailments were salvaged. The men were able to obtain better food and regular meals, clean clothes, more rest and quiet and medical attention than were available at the front.

250. MEDICAL SUPPLY. -- On the movement from Guadalcanal to New Georgia each Collecting Company carried 30 days of medical supply for the Combat Team. On the arrival of the Medical Battalion Headquarters this was consolidated and a division dump established in the vicinity of Banda Airfield. Supplies were carried forward through evacuation channels to the front line units, as required. It was necessary to drop some supplies by parachute as the troops approached First Plantation and Bairoko Harbor.

251. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION. -- Each Collecting Company had nine jeep and two 3/4 ton ambulances. The exclusive use of jeeps for medical evacuation was inadequate in that roads became passable only to wide gauge trucks which cut ruts deeper and wider than the jeep. The narrowness of the roads would not allow smaller vehicles to pass. The ambulance was a more suitable means of transportation. This is borne out by the experiences on Guadalcanal. The lack of winches to move the Field Hospital was a handicap when casualty carrying transport was immobilized in mud. The Medical Battalion had winches only on the trucks which were not allowed to use the roads. The evacuation of patients was delayed by the lack of winches.

LESSONS LEARNED.

1. Constant vigilance of the incidence of psychoneurosis is required to detect early any unusual number of cases in any company. Prompt action by command and medical personnel can prevent interfering with the efficiency of the division.

2. While a rest camp is valuable to the division to retain and recuperate personnel in the theatre of operations, the division does not want personnel to divert to this work.

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